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Solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant.
They made desolation; they called it peace.
(Cornelius Tacitus, Agricola 30)
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Ever since Thucydides justified his history by proclaiming the Peloponnesian War a great war and an epochal event for  humanity, 
analysts of events occurring in their own time and place have risked 
accusations of hubris for similar claims. Nonetheless, the first years of the 
twenty-first century seem to portend epochal caesurae. The end of the 
half-millennium-old world capitalist system and the emerging dominance 
of a new form of communication and consciousness qualify these years as 
a time of a dramatic break with the past.
According to Immanuel Wallerstein (2004), the world capitalist system 
began at the start of the sixteenth century and was centered in Western 
Europe. It appears to have entered its death throes at the start of the 
twenty-first century. An even greater change involves the transformation of 
communication. Writing emerged as the dominant communicative form 
about two-and-a-half millennia ago, and printing about the same time 
as capitalism; together they formed a logocentric form of consciousness. 
Midway through the twentieth century, an iconocentric con sciousness 
began to displace logocentrism. Logocentrism is a writing-based commu-
nicative form and iconocentrism is image based.
The chapters that follow concentrate on the United States as a principal 
site of these changes. The United States is and has been the vanguard for 
modern capitalism and the place where iconographic communication has 
developed exuberantly. This is not to say that other countries and regions 
do not participate in the changes, but the United States remains the 
pacesetter and the hegemon.
Systems of political economy and consciousness do not seamlessly 
 succeed one another. Typically, an interregnum intervenes. During such 
interregna, chaos prevails. Among the characteristics of chaotic interregna 
are “wild fluctuations in all the institutional arenas. . . . The world-economy 
is subject to acute speculative pressures . . . [and a] high degree of violence is 
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erupting everywhere” (Wallerstein 2004:87). Most people adjust by relying 
on short-term adaptations using customary methods and strategies. Class 
conflict, as has been the case throughout recorded history, continues to pre-
vail. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it takes the form of “the 
struggle between the spirit of Davos and the spirit of Porto Alegre” (88). 
In the struggle over the system (or systems) that will succeed our existing 
world-system, the fundamental cleavage will be between those who wish to 
expand both liberties—that of the majority and that of the minorities—
and those who seek to create a non-libertarian system under the guise of 
preferring either liberty of the majority or the liberty of minorities. In 
such a struggle, it becomes clear what the role of opacity is in the struggle. 
Opacity leads to confusion, and this favors the cause of those who wish to 
limit liberty (89). 
Needless to say, the ruling classes of the current era favor the nonlibertar-
ian solution. Furthermore, the role of opacity in obscuring communication 
along with analytic and strategic thought looms even larger because of the 
shift from logocentric consciousness to iconocentric consciousness.
While far from resolved, trends and developments in the first decade of 
the twenty-first century favor the nonlibertarian solution. Police state 
controls, pervasive surveillance, and mass incarceration grow apace in the 
United States. At the same time, the U.S. military spreads war, terror, and 
torture in a desperate attempt to maintain its elites and their influence 
over the rest of humanity.
The Risk Society
The Trinity explosion began the risk society on July 16, 1945, in the Jornada 
del Muerto (Journey of Death) desert near Almogordo, New Mexico. It was 
the first test of the atomic bomb. Three weeks later, on August 6, 1945, the 
United States used another atomic bomb to destroy the city of Hiroshima, 
and three days after that, a third bomb blasted Nagasaki.
Ulrich Beck (1986) popularized the term “risk society” to describe a 
social shift from the past when the main hazards faced by humans came 
from the natural world. In the new social world, the main hazards are from 
human products. Beck proposed five principles of the risk society.
First, risks threaten systemic and irreversible harm. Most hazards, 
according to Beck, used to be personal, whereas in the risk society they 
are global. Furthermore, they are often beyond ordinary direct detection. 
For instance, in the case of nuclear explosives, much harm comes from 
 invisible radiation. Beck gave the example of odors in medieval cities as 
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the old style risk: “[H]azards in those days assaulted the nose or the eyes 
and were thus perceptible to the senses, while the risks of civilization today 
typically escape perception and are localized in the sphere of physical and 
chemical formulas”(21). Beck’s bad history and bad science on this last 
point are addressed below.
The second of Beck’s principles refers to a boomerang effect of risks. 
Accordingly, those social strata that initially benefit from producing risks 
eventually turn back and threaten them (23). Genetically modified food 
might exemplify this proposition as the U.S. corporate leaders who profit 
from the products may one day find themselves eating the hazardous food 
they produce. This second principle also relates to the global character 
of modern risks, a communality of fear and insecurity (Van Brunschot, 
Gibbs, and Kennedy 2008:29). 
Third, modern risks create a positive feedback loop in which risks cre-
ate more risks. Modern risks are infinite and create infinite demands for 
reducing them (Beck 1986:23). Risk management has become profitable 
with the ever-expanding market.
Fourth, risk has become the arbiter of social stratification, replacing 
the old class and status system based on unequal distribution of scarce 
resources. In this view, danger, not scarcity, determines social position 
and relations. Moreover, knowledge of risks has become commodified, 
a commodity not everyone can afford, because so far as scientists do not 
recognize risks, they do not exist as social artifacts (Beck 1989:100). This 
means that scientific risk experts have a monopoly on defining what 
dangers society contains. Those who lack technical expertise must rely on 
those who have it, thus removing much of the critical discourse about risk 
from popular politics (1986:71–72).
Fifth, risk pervades public spaces. Private security measures have 
increasingly replaced public safety. This point relates to social stratifica-
tion, as those lower in the social order must rely on more on public space 
and public safety.
These five principles operate as propositions in Beck’s theory of risk. 
They ignore historical reality. Each one makes an invalid distinction 
between archaic kinds of risks and modern risks. Beck’s example of medi-
eval odors neglects the fact that odors, though noxious, are not dangerous, 
whereas a good many serious health hazards provide no direct sensory 
evidence. Moreover, medieval hazards were no less systemic or global. 
The Black Death of the fourteenth century, which devastated Europe, came 
from Asia. The plague bacillus is not directly detectable, and even if it were, 
the public consensus did not have a germ theory of disease (Slack 1988). The 
Black Death tended to strike differentially—according to social stratification. 
The wealthy and mobile were more able to escape than impoverished masses 
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as recounted by Chaucer. Each of Beck’s five propositions suffers from simi-
lar fatal weaknesses. Therefore, why did his risk society thesis gain so much 
intellectual purchase? The answer lies in his political economic theory.
Beck’s political economic theory is anti-Marxist and neoliberal, with 
neoconservative implications. He revealed in his argument that the risk 
society “set [people] free from the social forms of industrial society . . . 
just as during the Reformation people were ‘released’ from the secular 
rule of the Church into society” (Beck 1986:87). He outlined his political 
economy in seven theses. First, welfare states of the West dissolved “class 
culture and consciousness, gender and family roles.” This brought on 
“a social surge of individualization” (87);  second, “ties to a social class recede 
mysteriously into the background. . . . Status-based social milieus and 
lifestyles . . . lose their luster”; third, “[t]his tendency to the  ‘classlessness’ 
of social inequality appears as a textbook example in the distribution of 
mass unemployment” (88); fourth, “[t]he ‘freeing’ relative to status-like 
social classes is joined by a ‘freeing’ relative to gender status. . . . The spiral 
of individualization is thus taking hold inside the family”; fifth, “as indus-
trial society triumphs, it has always promoted the dissolution of family 
morality, its gender fates, its taboos relative to marriage parenthood and 
sexuality, even the reunification of housework and wage labor” (89); sixth, 
“[t]he place of hereditary estates is no longer taken by social classes. . . . 
The individual himself or herself becomes the reproduction unit of the social 
in the lifeworld. . . . What the social is and does has to be involved with 
individual decisions”; seventh, and finally, individualization becomes “a 
historically contradictory process of socialization . . . social movements and 
citizens’ groups are formed in relation to modernization risks and risk 
situations” (90). 
In sum, Beck confused class and status, offering a bizarre mix of 
classical-political economic theory derived from Smith and Ricardo with 
a social phenomenology based on Husserl and Schutz. Beck offers a ver-
sion of Francis Fukuyama’s end of history thesis (1992), with its grounding 
in Alexander Kojève and Leo Strauss’ neoconservatism (Derrida 1993). 
The popularity of Beck’s concepts goes hand in hand with the neoliberal 
bent of the late twentieth century and its neoconservative culmination 
in the beginning of the twenty-first century. Nonetheless, the concept of 
risk has its utility in analyzing contemporary social trends. The British 
anthropologist Mary Douglas developed her concepts of risk about the 
same time as Beck, but with greater relevance to social reality.
Mary Douglas prefaced her 1992 collection of essays, Risk and Blame, 
by saying “The day anthropologists give up their attempt to ground mean-
ings in politics and economics will be a sad day” (ix). In the modern 
contemporary world, “[w]e have disengaged dangers from politics and 
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ideology, and deal with them by the light of science” (4). As Douglas goes 
on to show, before we moderns in industrialized societies become blinded 
by complacency about our superior intellectual grasp, it would be well 
to examine how we, in fact, bend science to the same political and ideo-
logical uses as the taboo-thinking of people from other kinds of societies 
and other times. Different types of cultures offer three different kinds of 
explanations for misfortunes: the morality of the victim, the work of indi-
vidual adversaries in the same society, and the work of outside enemies. 
The kind of explanation and a society’s system of justice “are symptoms of 
the way the society is organized” (6). In complex, modern, industrialized 
societies, people use all three kinds of explanations, sometimes even for 
the same misfortune. Such societies are not governed by rational, scientific 
dedication to projects designed for the common good; occasionally a bit 
of such an orientation creeps into public policies. As Douglas pointed out, 
the taboo-thinking linking danger and morals did not come from lack of 
knowledge. “Knowledge always lacks. Ambiguity always lurks . . . there are 
always loopholes for reading the evidence right.” Science has not banished 
the urge to dominate; industrialization has not deconstructed the rhetoric 
of fear and danger (9). The kinds of dangers identified and the people 
deemed dangerous reflect social structure and the values that sustain it. The 
elite always have right on their side; the marginalized are always to blame.
The reintroduction of the concept of risk may have to do with the revival 
of laissez-faire economics (Lowi 1990). The new meaning of risk, however, 
differed from the one prevailing when laissez-faire economic theory was 
new. Then, it meant great chance—the possibility of great gain or loss. 
Currently, in the sense developed by Beck, usage restricts it to hazard or dan-
ger. Meanings, especially of index concepts like “risk,” change as the momen-
tum of interlocutors shift with respect to the fulcrum of social change. 
These debates often pertain to investments in new technologies, decisions 
to invade, refuse immigration, or to license or withhold consent (Douglas 
1992:24). The modern, Beckian concept of risk helps protect vested indi-
vidualized interests in an individualistic culture such as that of the contem-
porary United States with its expansive capitalist enterprises (28). Along 
with risks comes blame. Lately, the blameworthy look like foreigners who 
hail from oil-rich territories coupled with marginalized, redundant minori-
ties and impoverished Whites in U.S. urban and rural ghettos. Timothy 
McVeigh joins Jose Padilla, Willie Horton, and the Saudi hijackers of 9/11.
Moral Fears
Building on the seminal work of George Herbert Mead and Georg 
Simmel in the first decades of the twentieth century, some social scientists 
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 developed an analytics that focuses on social transactions or interactions. 
Some of the best-known work coming from these interactionists pays spe-
cial attention to deviance. Deviance refers to people and their acts falling 
outside of norms. Erving Goffman, in his study of social stigma, identified 
encounters between normals and deviants as constituting a “primal scene 
of sociology” (1963:13). It is primal because the encounter makes visible 
a founding moment of society; their mutual discomfort shows what most 
routine encounters obscure. Not knowing what another person might do 
makes every social encounter a potential danger, as in the incident when 
a distraught tenant shot at Georg Simmel as he approached a property he 
was managing for his uncle (Frisby 1992:103). A society’s moral system 
offers a general framework for evaluating other individuals, and its norms 
offer behavioral rules for social encounters. Violations of the rules create 
deviance, and those whom others perceive as engaging in the violation 
become deviants.
Critics of the interactionist approach say that it only provides micro-
sociological accounts without connecting interpersonal, small groups to 
larger, macrosociological concepts. While much interactionist work focuses 
on microinteractions, its explanatory power connects with macrosociolog-
ical processes. In her comparative examination of French and U.S. cities, 
Sophie Body-Gendrot argues for just such a link between quotidian life in 
urban settings and globalization. She relies on the concept of fractals or 
Mandelbrot sets, named after the mathematician Benoît Mandelbrot. As 
Body-Gendrot explains, fractal figures have parts that are the same shape 
as the whole but on a different scale. She claims that the fractal concept 
is more than just a metaphor; it defines a model for social organization. 
“It seems that our current societies are undergoing the same process 
of differentiation leading to continuous fractalization and to the same 
unbalance, ‘chaotic order,’ and constant readjustment” (Body-Gendrot 
2000:21). The fractal model harks back to Simmel’s determination to found 
a sociology around the concept of social forms (Simmel 1950:40–57). 
In a similar manner, I argue that interactionist concepts are useful in 
helping explain the epochal change in social organization and the current 
chaotic interlude before new world systems emerge. 
In his investigation of such deviants, or “outsiders,” Howard Becker 
observed that the legislation of rules does not fall from the sky; it is the 
work of what he propitiously called moral entrepreneurs. Their prototype 
is the crusading reformer (1973:147). Upon the institutionalization of 
new rules, rule enforcers police them (155). Becker’s structural analysis 
of deviance has borne fruit in case studies, such as Joseph Gusfield’s on 
temperance (1963) and drunk driving (1981) and Stephen Pfohl’s on child 
abuse (1977) to cite some of the better known ones. Studies of deviance, 
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or as Alexander Liazos (1972) sardonically remarked, “nuts, sluts, and 
perverts,” often abstracted the deviance process, and therefore neglected 
the context of social struggle. The kinds of people and milieus tend to 
be the detritus of profound, and often violent, social conflicts (Piven 1981), 
the walking wounded. As Becker pointed out in his original analysis, moral 
entrepreneurs, moral interpreters, and rule makers are not drawn from hoi 
polloi; they are, or represent, societies’ elites. Deviance is not conferred by just 
anyone, but by those who have the greatest stake in either keeping the status 
quo or sometimes moving it backward to a previous one. The better students 
of deviance recognized this fact all along. Deviance making is an exercise in 
social power, to keep it or get more of it. Stanley Cohen (1980) introduced 
the phrase “moral panics” to designate the construction of a moral state of 
emergency as part of elitist power strategies, which called for quick social 
rule making and rectification of class boundaries. Dario Melossi specified the 
historical sequence and class conflict context for such moral panics.
Melossi reinterpreted Rusche and Kirchheimer’s classic Punishment and 
Social Structure (1939) to account for U.S. criminal justice policies and 
practices since 1970. His thesis states that criminal justice becomes harsher 
when elites believe the working class is gaining political and economic 
strength. The elites respond as if this presented a moral crisis in society.
[L]abor insubordination tends to be interpreted by moral elites as an aspect 
of general moral malaise of society. . . . Agencies of social control . . . react 
to what they perceive as a moral crisis without necessarily being cognizant 
of the more immediate economic aspects of the crisis. . . . Therefore, follow-
ing social situations during which elites see their hegemony challenged, two 
things tend to happen simultaneously, apparently linked only in the murky 
atmosphere of a “public mood”: people work harder for less money, and 
prisons fill beyond capacity. 
(Melossi 1993:266)
Writing in 1993, Melossi limited his interpretation to the cycles of capital-
ism that go through periods of waxing and waning working-class strength. 
It is easy to expand his thesis. Instead of assuming the objectivity of a 
moral crisis, the morality crisis of the 1960s came from the elite’s reac-
tion to working-class strength of the postwar period. The same pattern 
of harsher state controls can apply to the current crisis of capitalism; in 
this case, it is not so much the strength of the working class as the profit-
ability squeeze. The elites create a moral crisis that takes several forms 
and replicates the three kinds of reactions to danger that Mary Douglas 
identified. First, outsiders, the impoverished, and economically dependent 
are blamed for their own moral failings. As Reaganism and Thatcherism 
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attacked welfare in the United States and Britain, in other countries, elites 
stirred up nativist reactions; second, while the welfare state shrunk, tending 
more toward a regulatory state (Braithwaite 2000; Rose 2000), redundant 
and dependent populations were demonized and dangerized (Lianos and 
Douglas 2000); third, terrorists became a new outside enemy. Terrorism 
replaced communism as the gravest threat to the capitalist world order. 
National moral panics and the moral crusades against a variety of deviants 
reflect the larger crisis of the world capitalist system. 
Modern Capitalism and Its Crises
Modern capitalism is industrial capitalism. It originated with the indus-
trial revolution and the national revolutions in America and France at the 
end of the eighteenth century. Chapter 2 briefly traces its history to its 
collapse in the twenty-first century. Marx’s analyses of capitalism contain 
two features salient to current and future social trends. First, capitalism 
depends on continual change, like a shark that must keep moving lest it 
drown. The point is captured in the following extracts:
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instru-
ments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with 
them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of 
production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition 
of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of 
production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting 
uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier 
ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and vener-
able prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become 
antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is 
holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his, 
real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.
***
The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the 
bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe.
***
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a 
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. 
(Marx and Engels 1848:207)
The second salient feature of capitalism is its falling rate of profit (Harvey 
2005). The more the capitalist system functions over time, the smaller will 
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be the rate of profit (Marx 1894, vol. 3, part III). When the overall rate of 
profit approaches zero, the moving shark of capitalism stalls and drowns.
Throughout the nineteenth century, capital expanded in Western 
Europe and North America mainly by exploiting domestic markets. 
A crisis struck toward the end of the nineteenth century leading to changes 
in the system. Domestic markets alone, especially in Europe, declined in 
profitability; competitive capitalism gave way to monopoly capitalism and 
imperialism (Lenin 1917); capitalism revitalized itself by monopolistic 
consolidation and neocolonialism in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific.
The next crisis occurred in the period of 1968–1973. It was simultane-
ously an economic crisis brought on by rising wages and costs coupled 
with a political crisis. The uprisings of 1968 in Chicago, Mexico City, Paris, 
Prague, and other locations around the globe signaled the political part of 
the crisis. Capitalism once again found a solution in a reaction against the 
political demand, followed by what has come to be called globalization. 
Globalization brought modern capitalism to the least developed parts of 
the world, and invaded countries and regions that had called themselves 
communist, notably China, Eastern Europe, Russia, and Vietnam.
Reaganism and Thatcherism, neoliberal economics, and neoconserva-
tive politics replaced the liberal consensus that has governed the West since 
1848. “The cultural shock of 1968 unhinged automatic dominance of the 
liberal center. . . . The center abandoned the theme of developmentalism . . . 
and replaced it with the theme of globalization” (Wallerstein 2004:85–86). 
Without ascribing causative force, the attacks of September 11, 2001 (from 
here on 9/11), marked the end of the modern era and the beginning of 
postmodernity. As the capitalist world system founders, a chaotic period 
has ensued, marked by wild fluctuations in all institutions, acute specula-
tive pressures in the world economy, and outbreaks of violence, which do 
not surrender to conventional exercises of force by the leading imperialist 
states (87). The political-economic system of capitalism, which had come 
to dominate the world since its beginnings in the late eighteenth century, 
faces its death in the early years of the twenty-first century. At the same 
time, communication, culture, and consciousness have been changing at 
an accelerating pace in which the millennia-old reign of Logos is replaced 
by a new form, Iconos.
Spectacles and Icons
Historically, writing, laws, and the state coemerged. As bureaucratic 
social organizations, states need record keeping for such vital concerns 
as  taxation. Keeping fiscal and similar records typically intertwined 
with religious applications. The ancient empires—Egyptian, Mayan, 
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Mesopotamian, Indus and Ganges in India, and Chinese—exhibit writing 
systems that recorded matters of the heavens, conquests, successions, and 
similar imperial events, along with fiscal and administrative matters. These 
early imperial states often published written laws regulating all manner 
of life within their territorial purview. Consolidation of the state political 
form was logocentric from its beginning. Eric Havelock (1963) and Harold 
Innis (1950), among others, discussed the transition in ancient Greece 
from a dominant performative communicative form, Mythos, to a lexical 
one, Logos. The polis came to dominate the Greek political world along 
with Greek alphabetic writing. Formerly dominant performance, rather 
than suffusing all social institutions, became increasingly circumscribed 
into theater and, especially in Athens, political decision making and eco-
nomic exchange in the agora.
Just as the state and writing go hand in hand, early capitalism and 
printing appeared in Europe at about the same time. In the waning years of 
the fifteenth century, three technologies loosed the capitalist form on the 
world: moveable type, double-entry book keeping, and navigational and 
sailing ship refinements. Printed books and documents came from move-
able type. The ability to record investments and returns by bookkeeping 
was essential for tracking the lifeblood of capitalism—profit. Improved 
navigation, charting, and sailing made possible exploration and trade 
with Asia and Africa and also the exploitation of the Western hemisphere. 
The last greatly enlarged the European money economy making possible 
expanded trade with Asia.
The advent of modern industrial capitalism injected the commodity 
form into social relations. By the middle of the twentieth century, Guy 
Debord argued that the society of the spectacle prevailed. His argument 
proceeded as follows. First, societies where modern production prevails 
present a massive accumulation of spectacles. “All that once was directly 
lived has become mere representation. . . . The spectacle is not a collec-
tion of images; rather, it is a social relationship between people that is 
mediated by images” (Debord 1967:12). These mediating spectacles are 
signs of capitalist production. “The spectacle is capital accumulated to the 
point where it becomes image” (24). The society of the spectacle occurs 
when “the commodity completes its colonization of social life” (29). 
Debord relied heavily on Marx, especially Chapter I of Capital (1867). The 
same basic insights are found in Simmel’s Philosophy of Money (1900) and 
the widely anthologized “Metropolis and Mental Life” extracted from that 
larger work (1950). David Frisby (1992:167) quoted Christoph Asendorf 
(1993:95) as saying, “[p]reviously trusted things have become a plurality 
of commodities, about which one can relate nothing since they have no 
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history.” Following Debord, Marx, and Simmel, the history of modernity is 
the history of the commodification of all social relations.
Freud and George Herbert Mead claimed that the ego, or I in the case of 
Freud and the self for Mead, came from social relations. For both, those 
relations are mediated by signs. “[T]he character of the ego is a precipitate 
of abandoned object cathexes” (Freud 1923:19). “So the self reaches its full 
development . . . by thus becoming an individual reflection of the general 
systematic pattern of social or group behavior . . .” (Mead 1934:158). 
This line of thought together with the argument from Debord means 
that modern persons depend for their identities on commodity relations, 
which are disguised and occluded social relations in a capitalist system of 
production. 
Communicative forms began breaking away from the logocentric 
mediation by verbal symbols, during the twentieth century, accelerating 
with the advent of television midcentury. Instead of verbal symbols, images 
took over more of the communicative load. By the end of the  century, 
images began to edge out words. The iconic relation, where the sign is 
based on resemblance, brought people into the age of the  iconocentric. 
This development appears on the millions of computer screens that are 
dominated by icons. Social relations, already commodified, became image 
based. The shift from the modern to the post modern is a shift from logo-
centrism to iconocentrism.
Controlling the Masses
Elites have the upper hand despite their small numbers, because they can 
control the masses. Through the ages, they have relied on their position 
to shape and direct essential social institutions—the economy, politics, 
education, and so on. One of the most powerful of those institutions has 
been the state.
One view of the state emphasizes its role as arbiter. This Lockean 
kind of idea underlies the rationale for late modern neoliberalism. 
Conceiving of the state as arbiter limits its legitimate function to offer-
ing institutions for dispute resolution. To varying extents, political elites 
during the period of liberal consensus—from 1848 to the late twentieth 
 century—subscribed to this viewpoint. From time to time and place to 
place in the developed world, versions of more leftist orientation led to 
more social democracy and culminated in the welfare state in Europe 
and, to a lesser extent, North America. When the ideology of the liberal 
consensus began to unravel in the 1970s, the liberal consensus turned into 
neoliberal regulation.
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Always operating alongside the arbiter perspective, the other  ideological 
orientation about states took the Hobbesian approach. This viewpoint 
treats the state as the ultimate power. There are left versions of this. Among 
them, social theorists such Pierre Bourdieu, Foucault, and Habermas take 
a realist position. They critically analyze state power and, to some extent, 
discuss ways to limit it. Those of right political orientation take an apolo-
getic stance regarding state power. Neoconservative spokespeople went 
beyond apologias; they celebrated state power, advocating its extension 
into imperialistic adventures.
States rarely exercise power without institutionalizing it under law. The 
liberal governments Antonio Gramsci analyzed used their power as hege-
monic control. As opposed to authoritarian control, hegemony depends 
on maintaining widespread consensus. It does so by relying on the state’s 
role as arbiter. Instead of using forceful state apparatuses such as police 
and armies, the hegemonic state relies on setting the ground rules for what 
counts as truth, value, and legitimacy. Relatively subtle adjustments in law 
and other regulatory functions ensure continued elite supremacy while 
still keeping support of the masses.
Historically, the interwar period introduced a hiatus in the hegemonic 
development of the liberal state. Assorted authoritarian regimes arose. 
Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and the Stalinist Soviet Union exemplify them. 
They use two tactics. They terrify the masses with threats of enemies, both 
internal and external. To escape the monsters underneath the beds and the 
barbarians at the gates, the masses allow the state extraordinary power over 
themselves. In the United States, this tactic reveals itself as the promotion 
of the dual fears of crime and terrorism (Altheide 2002, 2006, 2009a).
The other tactic uses the machinery at the disposal of the state for direct 
physical control. Domestically, they increase police state tactics. Outside 
the metropolis, the massive armamentarium extends control by military 
force. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq are part of the second tactic. 
Twenty-first century imperialism of this kind serves the same purposes 
as the military exercises used during the period of neocolonialism when 
Britain, France and, to a lesser extent, other capitalist states, extended 
control over markets and resources in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. Fear 
and force operate in tandem to sustain the elites of the capitalist center in 
the United States, its Anglophone associates, and other capitalist centers 
in Europe and Japan. 
Law and Terrorism
The United States has built the largest counterterrorism establish-
ment in the world. It dates from the early 1980s when the first federal 
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 counterterrorism laws allowed the military to chase enemies anywhere 
on earth so long as they called them terrorists. After 9/11, the apparatus 
expanded with a massive reorganization of government agencies to go 
with military adventures and invasions. Other Anglophone, metropolitan 
countries, especially Great Britain and Australia; followed suit. In these 
countries, the counterterrorism apparatuses depend on laws and legal 
rationales. These legal structures contrast with regimes using authoritar-
ian and customary methods. Countries such as Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, 
and Syria do not put so fine a point on repressive measures as those where 
the common law offers a modicum of protection against state power.
Within the United States, a new government agency took over many 
internal control functions by absorbing formerly independent agen-
cies such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which became 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). Apparently lacking either a literary or histori-
cal sense of irony, U.S. legislators and bureaucrats missed the allusions to 
Kurt Vonnegut’s Ice-Nine (1963) or the Nazi RSHA (Reichsicherheitsamt), 
the central security apparatus of the SS. Other agencies and functions 
retained their independence like the FBI or turned from mainly foreign 
activities such as the National Security Agency (NSA) to devote more of 
their energies to surveilling Americans.
Carrying out the counterterrorism legal mandate in the United States 
has taken the form of rounding up the usual suspects. A swarm of inves-
tigations led to a string of prosecutions, resulting in few trials and con-
victions, many of which count as ludicrous while others are more tragic. 
John Walker Lind and Jose Padilla fit in the tragic category. Among the 
outrageous are the Lackawanna Six (Temple-Raston 2007), the Fort Dix 
case (Belczyk 2009), the so-called Virginia paintball terrorists sentenced 
to 15 and 20 years respectively (Fox News 2004), and the plight of Sami 
Al Arian (Shaulis 2008). The Detroit case, in which most convictions were 
reversed (Detroit News 2004), is somewhere between outrageous and just 
plain ludicrous as is the alleged plot to blow up the Sears Tower, which has 
yet to result in any convictions although federal prosecutors plan a third 
trial (New York Times 2009a). The case of Steve Kurtz almost fits in its own 
category as unbelievable unless one accepts the notion that the world is a 
very different place than most people think. He is an artist and art profes-
sor prosecuted for art terrorism (Duke 2004; New York Times 2008).
Because of its reliance on legal justifications, counterterrorism policies 
and practices by the United States government encountered jurispruden-
tial resistance. Various attempts to resist through legal means have used the 
Anglo-American traditions with their tools to limit state power, though 
a few recent court decisions affirmed basic rights. Despite some legal 
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 victories, the state remains the main actor in this type of social control. 
All others react to it.
Terror, Law, and Torture
As a generalization, states using torture also generate terror laws, often 
called anti- or counterterrorism; the United States is a case study of the 
phenomenon. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States 
developed torture expertise along with cadres of trained personnel. 
During the Cold War, it exported torture to allies and proxy regimes. In 
the last decades of the twentieth century, crime hysteria and an expansive 
crime-control apparatus prepared the U.S. populace to accept torture. The 
current war on terror combines U.S. imperialism and racism with an ideo-
logically prepared population and laws and organizations enabling the use 
of torture. Other states using torture may differ in historical particulars, 
but the generalization appears to hold, as it derives from expanding state 
control.
Recent revelations emanating from a variety of U.S. government agen-
cies and affiliated private organizations reveal their use of torture in con-
nection with the Global War on Terror, GWOT in government-speak. The 
manner of the revelations suggests torture is something new. It is not. 
The United States is a torturing nation. During the colonial era and 
the early republic period, America relied on torture as a way to control 
the indigenous population, convicts, indentured servants, and slaves. 
Once established in the nineteenth century, municipal police forces used 
torture as part of interrogations—the so-called third degree. After the 
Second World War, the U.S. military and intelligence agencies developed 
torture techniques and mind control as part of clandestine Cold War 
 tactics. The techniques were exported to authoritarian regimes, especially 
in Latin America, via the School of the Americas training center.
Although most commonly associated with interrogation, torture 
serves other purposes also. Deterrent torture discourages (or encourages) 
a population regarding certain activities. Before the Civil War, owners 
encouraged work by torturing slaves; after the Civil War, the freed slaves 
were discouraged from seeking betterment through torture and lynching. 
Another effect of torture aims at dehumanizing the victims to turn them 
into docile creatures. Simultaneously, it dehumanizes the torturers by bru-
talizing them. Deterrent and dehumanizing tortures represent concomi-
tant forms of terrorism. Imperialistic enterprises have relied on torture 
historically and in the present. It is not, therefore, accidental that reports 
of torture arose with the so-called counterterror wars against Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Torture remains part of the imperialist toolbox.
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Although the use of torture diametrically contradicts basic humanistic 
ideals of democracy—the Anglo-American legal tradition and what is pro-
moted as Americanism—public opinion in the United States generally 
supports its use. Torture has a certain populist appeal. Lynching was a 
populist practice, usually accompanied by torture. The widespread use 
of torture accompanying public executions under the Ancien Régime in 
Europe also attests to its popular appeal. American public opinion in its 
support draws on populist thirst for revenge and retribution.
Increasingly, documentary evidence shows that the G. W. Bush regime 
planned the use of torture. The intelligence agencies employed torture for 
all their main purposes—interrogation, deterrence, and dehumanizing. 
The political leadership relied on its populist appeal. While abjuring the 
former regime’s torture policies, the Obama regime has avoided investi-
gations and prosecutions. There remains a question about whether the 
practice has stopped.
Camps, Gallows, Ghettos, Gulags, and Prisons
Spatial restriction of targeted, marginalized populations is not new. Jewish 
ghettos had a long history in Europe before the Nazis established new 
ones as part of the Drang Nach Osten. Residential segregation grew in U.S. 
cities during the twentieth century. Lagers or concentration camps made 
their first appearance in the United States with Indian reservations (Biolsi 
2007). As a number of historians and social analysts have pointed out, 
prisons are a phenomenon of industrial capitalism.
Despite its motto as the land of the free, the United States today is the 
most incarcerating country in the world by a wide margin and may even 
hold first place in human history. Critiques of this mass incarceration 
point to multiple causative factors that have been interacting over several 
decades. In keeping with that multiple causation, contemporary mass 
incarceration in the leading capitalist society reflects a set of confluent 
social and cultural trends of late- and postmodernity.
Almost half of those currently imprisoned in the United States 
are African American, and most of them lived in the urban ghettos. The 
same holds true for other sequestered minorities, such as Latinos and 
Native Americans. The pattern suggests a conduit from ghetto to prison, 
greased by carceral practices in state apparatuses of control but made 
possible by the overall workings of the political economy that made those 
populations marginal and redundant in the first place. 
Another means of control does not use direct physical restraint. People 
on probation or parole, along with illegal aliens not captured by immigra-
tion authorities, make up a subpopulation whose mobility is not curtailed 
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but restricted. The rest of the population in the United States is subjected 
to increasing degrees of surveillance.
The mobile–but-surveilled majority face a barrage of electronic devices. 
National intelligence agencies in the United States use a variety of tech-
niques for eavesdropping. Cameras are coming into greater use. They 
already surveil most public places in urban Great Britain. In a sense, this 
mass surveillance reproduces the surveillance under the French Ancien 
Régime, except that instead of informers, the current approach relies 
on electronics. Another comparison is that of the German Democratic 
Republic during the Cold War with its STASI and their use of hundreds of 
thousands of informants.
Meanings of Capital Punishment
Persistence of capital punishment in the United States in the face of 
its abolition in most of the developed world offers a glimpse at the 
importance of fear by control agents. Most countries in the world have 
abolished  capital punishment. Many others have restricted it to excep-
tional crimes. Only a few, including the United States, still execute. With 
the possible exception of China, where the actual number of executions 
remains  uncertain, the death penalty cannot serve instrumental goals 
(Garland 2005). Studies have shown it has no deterrent effect, and pre-
cise talion retribution has always been impossible. Its main function is 
expressive.
China, Saudi Arabia, and the United States are among the most pro-
lific executioners. Capital punishment has different expressive roles in 
these countries according to their different cultural traditions. In China it 
demonstrates the importance of social cohesion. Chinese predominantly 
view it in terms of deterrence, both general and specific including death 
as incapacitation (Ho 2005; Jiang et al. 2007; Liang et al. 2006). In Saudi 
Arabia, it supports a religious and traditional autocratic regime, and in the 
United States, it serves as a form of revenge and terror.
Capital punishment has long been a form of state terror. The term 
“terrorism” is often traced to la Terreur of the French Revolution. 
Robespierre and Saint Just, both opponents of capital punishment generally, 
nonetheless led the terror and explained its necessity. After the counterrev-
olution of Thermidore, the White Terror terrorized the masses whereasthe 
Red terror (la Terreur) terrorized the aristocracy. (Mayer 2000).
Another famous historical episode of state terrorism came out of the 
Bolshevik Revolution. First, the various parties involved in the postrevo-
lutionary civil war used terror. Then, Stalin used legalized terrorism to 
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consolidate his power in the 1930s purges (Mayer 2000; Overy 2004; 
Thurston 1996).
Following the Chinese Revolution of 1949, Mao started the Cultural 
Revolution to eliminate vestiges of feudal hierarchy. Although the contin-
ued control of the Cultural Revolution by Mao and the party leadership 
remains disputed, in practice, terrorism was widely employed, including 
capital punishment. With the capitalist counterrevolution, the government 
leadership has used capital punishment to manage a potentially explosive 
social situation (Lu and Zhang 2005).
Religious rationales for capital punishment can be traditional, as in 
Saudi Arabia, or vengeful as in the United States. Traditional Koranic jus-
tice underpins the Saudi monarchy. In the United States, an overwhelm-
ingly Christian country both socially and culturally, capital punishment 
fulfills a fundamentalist creed. It also serves to terrorize marginalized 
populations as did lynching. In both religious and terroristic uses, it 
retains popular support (Lifton and Mitchell 2000; Sarat 2001). 
Even in abolitionist countries, public opinion still favors it. The history 
of abolition in Europe reveals the relation most clearly. Before its aboli-
tion, the public generally supported it; after its abolition support gradu-
ally declined (Zimring 2003). In Latin America, where the death penalty 
has been abolished longest, public opinion is nearly split (Briceño-León, 
Carmadiel, and Avila 2006). In contrast, public opinion in retentionist 
countries, including the United States and China, shows two-thirds to 
three-fourths in favor of capital punishment. Laws, politically framed dis-
courses, and public policy shape, channel, and articulate public opinion 
thereby giving form to the meaning of the death penalty.
The Emergence of  Iconocentric Dominance
Coupled with an epochal shift in the central and hegemonic political 
economy from capitalist to a postcapitalist world system, a revolution has 
begun to occur in communication and consciousness. This revolution 
shifts the form of communication from one that is logocentric, mainly 
represented by print, to one that is iconocentric, representation via images. 
Iconic representation refers to what C. S. Peirce identified as a kind of sign 
relation. He distinguished it from two others: the symbolic and the indexi-
cal (Deledalle 2000; Peirce 1960). This Peircean semiotic meaning of iconic 
representation differs from, but, to a degree, overlaps with the meaning of 
iconic associated with religious icons. In the overlapping area of meaning, 
analysis of the Biblical injunction against icons and iconoclastic move-
ments throughout history present opportunities to link iconic representa-
tion with social changes.
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A number of thinkers have noted changes in communicative technol-
ogy. Perhaps the best known is Marshall McLuhan (1964; McLuhan and 
Fiore 1967), but he was preceded by his mentor Harold Innis (1951) who 
was contemporary with the classicist Eric Havelock. All three argued for 
a link between communicative technology and changing social relations, 
cultural forms, and consequently, changes in collective consciousness.
The argument begins with Havelock’s (1963, 1983) analysis of ancient 
Greek culture. He said that sometime in the seventh century BCE, Greek 
communication and thought shifted from one grounded in mythos to 
one built around logos. Mythos was a performative kind of thought and 
communication, which depended on presence. Logos was associated with 
writing. It allowed for increasing abstraction. Printing ushered in another 
era with attendant changes in communication, thought, and society. As 
McLuhan famously pointed out, the advent of electronic media in the 
twentieth century not only changed the way modern peoples commu-
nicate but also think. The electronic media’s pervasiveness has mediated 
all other forms of communication (Auslander 2008), and therefore, all 
social intercourse and social relations. Finally, computerized electronic 
communication began the process whereby the logocentric mode of com-
munication and thought gives way to the iconocentric—an image-based 
mode.
Therefore, twenty-first century postmodernity portends not only a 
postcapitalist world but also a postlogocentric one—an iconocentric 
world. These two shifts—the end of the capitalist world system and the 
end of logocentrism giving way to iconocentrism—mark the postmodern 
era in all social and cultural areas.
Such enormous changes would presumably produce generalized and 
diffuse anxieties, which people often displace onto more manageable 
and concrete entities—scapegoats of all kinds. Powerful elites use these 
anxieties; they magnify and exacerbate them for control of the masses. 
The ensuing period of chaos predicted by world-system theory may well 
lead to an oppressive future system, a police state style dystopia. There 
are, however, discourses of liberation that work against that eventuality. 
Those discourses use tools that heretofore mainly belonged to ruling elites. 
They rely on the broad ground of popular culture and will have to include 
increasing deployment of icons. The recent history of shifts in the arts and 
humanities provide a sense of direction for discourses of liberation.
Modernism to Postmodernism and beyond
Modernism should be distinguished from modernity. The latter refers to a 
period of social arrangements and technological developments beginning 
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roughly with the twentieth century. Modernism, on the other hand, takes 
in cultural developments in the arts and humanities. 
As cultural artifacts, the arts offer texts for nondiscursive reading. More 
subjective and context dependent, they yield differing perspectives on 
social realities. By adding perspectives, they permit more complete, and 
often more profound, analyses when coupled with traditional discursive 
sources. The arts represent social trends even as they contribute to shaping 
them. Historically, the arts have represented social trends before socio-
logical discourses have reported them (Best and Kellner 1997 citing Shlain 
1991; Jameson 1981).
Modernism and postmodernism have a number of different mean-
ings. In part, the differences arise from disciplinary orientations. They 
also depend on interpreters’ ideological orientations. Modernism usually 
refers to the cultural aspects of modern times. The beginning and end of 
the modern period reflects different interpretations including those of his-
tory, philosophy, and the social sciences. Different meanings of modern-
ism give way to an array of different meanings of postmodernism. Some 
interpreters deny the very existence of postmodernism. For the purpose of 
this book, modernism refers to cultural developments since the late nine-
teenth century. Impressionism in art and music, realism in literature, and 
Nietzsche in philosophy signaled the coming of modernity in the twenti-
eth century. Representative developments in other areas include relativity 
and quantum mechanics in physics, psychoanalysis, extensions of suffrage, 
and the establishment of sociological studies as an academic discipline.
Just as modernism in the arts anticipated modernity, so postmodern-
ism has anticipated postmodernity. For example, some analysts locate the 
earliest signs of postmodernism in the architectural trends of the 1950s. In 
other respects, many analysts cite the 1950s as high modernism, giving the 
term postmodern to aesthetic and philosophical trends and developments 
after 1968. The argument of this book places signs of postmodern innova-
tions in cultural practices beginning in the 1970s, and increasingly so in 
the following decades, to the end of the twentieth century. Postmodernity, 
in contrast, refers to the period roughly beginning with the twenty-first 
century and coincident with postcapitalism.
Opportunities for Liberation in Chaotic Interregna
During the periods of chaos between the end of one dominant world 
system and the emergence of another present opportunities for libera-
tion from repression. Repression is used in two different contexts. One is 
psychological, the Freudian kind of repression, and the other is political. 
Links are possible through the thought of Freud and Marx. In both, the 
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Freudian and Marxian sense, consciousness liberates decision making. 
Without consciousness, people are driven by forces outside their control. 
Unconscious impulses play the role on the psychological plane; propagan-
distic manipulation does it on the political. Liberation from both kinds of 
control calls for increased consciousness.
During periods of chaos, such as that beginning in the twenty-first 
century, strange attractors can produce a butterfly effect. That is, relatively 
small factors in initial conditions can produce great effects in a succeeding 
system. That possibility makes attempts to gain freedom from domination 
and achieve greater consciousness more possible. It also makes it more 
likely to affect future social conditions (Kellert 2008).
Late modern repression has taken several different but related forms. 
One is based on the actuarial society. The actuarial approach is a way to cal-
culate risk and take steps to reduce its extent (Feeley and Simon 1992). The 
other form is the control society. That approach uses techniques and tactics 
to control mass societies. These include, but are not limited to, physical 
force, propaganda, suppression of information, and obscurantism.
Fighting against both forms of repression entails getting one’s hands 
dirty. The sociologist of work, Everett C. Hughes (1958), spoke of the 
need for social researchers to get their hands dirty by direct observation 
of social acts and social relations. Jean-Paul Sartre (1948) used the dirty 
hands motif in a different context, that of the revolutionary. In both cases, 
greater consciousness, analytic understanding, and political praxis require 
involvement in social realities. Dirty hands also can imply a burden of guilt, 
as in Žižek’s (2008a:c.5) discussion of Leninist versus Stalinist objective 
guilt. Intellectuals play a vital role in liberation. Albert Camus authored one 
of the noteworthy discussions of that role in The Rebel (L’Homme Révolté 
1951), in which he argued, pace Descartes, I rebel, therefore we are.
Many of today’s intellectuals discussing ways to resist emerged from 
the crucible of 1968. Among the most notable, discussed in detail, are the 
relevant thoughts of Badiou, Rancière, and Žižek. Their ideas apply to a 
newly emerging world proletariat. This new proletariat occupies the fave-
las and banlieue of urban centers in the developing world.
These new proletarians can be mobilized partly through the work of 
intellectuals who can provide them with deconstructive and subversive 
discourses. Recognizing the emergence of iconocentric communication and 
consciousness, subversive discourses of resistance must use the iconic forms.
Structure of the Book
This first introductory chapter gives an overview of the argument of 
the book. Chapters 2 and 3 lay the theoretical foundations. Chapter 2 
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reviews the development of the capitalist world system and shows that 
capitalism as we know it has reached its senescence with its demise already 
underway. 
Chapter 2 also analyzes the development and role of the state in the 
exercise of social control. It begins with brief critical summaries of thought 
about the state from Aristotle, to Hobbes and other Enlightenment phi-
losophers, and finally twentieth century analysts like Weber, and Carl 
Schmitt. Late modern social analysts such as Pierre Bourdieu and his 
symbolic violence (1997), Michel Foucault’s governmentality (1978), 
and Jürgen Habermas’ communicative action (1984) have described state 
control and offered ways for people to enlarge their freedom from it. The 
analysis addresses the state as both a political and cultural institution. 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is contrasted to the authoritarian regimes 
of Fascism and Stalinist communism. It explicates strategies of authoritar-
ian control, and shows how the hegemonic approach under current liberal 
democracies is giving way to authoritarian strategies in advanced capitalist 
societies, especially the United States and Britain. 
The next three chapters address the control of the masses by elites 
in the late modern era. They offer a review of empirical data. Chapter 4 
shows how advanced capitalist states use law to terrorize domestic popula-
tions and populations in peripheral areas of the world system. Chapter 5 
examines how torture has played a prominent role in terror and control. 
Chapter 6 looks at physical restraint in the form of capital punishment, 
ghettos, prisons, gulags, and lagers combined with increasing reliance on 
technologies to surveil mass populations.
Chapter 7 traces the revolution in communication and consciousness 
that began around the mid-twentieth century. Using Peirce’s theory of 
semiosis, it shows how civilizations have relied on a logocentric form for 
two-and-a-half millennia. With the advent of electronic media, especially 
since the middle of the twentieth century, reliance is shifting to an icono-
centric approach. It describes a shift from verbal forms of communication 
and consciousness to those based on images.
In Chapter 8 the argument turns to the arts. It interrogates the arts 
to get a better grasp of the function of fear in the changing political 
economy—showing how the arts reflect and represent common sensi-
bilities, often presenting them in ways not yet articulated by discursive 
means.
Chapter 9 reviews means of social control over the masses by the  ruling 
elites. It shows how all forms of social control, formal and informal, have 
resisted liberation. The repressive apparatuses of the state depend on 
repressive cultural controls. Cultural controls help ensure repression of dis-
courses of liberations. They commonly do not rely on outright  censorship; 
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instead, they use control of mass media and implicit understandings of 
what counts as credible, and even how credibility is  measured.
The last chapter reviews various approaches to fighting against 
repression. It provides an analysis and critique of several popular inef-
fective approaches. Then it explicates and evaluates those that hold more 
promise. The last part of this chapter consists of a conclusion that points 
the way toward the specific kind of discourses of rebellion needed in the 
future.
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Capitalism’s Collapse
The collapse of capitalism does not presage the socialist utopia upon which twentieth century revolutionaries pinned their hopes. Nor does 
it mean the end of capital as the basis for the economy. The capitalism 
that is collapsing is the kind of political economy regnant since the early 
nineteenth century, centered first in northern Europe, then in the settler 
states of North America and Australia, and finally in Japan and other parts 
of Asia. It is the kind of industrial capitalism described and analyzed by 
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Its essential features include free wage 
labor, private property, and a regulatory state. The successor system has yet 
to form. That position is up for grabs.
Immanuel Wallerstein (2003) has argued that “[t]he world capitalist 
system is, for the first time, in true systemic crisis” (223). Inherent insta-
bilities in the system caused the crisis. With its breakdown, the longtime 
dominance of capital no longer sustains a global political economy. The 
first decades of the twenty-first century, therefore, reflect an age of tran-
sitions between systems. With respect to its transitional character, the 
current period resembles the late fifteenth century. Wallerstein distin-
guished cyclical rhythms of the system—the boom and bust cycle—that, 
in fact, maintain its equilibria based on the trends growing out of those 
cycles. Accumulation of capital defines capitalism; the mechanism for 
accumulation is profit; costs offset profit. Wallerstein notes three types of 
cost: labor, inputs and infrastructure, and taxation. “[O]ver five hundred 
years and across the capitalist world-economy as a whole, the three costs 
have all been steadily rising as a percentage of total value produced” (226). 
The repeated crises caused by overaccumulation—resulting in a falling 
rate of profit—have reached the point where refashioning the system 
can no longer restore profitability. The falling rate of profit has reached 
a global and systemic asymptote. Therefore, the current global finan-
cial crisis comes from a basic systemic disequilibrium and not cyclical 
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 readjustments, no matter how severe they seemed. The current crisis 
goes far beyond the Great Depression of the interwar period, or the Long 
Depression, which began in 1873 and continued through the last decades 
of the nineteenth century. Increasing productive efficiency through tech-
nological innovations—the computer revolution, for example—and the 
neoliberal offensive of the late twentieth century are but “one gigantic 
attempt to slow down the increasing costs of production” (226).
Wallerstein explained the causes of the rise in the three forms of cost. 
The cost of labor rises through workers organizing—syndical action. 
Traditionally, capitalists have countered this cost in a two-step process. 
First, they resisted workers directly—often by force—and ultimately, they 
relied on the state to suppress workers’ organizing efforts. The many indus-
trial clashes famous after the Civil War in the United States and other such 
events continuing through to the Memorial Day massacre at Republic Steel 
in Chicago in 1937, record this strategy. Eventually, however, this strategy 
fails because capitalist societies are also mass-based polities. Regardless of 
how undemocratic a regime might be, workers ultimately get their raises 
in the face of forceful opposition. The second step in the process to reduce 
labor costs takes the form of flight. Capitalists move production to lower 
labor-cost regions. The northeast and midwest turn into rust belts, while 
the south and southwest thrive. When those regions become too costly, the 
capitalist flees farther to so-called developing countries on the periphery. 
This second step became the preferred model for the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first century. The latest notorious example is the General 
Motors bankruptcy. The corporation declared bankruptcy in the United 
States while using government bailout money to finance moving assets 
to China (Daily Finance 2009; New York Times 2009; Wall Street Journal 
2009). Usually, such moves also help reduce the second and third catego-
ries of costs—inputs and infrastructure and taxation.
Inputs and infrastructure costs include raw materials and the costs of 
transport, waste disposal, and the like. Moving production to developing 
areas of the world often means moving them to countries with coopera-
tive regimes. The regimes usually offer forces to control labor organizing, 
relatively few and weakly enforced environmental laws, and low taxes on 
 corporations. Unfortunately for this capitalist strategy, developing areas 
turn into developed areas, and this occurs much faster than it did in the core 
areas of capitalism. What took Western Europe and North America a cen-
tury and a half takes developing areas only a few decades. Fleeing from costs, 
therefore, just puts off the inevitable. It buys time but does not solve the 
underlying problem. Furthermore, curbing these sources of costs, especially 
labor costs, exacerbates one of the underlying contradictions of industrial 
capitalism: paying low wages reduces the market for the goods and services 
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that are produced. If workers are not paid enough to buy what they make, 
the capitalist cannot sell enough to make a profit. All these costs and contra-
dictions have come to the point where capital has no place left to flee.
Marx’s Falling Rate of Profit
Marx posited a general law of capital—namely that the rate of profit will 
decline over time. Its cause is fundamental to the effect of capital in society. 
Capital organizes productive capacity. It does so by creating those objects 
needed to produce capital equipment like machines and infrastructure 
like roads. More importantly, capital organizes the productive capacity 
of people. Industrial capital, unlike all other forms of political economy, 
intervenes in the productive process. It organizes work. In Marx’s time, the 
most visible effect of this property of capital took the form of factories and 
factory discipline. Today, one of the best-known descriptions of this his-
torical process appears in Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1975). 
Worker input or labor capacity is the source of surplus value, which is 
profit. Capital not only disciplines workers, it also makes their work more 
efficient. Fewer workers are needed to produce. This creates what twentieth-
century economists call structural unemployment. Nonetheless, capital 
as the organizing force of society takes account of all workers, whether 
employed by a particular group of capitalists or not. The surplus value of 
a product contains all the labor power, whether or not it is used to make 
the product. This is the key to Marx’s analysis. One capitalist may increase 
profits by laying off workers, but the system of production employs, in 
the more abstract sense of that term, all the workers in a society.
The progressive tendency of the general rate of profit to fall is, therefore, 
just an expression peculiar to the capitalist mode of production of the progres-
sive development of the social productivity of labour. This does not mean 
to say that the rate of profit may not fall temporarily for other reasons. 
But proceeding from the nature of the capitalist mode of production, it is 
thereby proved a logical necessity that in its development the general aver-
age rate of surplus-value must express itself in a falling general rate of profit. 
Since the mass of the employed living labour is continually on the decline 
as compared to the mass of materialised labour set in motion by it, i.e., to 
the productively consumed means of production, it follows that the por-
tion of living labour, unpaid and congealed in surplus-value, must also be 
continually on the decrease compared to the amount of value represented 
by the invested total capital. Since the ratio of the mass of surplus-value to 
the value of the invested total capital forms the rate of profit, this rate must 
constantly fall. 
(Marx 1894, vol.3:213)
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Marx goes on to make clear that the decline in surplus value, and therefore 
profit, relates to the total capital in a society. And so, once globalization suc-
ceeded, the entire world became one big society, at least as far as the capital-
ist system is concerned. The rate of profit in global capital now approaches 
zero, hence it occasions the collapse of the world capitalist system.
Because the rate of profit declines as a function of capital  accumulation—
the more capital, the more productive efficiency, the lower the rate of 
profit—several other consequences follow. In Chapter 15 of Volume 3 of 
Capital, Marx explained that the falling rate of profit weeds out less efficient 
and smaller capitalists, thereby concentrating capital. Overaccumulation 
and falling rates of profit lead to overproduction, speculation, crises, and 
surplus capital, along with redundant populations. In the past, these 
conditions and consequences have led to the great economic depressions. 
They last until the surplus capital gets used up. The best-known historical 
precedent was the Great Depression. It did not end until the Second World 
War deployed the surplus capital by literally destroying it. Marx’s law of 
the falling rate of profit fulfills the idea made famous in the Manifesto of 
1848 that capitalism is its own grave digger. Usually taken in a simple polit-
ical sense—that, by creating a proletariat, capitalism has formed a group 
that will overthrow the capitalist regime—the falling rate of profit thesis 
shows that accumulated capital cannot help but eventuate in destroying 
the  capitalist system. The irony is that capital provides the most effective 
answer to the age-old question of all ruling classes: how to get the masses 
to work. It does so, however, in a way that guarantees its own destruction.
Marx’s theory for the falling rate of profit entails a crucial connection 
between capital and social control. Capital organizes social production. It 
organizes time and space, as in Taylorism and Fordism, with the imposi-
tion of the assembly line. The assembly line is just an obvious example. 
Capital organizes all social time and space. For example, in the United 
States, commercial time—roughly 9 a.m. to 10 p.m.—distinguishes 
day from night. Nighttime is when most businesses close. Shopping 
districts define neighborhoods in most cities. Marx observed early on 
that industrial capitalism differs from all previous modes of production 
in that capital intervenes in the work process. In feudal production, for 
example, the ruling class just appropriated work products without them-
selves organizing workers or their work. Industrial capitalism provides the 
time, place, and manner of production. Also, as Marx said in the preced-
ing quote from Capital, industrial capitalist production organizes all the 
 “living labor,” not just those employed at a given time or place. To organize 
all labor implicates the state, as the state is the main instrument of social 
control. For example, the state operates in the interest of capital’s organiz-
ing needs through municipal zoning ordinances—heavy industrial, light 
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industrial, commercial, residential, and so on. The industrial capitalist 
mode of production inseparably enmeshes the state with a definitive char-
acter of capital—policing the social order. The state disciplines labor and 
creates a disciplinary society. The state’s role remains fundamental because 
it defines private property. By defining private property through law, the 
state becomes a separate entity, apart from civil society (Marx and Engels 
1846). Capital orders labor when workers sell their labor, and private 
property subsumes labor when employers organize workers’ “individual 
functions into one single productive body” (Marx 1867:449) to overcome 
their resistance to capital’s imperative. 
It was not the introduction of machines that subordinated labour. It was the 
ill-defined “revolution” in the organization of production during the period 
of manufacture that facilitated the introduction of machines. Society is not 
disciplinary because it is capitalist; rather capital derives its profits from that 
which makes society disciplinary [emphasis added].”
(Marsden 1999:144–145)
Systemic Change and the Age of Transition
Wallerstein (2003) used chaos theory to extend the implications of the 
collapse of the capitalist system. As with all systems, once it enters sys-
temic crisis, it bifurcates as it moves irremediably away from equilibrium. 
It enters a period of chaos. Such periods have wide fluctuations among 
all system variables, extremes in all areas of social life, and on a global 
scale. The twenty-first century opened on the greatest difference between 
rich and poor in history. Speculation rampages, resulting in, inter alia, 
the financial crisis that began in 2008. Financial controllers like central 
banks cannot control it. Wars small and large keep breaking out, not 
between major powers, but in various combinations of major powers, 
local, regional, and civil conflicts everywhere. The inability of the United 
States, the UN, NATO, or any power block to prevent wars in Yugoslavia, 
the Congo, or Afghanistan testify to such effects. Consequences of socially 
organized causative vectors, global warming for instance, drastically affect 
the physical environment. Extreme weather, epidemics, draughts, and 
floods follow (Wallerstein 2004:87). The good news is that during periods 
of chaos, people can make effective changes and help mold the successor 
system.
Catastrophe theory and chaos theory refer to mathematical models 
of dynamic systems. They build on the general systems theory of Ludwig 
von Bertalanffy (1950, 1968) that treated interaction holistically. Systems 
theories describe and explain dynamics in general. They are not bound to 
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anything particular, but focus on the dynamics themselves. René Thom 
developed what came to be called catastrophe theory. Thom was a mathe-
matician specializing in topology, a field of geometry. Thom (1973) theo-
rized that changing systems follow a limited number of forms, which he 
described in mathematical equations. There are no more than seven such 
forms. Equilibrium points are central to his theory. Stability in dynamic 
systems assumes fluctuations among points or attractors. For example, 
in capitalist political economies, capitalists and workers act as the most 
salient attractors, and their dynamics involve continual class conflict. 
Perturbations in such systems, such as economic depressions, come from 
disturbances in the political economy as a whole. Catastrophes occur when 
systemic regulators no longer contain the conflict through various insti-
tutional responses. Such crises always hold the potential for bifurcation of 
the system. Bifurcation occurs at a tipping point where the system stops 
organizing itself and enters a chaotic state. 
Chaos theory describes chaotic dynamics as nonequilibrium states of 
systems. Henri Poincaré first described it in his 1890 paper on the three-body 
problem in astronomy. Despite initial insights in the first half of the twentieth 
century, chaos theory became formalized as such only in 1960. It first became 
evident to some scientists that linear theory, the prevailing system theory 
at that time, simply could not explain observations of certain experiments. 
What had been excluded as measure imprecision and simple “noise” was con-
sidered by chaos theorists as a full component of the studied systems. Edward 
Lorenz (1963) pioneered modern chaos theory. He discovered a descriptor 
of chaotic states through his work on weather prediction in 1961. When 
running a weather simulation, he wanted to see a sequence of data again. To 
save time, he started the simulation in the middle of its course. He entered 
data from a printout of the data corresponding to conditions in the middle 
of his simulation, which he had calculated the last time. To his surprise, the 
weather that the machine began to predict was completely different from 
the weather calculated before. The computer worked with 6-digit precision, 
but the printout rounded variables off to a 3-digit number. This difference 
is tiny, and the consensus at the time would have been that it should have 
had practically no effect. Lorenz had discovered that small changes in initial 
conditions produced large changes in the long-term outcome. Lorenz’s dis-
covery gave its name to Lorenz attractors, also known as strange attractors, or 
the butterfly effect: a butterfly flapping its wings in Argentina can produce a 
typhoon in Indonesia. When systems lose equilibrium and enter chaos, they 
do not behave randomly. Typically, they exhibit large fluctuations, but such 
fluctuations follow patterns around barely detectable variables.
Fractals are another piece of chaos theory. Fractals are forms with the 
same structural pattern regardless of their size. For example, a one-meter 
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stretch of the coastline of Britain has the same structure as the coast’s 
entire length. Benoit Mandelbrot (1982) discovered the mathematical 
description of fractals originally in 1960—about the same time Lorenz 
discovered his attractors. He found recurring patterns at every scale 
in data on cotton prices. In 1967, he showed that a coastline’s length varies 
with the scale of the measuring instrument, resembles itself at all scales, 
and is infinite in length for an infinitesimally small measuring device. An 
object whose irregularity is constant over different scales, “self-similarity,” 
is a fractal. Fractal theory contributes to chaos theory in showing the rep-
lication of small variations according to regularities or structural patterns. 
Thom’s catastrophe theory, Lorenz’s attractors, and Mandelbrot’s fractals 
have application to analyzing world systems of political economy, espe-
cially when such systems tip past their equilibrium points and bifurcate. 
All these theories have become subsumed under the general term, “chaos 
theory” (Gleick 1988; Prigogine and Stengers 1984).
Writing in 1994, Wallerstein argued that the world capitalist system 
was headed for bifurcation and would enter a state of chaos. He began his 
argument by pointing to Kondratieff cycles, those long-term fluctuations 
under capitalism lasting fifty to sixty years. Each cycle separates into an 
A phase and a B phase, which are roughly equivalent to expansion and con-
traction or good times and bad times. For instance, the Long Depression 
that began in 1873 and the Great Depression of the 1930s were parts of 
Kondratieff B phases. The boom after the Second World War, 1945–1973, 
was an A phase (Hobsbawm 1994; Mandel 1995). These fluctuations 
measure capital accumulation and class conflict, in which the working 
class and bourgeoisie act as poles generating the dynamic flux. Wallerstein 
argued that, on previous times, factors affecting capital accumulation 
and class conflict produce perturbations in the world system, but the 
system continually returned to equilibrium after a period of refashioning 
itself. The Kondratieff cycles measure these perturbations. One analogy 
is the human body that maintains a homeostatic internal temperature of 
37.0 °C (98.6 °F). Various factors can create disturbances or perturbations 
so that it rises or falls. Most commonly, we think of infectious disease. 
Nonetheless, as long as a body continues to live, it returns to somewhere 
close to the equilibrium point. Similarly with the world capitalist system, 
as various destabilizing factors beset it.
Wallerstein identified eight such factors. He argued that these eight 
factors combine to push the system past its tipping point into bifurcation 
and chaos. The first is that the world will no longer be unipolar under 
U.S. hegemony. Second, investment will concentrate in older areas such as 
China and Russia leaving little for the new areas of the global south such 
as Africa and Latin America. Hence, the global North-South gap will grow. 
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Coupled with that, the third factor is disparate demographics with continu-
ing high population growth in the South and little growth in the North. 
Those in the South will exert massive pressure for migration—especially 
among the middle strata, educated persons—thereby lowering wages 
of similarly situated white-collar workers in the North. Denizens in the 
North will apply political pressure in favor of repressive limitation against 
migration—the formerly so-called dangerous classes (immigrants and 
marginalized racial and ethnic groups). Fourth, expansion of investment 
in the coming Kondratieff A phase will squeeze employment in the middle 
strata as capitalists try to increase profits along with a reduction in state 
budgets for public services such as health and education. “In any case, 
the capitalist world-economy will be faced with the immediate dilemma 
of either limiting capital accumulation or suffering the politico-economic 
revolt of the erstwhile middle strata” (Wallerstein 1994:445). The fifth factor 
comes from ecological constraints, both the depletion of natural resources 
and environmental degradation such as that caused by green house gases 
and consequent global warming. Sixth, the capitalist world system has 
run out of world. There are no more areas that capital has not thoroughly 
penetrated. Deruralization is approaching the maximum. The seventh fac-
tor pertains to the middle strata in the global South, whose numbers have 
risen significantly and who demand a living standard and consumption 
that will strain the world economy and detract from capital accumulation. 
Eighth, and finally, Wallerstein pointed to the twin rise of democratization 
and decline of liberalism. The liberal solution restricted the dangerous 
classes to the core areas of the world system. Since the 1970s, liberalism has 
withered. At the same time, pressure for democratization steadily grows. 
“[T]he dangerous classes become dangerous once more” (449). These fac-
tors taken together create conditions of endemic and increasing violence, 
ever greater speculative fluctuations in the world economy, and relatively 
unpredictable changes in formerly well-established institutions. Think of 
the recent movement to privatize public education in the United States as 
one example. The upshot is the end of the world capitalist system as the 
system bifurcates under fluctuations it cannot contain.
Elite Responses in Times of Crisis
The elites—the ruling classes—respond to systemic crises by looking out 
for themselves, not by trying to save the system. If Wallerstein is correct, 
the current crisis of the world capitalist system has few precedents. One 
was the collapse of the Roman Empire, which ended the ancient world. 
The other was the collapse of feudalism and advent of the current system 
in Europe around 1500 C.E.
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Two apologias are in order. First, the following discussions on the 
Roman Empire and end of feudalism neither prove nor polemicize his-
torical arguments. Instead, they illustrate how elites behave in times of 
general crisis and collapse. Second, there is a Western, Eurocentric bias. 
The collapse of Rome did not end a world system, as other empires, nota-
bly in Asia, followed their own trajectories. The end of the Middle Ages 
in Europe also was not a global phenomenon. Nonetheless, the current 
world capitalist system originated in Europe, and therefore favors the 
Eurocentric bias.
The mode of production in the ancient world depended on slavery and 
bound peasantry. Ancient states organized production. The states took the 
form of empires. Empires enforce a redistributive economy in which basic 
producers, mainly agricultural with some artisanal manufacture, support 
the state machinery. The largest state sector is a military that enforces 
redistribution in domestic populations and conquers new territories, thus 
ensuring arable land and a supply of slaves. World empires subjugate sur-
rounding tribal peoples and land. The periphery of empire is the site of 
primitive accumulation. The middle strata control long-distance luxury 
trade, while the upper strata control the military that garners tribute 
(Wallerstein 1974b:90). World empires have a political center that controls 
space. Their control depends on military force under bureaucratic regula-
tion supported by an ideological apparatus, typically based in religion. The 
means of control are extremely costly and eventually lead to the demise of 
the empire as it overextends itself. Rome became the most developed and 
complex of imperial societies, unequaled except by China.
Bryan Ward-Perkins (2005) argued that invasions from the  periphery, 
coupled with internal civil war and social unrest, undid the fabric of the 
Roman Empire. These dislocations eroded the tax base so critical for 
supporting a permanent, professional army that functioned as the cen-
terpiece of imperial control. The Roman elite sought their own security. 
One strategy had peripheral tribal peoples become part of the empire. 
After all, the barbarians invaded the empire to get a piece of the pie, not 
due to ideological differences. As Ward-Perkins pointed out, even the 
Vandals, a scourge of a civilization, found themselves treaty partners with 
the Empire. “[E]mperors found it easier to make treaties with invading 
Germanic armies—who would be content with grants of money or land—
than with rivals in civil wars—who were normally after their heads” (52). 
The imperial elite threw local provincials to the wolves to defend against 
other invading tribes and rivals in civil wars. Of course, these strategies 
further unraveled the Empire’s bonds, as these semiperipheral areas with 
their own local elites saw little reason to support the imperium. “The 
imperial government was entirely capable of selling its provincial subjects 
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downriver, in the interests of short-term political and military gain” (56). 
Class-consciousness by the imperial elite did not lead them to support the 
institution of Empire. It did, however, lead them to recognize their self-
interests as a class. They were entirely willing to jettison everything but 
that which maintained their privilege.
The Empire disintegrated, and the Western world entered a chaotic 
transition phase. Feudalism emerged as the new system. The feudal mode 
of production differed little from that of the Roman Empire. It was an agri-
cultural economy with bound labor and direct extraction of surplus value 
in that the political system ensured surplus extraction. The feudal politi-
cal system differed from that of the ancient world, as relations between 
producers and exploiters were derived from transgenerational personal 
bonds. Custom bound both lord and peasant. Unlike the Roman imperial 
system where the Empire intervened, the manor was the main economic 
and political unit: “the lord’s estate became the state” (Katz 1989:57). 
Repeatedly, throughout the middle ages, strong men—Charlemagne 
(742–814), Frederick Barbarossa (1122–1190), and others who were 
less successful—tried to reestablish a world empire modeled on Rome. 
None succeeded. Nonetheless, the feudal mode of production  persisted, 
and formed the foundation upon which the capitalist world system 
emerged.
The Roman Empire and the world empire of the ancient world dis-
integrated in the fifth century; the medieval world began its end in the 
fifteenth century. Almost exactly in the middle of the fifth century, around 
1450, developments and events marked the end of the old system and a 
transition to its successor, the world capitalist system. Some of the most 
prominent of these landmarks are the development of moveable type 
(printing), the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, the development of 
canons, the end of the Hundred Years War, and the employment of linear 
perspective in drawing. During the succeeding decades of the fifteenth 
century, technological advances and political reconfiguration facilitated 
the demise of feudalism. These included the employment of rudders on 
ships, the invention of the astrolabe—forerunner of the sextant—for 
navigation, and, probably the most important for the advent of world 
 capitalism, double-entry bookkeeping. The foregoing did not cause the 
transition of the fifteenth century; they act as historical signposts. Western 
feudalism broke down for far more existential reasons: a crisis in produc-
tivity and means of extracting surplus.
The economy of Europe remained largely agricultural. Beginning in 
the last half of the fourteenth century, agriculture reached its  optimal 
productivity. At the same time, the landowning seigniorial class competed 
among themselves to expand their demesnes to secure more income. 
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Consequently, the ruling class accrued greater expenses due to their 
internecine warfare. When the landowners squeezed the peasantry to 
extract greater surplus, they revolted. Peasant revolts became endemic 
and increasingly intense. A general decline in prosperity ensued abetted 
by wars, famine, and epidemics, resulting in population decline and a 
recession from marginal lands. The enclosure movement became a third 
factor contributing to the crisis. Landowning aristocrats engrossed for-
merly common lands. Rising management costs prodded them to turn 
away from direct management toward tenancy. All three—peasant unrest, 
seigniorial competition, and enclosure—began to transform the politi-
cally weak feudal system. Aristocrats increasingly sought more political 
surety through law so they turned to the state, which, at the time meant, 
the crown. Louis XI (1423–1483) of France, Henry VII (1457–1509) of 
England, and Ferdinand (1452–1516) and Isabella (1456–1504) of Spain 
laid the groundwork for centralized states at the expense of the feudal sys-
tem. But they were enabled by the desperate scramble of the aristocracy. 
They created standing armies and enlarged bureaucracies. As with Roman 
elites, medieval elites threw away the system that had elevated them in 
favor of immediate preservation of privilege.
Wallerstein (1974a:37) identified three explanations for the crisis of 
feudalism. First, a cyclical economic contraction beginning in the last half 
of the fourteenth century combined with a second that posits increased 
expenditure and demands on peasants by landowning aristocrats. Third, 
a shift in Europe’s climate lowered soil productivity. The elite—the land-
owning aristocracy—sought surcease by giving up direct management 
and, therefore, direct extraction of surplus by turning from serfdom or 
a similar feudal agricultural division of labor to tenancy. Some also sold 
their land to wealthier peasants. They turned to the crown and court to 
keep their privilege and advantage.
Review of the two crises in history, the fall of Rome and the demise of 
feudalism, shows a common reaction from the ruling class. They save their 
own skins. In the case of Rome, the main immediate threat came from 
external invasion. Medieval Western Europe successfully stopped external 
invasions from Asia—the Mongols in the thirteenth century and the 
Ottomans in the fifteenth. In medieval Europe, the crisis was economic. 
If the current crisis in the world capitalist system does indeed portend 
the system’s collapse, it is reasonable to expect similar responses by the 
haute bourgeoisie. They will scramble, often fighting each other, for every 
 possible advantage even while the system is collapsing. Their behavior 
will act as positive feedback to the crisis, exacerbating it even as they try 
to avoid its ill effects. They will seek new ways to extract surplus from 
the masses; at the same time, they will cut down the middle strata’s drain 
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on surplus while using the state to enforce both. These strategies entail 
a resurgence of imperialism, but of a new kind—something now called 
globalization. Although they will rely on state power, this does not imply 
any nationalistic fixation, as they are a global class—a fact of which they 
are individually and collectively well aware. Financial magnates from 
Wall Street hobnob with their counterparts from the cities of London 
and Tokyo. They do not consort with plumbers, computer programmers, 
or Indonesian sweatshop workers. In the centers of the world capitalist 
system, ruling classes use every method to keep their privileges. They 
employ and deploy their access to communication media and the culture 
industry to help keep control. When that fails or does not reach all of its 
intended audience, they will resort to force—police and military. Though, 
economic pressure and social control remain the tools of choice, they vary 
in technique and proportion by time and place. For instance, corporations 
employ paramilitary death squads in Latin America, states stage full-
scale military invasions in the Middle East, criminal justice apparatuses 
discipline in the United States, and so on. A consistent theme in all these 
strategies is the reliance on fear. To keep their privileged position, the rul-
ing classes secure fear.
The Current Crisis
The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon offered an 
opportunity similar to that of the Reichstag Fire of February 27, 1933. 
Another similarity between the two events lies in their murky causes. 
There remains no clear proof of or consensus on the perpetrators of 
either. Nonetheless, Nazi leaders had quickly claimed that Communists 
set the fire and U.S. officials identified Osama bin Laden within hours. By 
noon on 9/11, Senator Orin Hatch said intelligence personnel had briefed 
him to that effect (Tapper 2001). President George W. Bush along with 
Vice President Richard Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
followed the reasoning of a group of advisors grouped under the rubric 
of neoconservatives. It included people like Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, 
and Douglas Feith. That reasoning led to military attacks on Afghanistan 
and Iraq as part of a Global War on Terrorism, or GWOT in military-
speak. The president couched GWOT in moralistic terms, identifying 
terrorists as evil and part of an axis of evil (Kirk 2003). Meeting with a 
central committee of the National Security Council at 9:30 p.m. the day 
of the attacks, Bush relayed the received wisdom of intelligence advi-
sors that al-Qaeda, allied with the Taliban, were behind the attacks. He 
assured those in attendance that they would have unlimited support in 
the  coming boundless war, and that the United States would employ the 
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use of  preventive attacks to stop future terrorism (Clarke 2004:23–24; 
Woodward 2002:31–33). Bush noted that the tragedy presented a great 
political opportunity (Sammon 2002:133).
Regardless of questions about the origins, causes, or perpetrators of the 
attacks, 9/11 marked a turning point in the history of the world, because the 
political and economic leadership took advantage of the opportunity Bush 
had identified. At this point, and maybe forever, their precise thoughts, 
plans, and strategies remain hidden. Nonetheless, analysts can draw reason-
able inferences from succeeding policies and actions. Moreover, the effects 
of those policies, coupled with secular political and economic trends, 
pushed the world capitalist system past its tipping point and into chaos.
In the last third of the twentieth century, the elite began a counterattack 
against erosion of their relative wealth, control, and privilege. A high point 
in wealth and income equality in the years 1968–1973 marked that erosion. 
Richard Nixon’s successful presidential campaign in 1968 (Perlstein 
2008) and the memorandum written by the soon-to-be Supreme Court 
Justice Lewis Powell (1971) reveal the basic strategies. The memoran-
dum advanced the interests of the ruling class on every influential front: 
political, economic, military, intellectual, and cultural. By the 1980s, 
it had turned the tide against equality, democratic control, and public 
welfare. That success became symbolized by the Reagan presidency, and 
the Thatcher premiership, and global and domestic neoliberal political-
economic policies. Neoliberalism had two measurable effects among 
the metropolitan ruling class. With an uptick in the rate of profit, they 
regained and expanded unequal distribution of income. Even so, there was 
a lag in a similar movement with respect to wealth mainly due to growing 
debt (Duménil and Lévy 2004). After the rise in rate of profit in the 1980s, 
it began to decline once more in the twenty-first century. 
An important part of the elites’ counteroffensive depended on the 
popular and political construction of crime and fear of crime. Barry 
Goldwater had first raised it as a national campaign issue in 1964, 
but Nixon capitalized on it. On the eve of 9/11, Americans believed 
interpersonal street crime presented a major threat (Altheide 2002), and 
they generally supported increasingly repressive and invasive policing 
with exceptionally harsh sentencing (Beckett 1997; Beckett and Sasson 
2004; Glassner 1999). By the new millennium, the United States had 
become the nation with most incarcerations in the world (Mauer 2006). 
Another part of the ruling class offensive rebuilt what David Altheide calls 
 “packaged patriotism” (2006:3). Signs of that outlook included a retrofitted 
and more capital-intensive military and the popularity of entertain-
ment, such as movies in the Rambo series. These revanchist campaigns 
 established a cultural landscape of fear of outsiders, who were identified 
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as criminals, and narcissistic identification with jingoistic militarism. The 
already-established cultural front became an essential ingredient for taking 
advantage of the opportunity offered by 9/11.
Important objectives for the neoconservative strategy had four intercon-
nected prongs: (1) aggressive military action to achieve a dominance of force in 
strategic regions; (2) mass support among metropolitan populations; (3) extr-
action of surplus wealth from metropolitan  populations; and (4) extraction 
of surplus wealth from the periphery and semiperiphery of the world. The 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were the most visible of these strategies. 
Coupled with those, the U.S. military extended its deployment of bases to 
new areas of the world, especially central Asia (Johnson 2006). Militarism 
secured fear internationally, while, domestically, continual terror alerts rein-
forced pervasive policing and surveillance to a degree far surpassing the capa-
bility of the Nazis (Gellately 1990; Jeffreys-Jones 2007; Johnson 1999).
Elite control in mass societies uses two interrelated strategies. The first 
identifies an enemy of the people (Ibsen 1882) and then uses the power 
of the state to neutralize the ostensible enemy. The second extends and 
expands the policing power of the state to defend against new or additional 
enemies of the people. Dario Melossi (1993, 2008) has argued that elites 
foster moral panics when their control appears to them in some way threat-
ened. In the past, the threats have taken the form of working-class gains in 
both the economic struggle and the political. Most recently, this occurred 
in the 1968–1973 period, and the elites did indeed generate a moral panic 
in the form of fears of rising crime and an imputed moral decline in gen-
eral. Examples include attributions of immorality among those receiving 
welfare, especially Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and 
people who consumed illicit drugs. Sometimes, the two combined as in 
the so-called crack baby scare of the 1980s (Reinarman and Levine 1997). 
Dario Melossi summed up the construction of crime fear.
It is conventionally agreed that this new era started in the year of the oil and 
energy crisis, 1973—the year when according to historian Eric Hobsbawm, 
the “crisis decades” began (Hobsbawm 1994). The tide of penalty (as well 
as many other social processes) turned also around this same year. Before 
1973, recorded “crime” had been on the increase especially in aspects—
so-called “street crime”—that were particularly worrisome for the middle 
class (before, because the US victimization survey, which started in 1973, 
has shown no definite trend toward an increase, contrary to common cre-
dence, as Katherine Beckett explains in her review of Garland’s The Culture 
of Control (Garland 2001a; Beckett 2001). Crime’s ascendance in the 1960s 
was taken to represent the general crisis in authority and conformist values 
and traditions. 
(Melossi 2008:199–200)
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Earlier in the same book, Melossi noted that “[i]t is the representation of 
crime, much more than the repression of crime—as we believed in the 
1960s—that plays a key role in social control” (155–156). Melossi con-
tinued by referring to totalitarian regimes’ use of the media, citing Walter 
Benjamin’s observations about the Nazis, where “the star and the dictator 
emerge victorious” (Benjamin 1936:247). The criminalized individuals 
become enemies of the people, those who threaten society’s very founda-
tion, the basis for the glue that keeps everything running smoothly, espe-
cially the cycle of capitalist production (Mead 1918). Typically, outsiders 
fall into the criminalized population. Melossi (2008:235) called them la 
canaille, those who have subminimum moral worth as humans, who pur-
sue their own ends, and do not fit into the prescribed class roles needed 
for the social machinery. Jews, Gypsies, and those who were deemed “work 
shy” exemplified the category in Nazi Germany (Burleigh and Wipperman 
1991). They wound up in the concentration camps. In the United States, 
and more recently in Western Europe, recent immigrants supplied the 
human universe for la canaille, with, of course, the usual stand-bys of 
African and Native Americans. Furthermore, restrictive immigration 
policies operate with double efficiency, as immigrants who do not pass 
through official channels automatically acquire an “illegal” status by virtue 
of their lack of documentation alone. 
Melossi’s diagnosis fails to emphasize two factors. First, the construction 
of a criminal class does not just intensify social cohesion by scapegoating in 
a quintessentially Durkheimian way (Durkheim 1893, 1895, 1896). The cul-
tural gesture is accompanied by material movement. Increased policing and 
surveillance control everyone, not just the designated enemies of the people. 
Consider the recurrent stories of prominent persons—media stars, national 
politicians, and even the occasional plutocrat—whom the Transportation 
Security Agency (TSA) stop from boarding flights because their names 
inadvertently (ostensibly, at least) show up on a suspect list, or worse yet, 
a “no fly” list. In addition, mass incarceration creates a system of camps or 
lagers to which populations are removed, segregated from society, and where 
they become mere or bare life, without full human status (Agamben 1995). 
Such camps have played an important, if not essential, role in imperialist 
enterprises—from the reservations for Native Americans established in the 
nineteenth century, camps in Cuba for those who opposed Spanish rule, and 
the interring of Boers in South Africa by Lord Kitchener in the early twentieth 
century, to today’s camps in the United States holding “illegal” immigrants. 
The latter are not charged with crimes, but are interred under civil law, and, 
therefore, cannot enjoy the benefits of the Bill of Rights. 
Melossi’s basic argument makes a cogent case for recurrent repres-
sions coinciding with threats to ruling-class control. While Melossi used 
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it to explain criminal justice policy, especially in the United States, a for-
tiori, it applies to the current situation of the collapsing world capitalist 
system. A telling part of the picture pertains to U.S. immigration policy. 
Immigration prosecutions account for 53 percent of all federal prosecu-
tions as of March 2009, and they have constituted a majority for several 
years. Almost all such cases come from the Department of Homeland 
Security—the domestic arm of the GWOT(TRAC 2009a, b, and c). On 
the surface, these data support one of Immanuel Wallerstein’s predictions 
about the consequences of a collapsing and bifurcating world capitalist 
system—namely, that core societies will exercise increasingly restrictive 
immigration policies. Moreover, the data support a generalization of 
Melossi’s argument regarding la canaille, as most prosecutions target the 
usual suspects—immigrant populations who enter the United States for 
a better life. They are neither terrorists nor criminal schemers. They do, 
nevertheless, serve to reinforce elite control. 
Chalmers Johnson has become a critic of the strategies of elites in the 
United States. He is a true conservative, similar to Gore Vidal and Lewis 
Lapham, the former, longtime editor of Harpers magazine. They all decry 
U.S. imperialism as a betrayal of American republican virtues. In Johnson’s 
most recent book of a trilogy (2000, 2004, 2006), he argued that militaris-
tic imperialism exhausts the public treasure so as to lead to the eventual 
collapse of empire. He compared the United States to Rome and Britain. 
In the case of Rome, he allied himself with Cicero to lament the pass-
ing of the republic—an inevitable result of imperialist policy. He com-
pared the twenty-first century United States with mid-twentieth-century 
Britain, saying that Britain saved its democracy by relinquishing its empire 
(2006:279). He laid the blame squarely on the George W. Bush regime. He 
compared him to other presidents who overstepped Constitutional limits: 
Lincoln in the Civil War, Wilson and his suppression of dissent during the 
First World War and the Red Scare after it, and Roosevelt’s interment of 
Americans of Japanese descent during the Second World War. He noted 
that wars have accreted executive power throughout U.S. history, but that 
the structural separation of powers in government checked presidential 
dominance. According to Johnson, the picture changed dramatically with 
Bush.
When it comes to the deliberate dismantling of the Constitution, however, 
the events that followed the Supreme Court’s intervention in the election 
of 2000 that named George W. Bush the forty-third president have proved 
unprecedented. Bush has since implemented what even right-wing com-
mentator George Will has termed a “monarchical Doctrine” (2006) and 
launched, as left-wing commentator James Ridgeway put it, “a consistent 
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and long range policy to wreck constitutional government” (2005). In 
doing so, Bush has unleashed a political crisis comparable to the one Julius 
Cesar posed for the Roman constitution. If the United States has neither 
the means nor the will to overcome this crisis, then we have entered the last 
days of the republic. 
(2006:244)
His argument has several flaws. First, it abstracts politics from the political 
economy and confuses the state with government. The United States has 
always followed imperialist policies. It conquered all its current territory 
through imperialist expansion. Since the end of the nineteenth century, it 
created an oceanic empire. After the Second World War, it took over the 
management of former imperial holdings of Japan, Britain, and France. 
The former Japanese territories, it held directly. Britain did not disen-
gage from its empire in the 1950s and 1960s to save its democracy, but to 
save the Exchequer and Bank of England, and, not incidentally, provide 
more effective ways for British investors to extract wealth from former 
colonies. The George W. Bush regime did not deviate far from the preced-
ing regimes of Clinton and George H. W. Bush. The later Bush’s regime just 
carried imperialist policies out less effectively. The main difference between 
George W. Bush and other presidents has been one of style and an inability 
to divert and distract critics. In sum, the anti-Republican trend discerned 
by Chalmers Johnson is neither sudden nor peculiar to one president. It 
just became more apparent as the crisis of world capitalism became more 
acute.
The creation, better termed culmination, of empire by the United States 
is not a cause, but a consequence of the collapse of world capitalism. To be 
sure, the behavior of the elites in the current crisis, as in previous crises, 
hastens the collapse. Nonetheless, empire represents an attempt by elites 
to keep and expand their privilege. They act like the officers of a sinking 
ship by grabbing all the life preservers for themselves. Not accidentally, 
Britain has been the closest ally in the U.S. military and imperial adven-
tures. Ties between capital holdings in the two countries have been inex-
tricably linked for many decades. Observing the recent imperialism, it is 
not far wrong to call it Anglophone imperialism. Australia, Britain, and, 
a somewhat less enthusiastic, Canada have joined the invasions and other 
projections of force. These same countries have assiduously curtailed civil 
liberties, expanded policing and surveillance. They have also increasingly 
restricted immigration. It is not a coincidence of language but of capital 
interests and ruling-class strategies. 
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Chapter 3
States and Social Control
Stanley Cohen, who made famous the expression “moral panic” in his 1980 study of the Mods and Rockers, said that “social control” is a 
Mickey Mouse term (1985:2). Regardless of its membership among roden-
tia, the term is so broad and abstract as to lend itself to Mickey Mouse 
usage. When Edward A. Ross introduced the term into sociology in his 
1901 Social Control, he distinguished a broad and narrow usage. The broad 
usage roughly corresponds to society-wide institutions such as criminal 
justice, and the narrow usage corresponds to culturally shaped interaction: 
“purposive actions that define, respond to, and control deviant behavior” 
(Horwitz 1990:9). For Ross, the problem came down to how democratic 
polities could maintain orderly societies. The narrow and broad senses of 
the term might reflect a sociology of institutions derived from Durkheim 
versus a sociology of interaction acquired from Georg Simmel and 
George Herbert Mead. The Chicago School of Sociology of the first part 
of the twentieth century embodied both. In their seminal work, Park and 
Burgess identified social control as “the central fact and central problem 
of sociology,” and sociology as the “method for investigating the processes 
by which individuals are inducted to and induced to co-operate in some 
sort of permanent corporate existence we call society” (Park and Burgess 
1924:42). The interactionist view focuses on microsociology while the 
institutional takes on macrosociology. Of course, outside of heuristics, the 
two are not separable. Individuals interact with each other in regular ways 
(institutions) according to their beliefs, expectations, and values (culture). 
Moreover, interactionist sociology, which spawned what others called 
labeling theory, is annealed to social hierarchy and stratification.
Combining phenomenological insights and methodology with the 
American pragmatism and transactional analysis of George Herbert Mead 
permitted students of social deviance such as Edwin Lemert (1951, 1967; 
Lemert and Rosberg 1948) and Howard Becker (1963) to develop what 
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some called, often disparagingly, labeling theory. As Becker pointed out 
in 1973 by adding a chapter to his 1963 Outsiders, the labeling perspective 
was never meant as a theory. Becker, in despair at correcting the continual 
misunderstanding, wrote that, from then on, he would call it “an inter-
actionist theory of deviance” (181). Both he and Lemert often invoked 
the fact of social stratification to explain patterns of deviance. Briefly, 
they argued that those who labeled were the powerful, and those who 
got labeled were the weak. In modern society, the powerful and weak are 
defined by class and status. 
Therefore, for present purposes, social control refers to those strategies 
used by ruling classes to get everyone else to follow orders. Chief among 
the objectives of those orders is to answer the perennial question faced 
by all ruling classes in history: how to get the masses to work. The “state” 
refers to those organizations and institutions that employ formal means 
to implement the orders dispensed by the ruling classes. States have other 
definitive characteristics. 
The Evolution of the State
Too often, commentators confuse, conflate, or blur distinctions between 
the state and government or the state and politics. All societies, even the 
simplest, have some form of government as a means of collective decision 
making. For example, nomadic foraging peoples adopt episodic leadership, 
in which the best hunters are in charge of hunts, the most knowledgeable 
healers in charge of healing ceremonies, and so on. So too, all societies 
engage in politics, which are those activities by which groups make and 
carry out collective decisions. States, on the other hand, are complex struc-
tures involving sets of institutions whose functions control all other institu-
tions in a given society.
Empirically, and maybe theoretically, state political organizations 
coemerge with writing and class-based social stratification. Where there 
is a state, there is a written culture and class hierarchy. Settled agriculture 
has been a precondition for states to emerge, and this factor helps explain 
states’ territoriality. States define territorial boundaries that are both exter-
nal and internal. External boundaries define the reach of power, while 
internal boundaries delineate social stratification. Boundaries of stratifica-
tion begin with reserving the best land for the ruling class so that classes 
come to form around land boundaries. Social ordering reflects the nomos 
of the earth, to steal a phrase from Carl Schmitt (1950). Nomos originally 
referred to boundary markers in settled areas of ancient Egypt. Later, it 
took the more abstract meaning in ancient Greek, where nomos meant law 
or custom in contrast with phusis, which was nature. 
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Other structural characteristics of the state in addition to territorial-
ity are sovereignty, centralized government, coercive law, and ideology of 
legitimation. Cities formed the centers of early states with surrounding 
territories providing economic support for urban dwellers (Bauer 2007; 
Starr 1991). The patterns set in Mesopotamia and Egypt in the fourth mil-
lennium BCE. are recapitulated wherever pristine state formations emerge: 
China, the Indus River Valley, Mesoamerica, and so on.
Early states’ ideologies of legitimation derived from religion. The state 
and law had divine origins as did the prevailing class system that divided 
the populace into royalty, priests, nobles, commoners, and slaves. Typically, 
royalty claimed divinity. The early Hebrew state notably deviated from this 
pattern, as the king was not divine and largely a secular ruler. The secular-
ization of royalty was supported by the prohibition against worshipping 
idols. Royal power was limited by a transcendent god and law—the Torah. 
The Hebrew founding myth posited a covenant between Yahweh and the 
people as opposed to a covenant between a god and a king (Frankfort 
1978:343; Nelson 2006:13).
Classical Greece represents another watershed in the evolution of the 
state. Athens is the paramount example, beginning with Cleisthenes’ con-
stitutional reforms of 508/507 BCE. “Class conflict and often outright class 
warfare lay at the very core of the Greek polis. . . . [T]he politically domi-
nant class utterly controlled the state. . . . [T]he result was an intensity of 
political life and citizen involvement” (Nelson 2006:19; De Ste. Croix 1981, 
2004). The first theoretical discourses about politics and the state emerged 
from turbulence and strife; first Plato’s Republic, then Aristotle’s Politics 
and Constitution of Athens. Plato conceived the transcendent state derived 
from nature and constituting an ethical community premised on an 
abstract justice. Plato’s is an ideal state (Nelson 2006:20). Building on, but 
differing from Plato, Aristotle argued that justice was a goal, a telos, an end 
state of perfection toward which humans strive to realize their true nature. 
An important part of this striving required political engagement so that the 
ideal state was one that furthered the telic end. In addition, Aristotle recog-
nized the fundamental role of class in politics and class conflict. For him, 
justice needed to transcend class interests. For the classical Greeks, politics 
constituted law that was, therefore, always contingent. For Romans, on the 
other hand, law, although the result of human law making, grounded its 
authority in natural law (Cicero) or universal moral reason (the Stoics). 
The Roman idea of the state is first and foremost a legal structure, marking 
a major step in the evolution of the state. Moreover, the Roman concept 
identified the state as a public entity established by and through public 
law, a res publica. This Ciceronian idea entails a distinction between private 
and public and, therefore, a distinction between the state and society (27).
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What makes the state distinctive, setting it apart from the rest of society, 
is its claim on a monopoly of force in a territory (Weber 1919:310). Antonio 
Gramsci developed the idea of the extended state including the panoply of 
institutions and organizations that stabilize existing power relations such 
as the press, trade unions, the church, and mass culture (Wetherly 2005:2 
citing Sassoon 1980). In this view, the state manages power, ultimately 
backed by physical force and coercion. In capitalist societies, the state 
primarily functions to maintain stability due to the inherent instability of 
capitalism—the constant revolutionizing of the means of production and 
all social relations (Marx and Engels 1848:207). During periods of rela-
tively low social—and ultimately class—conflict, the extended state relies 
on market forces, and the extended state apparatuses to maintain stability. 
In times of intensifying conflict, however, the state brings to bear the tools 
of force and violence: “emergency powers are deployed for the exercise of a 
violence necessary for the permanent refashioning of order—the violence 
of law, not violence contra law” (Neocleous 2008:73). The periodic exercise 
of emergency powers springs from the nature and origins of the modern 
bourgeois state.
The political revolutions of the late eighteenth century, first in America, 
then in France changed the relation between the state and society. Backed 
by enlightenment-era political thought, the rising bourgeois classes laid 
claim to the rights of the social contract. No longer would the state be iden-
tified with the crown. It became identified with the people. Throughout 
the nineteenth century, definitions of the people kept expanding so that 
by the first decades of the twentieth century, advanced capitalist societ-
ies had adopted expanded governmental politics of liberal democracy. 
Extension of suffrage—women being granted voting rights—measures 
this expansion most clearly with the last great subpopulation brought 
into the fold by the end of the First World War in the United States and 
Britain.
The world economic crisis of the late 1920s and 1930s ushered in the 
rise of social democratic politics and the welfare state. Following the 
Second World War, mature capitalist societies governed themselves with a 
liberal welfare state. Marked by the worldwide uprisings of 1968 and the 
oil crisis of 1973, leaders of capitalism refashioned the political economy 
by dismantling the liberal welfare state. In the United States, and to a lesser 
extent in Great Britain, the welfare state was replaced by the regulatory 
state through revanchist, reactionary politics of the late twentieth century. 
This latest development means that the liberal Lockean view of the state 
as arbiter has increasingly given way to the authoritarian Hobbesian view 
of the state as absolute power. The significance of this shift cannot be 
overestimated, because it signals an end to the capitalist political economic 
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system dominant in the world since the beginning of the nineteenth 
century.
One distinctive feature of capitalism as a form of political economy 
comes from its separation of the political and economic spheres. “Capital-
ism is the first mode of production in history in which the means whereby 
surplus is pumped out of the direct producer is ‘purely’ economic in 
form—the wage contract. . . . All other . . . modes of exploitation oper-
ate through extra-economic sanctions—kin, customary religious, legal or 
political” (Spitzer 1987:56 citing Anderson 1974:403). Under the capitalist 
system, social regulation largely relies on the economic organization of 
need and gratification as opposed to the political organization of fear and 
terror.
When the market mediates human relationships it is a process of “choice” 
rather than “constraint.” . . . [W]e need a model which goes beyond the 
concept of control as constraint. From this perspective, any theory of social 
control must not only understand the ways in which control is exercised 
through what is prevented or punished, but also what is allowed. 
(Spitzer:57 citing D’Amico 1978:89)
Spitzer goes on to contrast the liberal capitalist state with Fascism. Fascism 
exercises social control through deprivation, identification with a power-
ful leader, and aggression against internal and external enemies. Liberal 
capitalism replaces denial with indulgent consumerism and lifestyles 
replace status identities such as race. In such a consumer society, anxiet-
ies are allayed more by purchasing the right product than by persecuting 
minorities or conquering the world (58). Especially since 9/11, the world 
has begun to tilt toward the fascist form, which should not be surprising, 
as Fascism is liberal capitalism’s doppelganger (Neocleous 2008:13). 
Social Control by the State as Arbiter
Commonly, exegetes contrast John Locke’s political philosophy with that 
of Thomas Hobbes, characterizing the former as liberal and the latter 
as absolutist. Without entirely gainsaying that interpretation, it is worth 
pointing out that what they emphasize about Hobbes is his theory of the 
state, while for Locke, it is his theory of government. Hobbes is famous for 
his description of the leviathan, the great beast that quells all civic violence 
by a monopoly of force. Locke is equally famous for discussing govern-
ment as a third party to settle disputes—the state-as-arbiter viewpoint. 
Nonetheless, anyone who has toiled in the vineyards of jurisprudence 
knows that making judgments is one thing, but making sure they are 
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executed is something else. Most of Locke’s discussion of political theory 
describes the judgment part of the process. In this view, the state serves 
as a field of contest, setting rules, boundaries and limits, and providing 
the umpires. Later in this section, I argue for Locke and Hobbes’ similar 
views regarding the state, but, at this point, Locke’s theory of government 
and politics remains paramount for understanding the liberal capitalist 
political economy.
Locke is well known for arguing that governments should protect 
 property. Less well acknowledged is his assertion that property rights flow 
from labor; in effect, a labor theory of value. Locke posited abstract indi-
viduals entering into commerce with each other and instituting govern-
ment to facilitate that commerce. Following these principles, governments 
should provide regulations for the market, for example, ensuring reliability 
in weights and measures. They should also offer venues for dispute resolu-
tion and ensure everyone equal treatment before the relevant tribunals. 
Locke’s system of government assumes a rational populace and advocates a 
rational system of laws and government. He generally avoids discussions of 
class conflict of the kind Aristotle made central. The Lockean system, later 
augmented by such thinkers as Adam Smith and David Ricardo, formed 
the underpinning of the bourgeois plans for representative, parliamentary 
government most immediately successful in Britain and its former North 
American colonies. Nonetheless, a problem soon arose.
Once even limited democratic representative governments begin to 
function, they soon give rise to contentious, class-interested politics. More-
over, governments have privileged access to state apparatuses of power, 
control, and force. Within the first decades of the nineteenth century, com-
moners started demanding expanded democracy and  representation. One 
result was the Peterloo Massacre of 1819, which sowed the seeds for the 
English Chartist Movement in the 1830s and 1840s. Adopting the strategy 
of gradual reformism, British ruling classes increasingly formulated a lib-
eral political system. A similar pattern emerged in the United States. On 
the European continent, however, the ruling classes remained recalcitrant, 
hence the uprising of 1848. Fear of mass rebellion forced the leading 
capitalist countries of Europe to adopt the Anglo-American  solution, 
albeit belatedly. These gradual reforms eventually produced a new form of 
government: mass-based politics. By the end of the First World War, mass 
politics became the standard in all leading capitalist countries. The forma-
tion of mass politics led to two models: Fascism and liberal welfarism. The 
latter kept the basic Lockean principles, but modified its relatively laissez-
faire approach to market regulation. The result was the interventionist 
state represented in the United States by the New Deal and in Europe by 
gradualist social democracy.
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Social Control by the State as Ultimate Power
Fascism and Stalinism exemplify the Hobbesian leviathan model. Both reput-
edly autocratic, in practice, they were bureaucratic and, most importantly, 
dependent on popular support. What the interwar Fascisms and Stalinism 
shared was less an autocratic form of rule than elevation of a supreme leader 
to cult-like status—the Führerprinzip. Contrary to the propaganda, espe-
cially that churned out during the Second World War, the interventionist 
states and absolutist states shared a central ideological principle: government 
under a state of emergency.
The concept of state of emergency brings together Lockean and 
Hobbesian political philosophy with the rehabilitated, idealist theories of 
the state. Plato first propounded the ideal state run by philosopher kings 
who ruled the polis and its population. Hegel (1821) elaborated upon a 
transcendent state that embodied the world spirit. After the First World 
War, Max Weber and Carl Schmitt revived Hegel’s transcendent state. 
Weber’s version followed the liberal mode, Schmitt’s the fascist. Weber 
provided the main theoretical force behind the Weimar constitution, while 
Schmitt’s early writings sedulously attacked its parliamentarism with lofty 
and highly abstract politico-legal argumentation. Ironically, Weber insisted 
on one of the main elements of that constitution that made possible the 
shift to Fascism in Germany: Article 48 gave the president of the republic 
power to declare a state of emergency, take control of the state and, in 
effect, override the Reichstag. It was that legal justification that Hitler used 
to persuade President Hindenburg to declare a state of emergency after the 
Reichstag fire of February 27, 1933. The Reichstag Fire Decree eliminated 
the Communist Party from the elections of March 5. Suppressing the 
Communists—the third-largest party in the Reichstag—permitted Hitler 
and the Nazis to pass the Enabling Act of March 23, giving Chancellor 
Hitler plenary powers, thus ushering in the Third Reich. What made 
Weber’s involvement ironic was that he was a staunch supporter of lib-
eralism and parliamentary, representative government. Ironic it may be, 
but the theoretical concept behind Article 48 is the necessity of absolutist 
powers for the sovereign in times of threat to the nation. On this point, 
Locke and Hobbes agreed.
They agreed, because at the heart of bourgeois liberalism lies the need to 
ensure stability. That need, and the political and legal institutions required 
to meet it, signal one of the basic contradictions of capitalism. On the one 
hand, it produces constant revolutionizing of the means of production 
and, thereby, constant change in market relations resulting in continual 
disruption of all social relations, as Marx and Engels observed in their 
1848 Manifesto. On the other hand, capitalists need predictability—the 
9780230103498_04_cha03.indd   47 3/31/2010   5:55:37 PM
48  SOCIAL THEORY OF FEAR
predictability of contracts, laws, markets, and so on—to make profits. 
Capitalism is a future-oriented economic system. Mark Neocleous has 
shown in his 2008 Critique of Security that the state of emergency must, 
therefore, be part of every bourgeois liberal political system. He traces its 
conceptual origins to both Locke and Hobbes. Hobbes explicitly justified 
the absolute state based on the ever-present threat of society reverting 
back to a state of nature and, therefore, perpetual insecurity. In contrast, 
Locke obscured his predilection for absolutism. He called it prerogative. 
“Prerogative therefore grants to the sovereign discretionary powers not 
bound by law. This is ‘an Arbitrary Power,’ Locke comments in parenthe-
ses” (Neocleous:15). While Locke implied that such prerogative power by 
the executive would apply only to foreign affairs and war, elsewhere he 
said domestic and foreign affairs are not really separable and are almost 
always united (Neocleous:16 citing Locke 1689 II:§3, 147). His justifica-
tion was that circumstances arise during which it is impractical to sum-
mon the legislature because of immediate need for action, that is, states of 
emergency.
States of emergency come about in the context of “reasons of state”—
one of those sophisticated phrases of ruling elites. Reasons of state differ 
from politics—the quotidian contentiousness of parties and class interests. 
Reasons of state trump politics, because they are rationalized by threats 
to the security of the entire society. States of emergency are matters of 
state, not politics. This was Carl Schmitt’s argument in his antiliberal and 
antirepublican writing of the 1920s (1919, 1922, 1923, 1927). The same 
formula figures in the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence and 
political theory aside from John Locke. James Harrington (1611–1677) in 
his The Commonwealth of Oceana, originally published in 1656 (Blitzer 
1981:p. xi) discussed the emergency powers concept. According to one 
twentieth century Harrington scholar and editor, “At the time of the 
American Revolution . . . Harrington’s writings . . . reached the peak of 
their popularity in this country, and Harrington himself enjoyed among 
American political theorists and practitioners a reputation second only 
to that of John Locke” (Pocock 1977:129–130, 150). In Harrington’s plan, 
the legislature sets up a special council with extraordinary, as he calls it, 
“Dictatorian” powers (Pocock, 1977:254). Such a council would have 
complete military command and legislative authority. Harrington cites 
the survival of the commonwealth as abrogating normal legal and moral 
constraints. More recently, the rationale of emergency executive powers 
was made by two political theorists of the Cold War era. Clinton Rossiter, 
in his 1948 Constitutional Dictatorship, used the period of 1919–1933 as 
a time of emergency, comparing the Unites States, Great Britain, France, 
and Germany. Perhaps even more pointedly, Rossiter discusses the United 
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States during the great depression and the Second World War as an exam-
ple of a constitutional dictatorship. Carl Friedrich (1957) also addressed 
the issue, reviewing political theorists from Machiavelli through Hegel.
The Nature of Law and the State
As states extend their authority throughout a society, they override and 
subsume alternative sources of authority—corporate kin groups, religious 
organizations, and whatever stands in the way of total control. A principal 
means by which they gain control is law. The state makes laws that cre-
ate and take account of individualized, legal persons. The law substitutes 
these persons for families, religious orders, and so on. Instead of corporate 
responsibility, the state creates several, or individual, responsibilies under 
law. State formation relies on individualization through law, which is most 
apparent when examining archaic protostates. Emerging states character-
istically create a census-tax-conscription system. The census enumerates 
individuals, taxes them, and conscripts them into armies or public labor. 
Individuals become assets of the state (Diamond 1971). As states begin to 
emerge, laws vie with customs as arbiters of social conflict. Criminal law 
replaces tort.
The intention of the civil power is epitomized in the sanctions against 
homicide and suicide—typical of early polities; indeed, they were among 
the first civil laws. Just as the sovereign is said to own the land, intimat-
ing the mature right of eminent domain, so the individual is ultimately 
conceived as the chattel of the state. Persons are conceived as les choses du 
monarchque (Diamond 1971:252). 
This process does not represent some enlightened and progres-
sive development in human rights, but the assertion of authority by a 
new political form—the state. Without a state, societies treat homicide 
as a tort, but once the state emerges, the blow striking down a person be -
comes the deprivation of a political, economic, and military resource to the 
sovereign. Unlike societies where corporate groups sought compensation, 
the state resorts to its definitive response, that of retaliation; hence the law 
of the talion so characteristic of early states. State ideology rationalizes lex 
talionis (law of retaliation) as punishment. Nonetheless, the process of an 
emerging concept of criminal law and punishment does not occur with-
out, often violent, conflict. Laws create the individual subject of the law, 
often with grades or variations of rights and obligations depending on the 
subject’s status. As Max Weber put it, the content of law is determined by 
status (1925:144).
It is a hallmark of rationalizing modernism to separate status and class. 
Equality before the law increasingly means abolishing status distinction 
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regarding rights and obligations. American law no longer distinguishes 
rights and obligations based on race, those based on gender are fast 
diminishing, and various other status designations are losing legal expres-
sion. The trends in law are toward regulating class-based social relations. 
Consequently, the American criminal justice system keeps order by apply-
ing criminal law to the lowest classes, civil law to the middling classes—the 
professions, technicians, managers, and the like—and corporate law to the 
ruling classes. In this case, “corporate law” refers to the business corpora-
tion along with the older sense of “corporate” referring to kin groups and 
the similar structures. The content of the law changes, and so does the 
ontological status of those subject to the law (Chambliss 1964:77).
The law, in its totality, is a sign that stands for force. It is in this sense 
that law and the state coemerge. As the state claims a monopoly on vio-
lence so it claims a monopoly on coining the law. At the same time, the 
state normalizes the law. Less necessary in absolutist governments where, 
force, violence, and law exhibit quotidian links and forgetfulness of the 
force behind law reaches its apotheosis in liberal democracies. It is in 
law’s “representativity that originary violence is consigned to oblivion. 
This amnesic loss of consciousness does not happen by accident. . . . The 
parliaments live in forgetfulness of the violence from which they were 
born” (Derrida 1992:47). Derrida was commenting on Walter Benjamin’s 
1921 essay, “Critique of Violence.” Benjamin singles out police violence.
Its power is formless, like its nowhere tangible, all-pervasive, ghostly pres-
ence in the life of civilized states. . . . Their spirit is less devastating where 
they represent, in absolute monarch, the power of a ruler in which legislative 
and executive supremacy are united, than in democracies where their exis-
tence, elevated by no such relation, bears witness to the greatest conceivable 
degeneration of violence. . . . All violence as a means is either law making 
or law preserving. If it lays claim to neither of these predicates, it forfeits all 
validity (287).
. . . For the function of violence in lawmaking is twofold, in the sense 
that lawmaking pursues as its end, with violence as the means, what is to 
be established as law, but at the moment of instatement does not dismiss 
violence; rather, at this very moment of lawmaking, it specifically establishes 
as law not an end unalloyed by violence but one necessarily and intimately 
bound to it, under the title of power. Lawmaking is power making, and, to 
that extent, an immediate manifestation of violence (295). 
Eerily, Egon Bittner (1967) made a similar point about police as the armed 
force of the state. It is eerie because each was writing in the penumbra of 
failed revolutions, Benjamin of 1919 and Bittner of 1968, in which state 
police forces crushed rebellions against state power. Benjamin’s point is 
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broader than Bittner’s. What Bittner had in mind was the local cop-on-
the-beat kind of policing. Benjamin addressed the police power of the state 
in general, state-regulated order. However that regulation may be carried 
out in a particular circumstance, the force and violence of the state always 
lie underneath. Robert M. Cover applied the concept to judicial interpreta-
tion, but his insights are generalizable to all applications of law.
Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death. This is true 
in several senses. Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition 
of violence upon others: a judge articulates her understanding of a text, 
and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his  children, 
even his life. Interpretations in law also constitute justifications for vio-
lence—which has already occurred or which is about to occur. When 
interpreters have finished their work, they frequently leave behind victims 
whose lives have been torn apart by these organized, social practices of 
violence. Neither legal interpretation nor the violence it occasions may 
be properly understood apart from one another. This much is obvious 
though: the growing literature that argues for the centrality of interpretive 
practices in law blithely ignores it (Cover 1986:1601).
Hegemony: The Liberal Approach
The liberal bourgeois state rationalizes its control by appeals to consent. 
In fact, such rationalizations are similar to that of hypocrisy as the hom-
age vice pays to virtue (François, duc de La Rochefoucauld in Bartlett 
1919:9529). Mass polities cannot be ruled without consent. By the end of 
the Franco-Prussian War (1871), the bourgeoisie, the capitalist or owning 
class, had gained control of the state apparatuses in the leading capitalist 
countries in Europe and North America. Nonetheless, control of the state 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for hegemony. Coincident with 
the reorganization of monopoly and neocolonial capitalism, the ruling 
classes gradually came to control the various cultural apparatuses. This 
allowed them to manufacture consent in Michael Buroway’s felicitous 
phrase (1979). They were so successful that among the main belliger-
ents, the masses rushed to the support of their governments for the First 
World War.
The critical usage of the concept of hegemony comes from Antonio 
Gramsci’s development of the notion in Prison Notebooks (1971). That 
work, and Anne S. Sassoon’s (1980, 1987) explication of his political 
writings, informs the following discussion. The ability to set rules and 
boundaries defines hegemony. Hegemonic control takes two forms: 
leadership of allies and domination of adversaries. In the world capitalist 
system since the Second World War, two organizations exemplify both 
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strategies: the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). They 
coordinate cooperative efforts among the major owners of the world while 
at the same time they keep in line periphery governments that might oth-
erwise resist or challenge international capitalist supremacy. The fractal 
nature of the structure of hegemony remains critical for understanding its 
functioning. The United States holds the majority voice at both the IMF 
and World Bank, with Japan and Britain playing second leads. The same 
neoliberal strategies applied by these two world institutions, especially 
with respect to developing countries, shows up in national neoliberal eco-
nomic policies in the United States and Britain, where they became known 
as Reaganism and Thatcherism respectively. At a far lower level in terms of 
volume of capital, the same principles and kinds of relationships manifest 
at local levels among small-town Babbitts. Hegemony, therefore, has both 
vertical and horizontal dimensions. Horizontally, the hegemonic class 
guides the levers of culture—the mass media, education, arts, and so on. 
Note that the operative verb is “guide,” not control. That is, hegemony 
eschews domination or micromanaging. Vertically, hegemony replicates 
its patterns from the highest levels of the world political economy down 
to the lowest, where it operates in isolated villages of tribal peoples in the 
Amazon and Andes. In such places and their equivalents throughout the 
world, peoples who had first contact with the West only a generation or 
two ago, find themselves dealing with international oil conglomerates like 
Shell and Chevron.
The analytic power of the concept of hegemony grows out of its utility 
in providing a theory of class struggle. Class struggle entails a relational 
concept of class. Classes define each other. “There can be no slaveholders 
without slaves, no lords without serfs, no capitalists without workers.” 
Moreover, the means of production mediate these class relationships. 
The question is always who owns the means of production and who 
has to work for the owners. (Parenti 2007:251). At the same time, the 
phenomenology of class relationships depends on perceptions of a dif-
ferent moment in the productive process—commodities. Classes, actually 
people in class relations, perceive each other and themselves through the 
spectacle of commodities (Debord 1967). At least since the 1920s, people 
get their identities from their lifestyles, from the commodities they con-
sume (Marchand 1985). Many of those defining commodities come from 
the culture industries (Horkheimer and Adorno 1944). Gramsci tied both 
the structural analytic of hegemony and its phenomenological counterpart 
to the state arguing that 
not only the philosophy of praxis does not exclude ethical-political his-
tory but that on the contrary its most recent phase of development consists 
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precisely in the vindication of the moment of hegemony as essential to its 
conception of the State and in the “exploitation” of the cultural factor, of 
cultural activity, of a cultural front which is as necessary as the merely eco-
nomic and political ones. 
(Sassoon 1987:111 [her emphasis] citing Gramsci 1975:1224)
Gramsci argues that the state is central in class hegemony. Not only does 
the state monopolize violence and administer forceful coercion, but it is at 
the center of managing the ideological apparatus (Althusser and Balibar 
1968) and culture industries. As an obvious example of the latter, con-
sider the central role of the U.S. Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) in managing the broadcast media. Unlike Michel Foucault’s (1978) 
vague and decentered governmentality where controlling powers diffuse 
throughout society in a capillary structure, Pierre Bourdieu (1972, 1997) 
analyzed the molding of mass obedience primarily through state agencies. 
The agencies are not the repressive apparatuses of police power, but more 
like Gramsci’s extended state. Primary schools, for instance, instill an 
automatic inclination to form lines to wait in turn. Whether of a liberal or 
authoritarian cast, these examples embodied forms of obedience in pres-
ent regimes—a template for organizing compliance. Embodied obedience 
lies beyond conscious deliberation or analysis.
Hegemony relies as much or more on shaping consciousness, desires, 
and values as it does on threats, force, and physical coercion. Nonetheless, 
these latter coercive strategies always remain ready when cultural appara-
tuses go awry. State forms of control under liberal bourgeois regimes dif-
fer from authoritarian regimes in the relative emphasis each puts on the 
cultural centers and on the manner of their management. Liberal regimes 
manipulate laws and regulations to favor one message over another—for 
example, the FCC changes regulations so that an owner could own 
more than one broadcast outlet in a market. An inevitable result was 
the semimonopoly of Clear Channel in radio across the United States. 
Authoritarian regimes rely more on force such as outright censorship and 
state monopolization of the airwaves. Liberal hegemonies marginalize dis-
sent; authoritarian ones suppress it, often with force and violent coercion.
Authoritarian Control
After the First World War, authoritarian regimes took power in all devel-
oped countries except those of the North Atlantic rim. They emerged 
neither accidentally nor incidentally. Authoritarian states signal a solution 
to the crisis of production of the 1920s. Several historical currents set the 
stage. The war had wrenched the last grip of the old feudal aristocracy 
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from the tiller of the state, most notably in Germany and Russia. Without 
state support, the class of large rentiers could not sustain economic viabil-
ity. The frenzy of industrial destruction during the war, the exhaustion 
of neocolonialism to support profits, and the failure to provide sufficient 
markets led to the financial collapse at the end of the decade. These his-
torically specific forces expressed the long-term crisis of the falling rate of 
profit, the engine of capital. Capital reorganization offered a solution.
What Gramsci called Fordism, alternatively termed Americanism, 
introduced mass production and mass consumption (1971:279–318). 
Mobilization of the masses had been a crucial part of the War with its 
enormous armies. Such statist techniques applied to industry after the 
war ended. Concurrent with the social reorganization of production 
came technological changes. Frederick W. Taylor (1856–1915) brought 
the two together by applying machine-oriented discipline to labor 
(Maier 1970:30). Taylorism formed the technological core of Fordism. 
Innovations in machinery, transport, and chemistry contributed to the 
modernization of the world economy. Factories turned to electrifica-
tion with the turbine taking over from the steam engine. Mechanization 
also helped increase agricultural output along with the use of synthetic 
fertilizers and pesticides. Especially in the western settlement countries—
Argentina, Australia, Canada, the United States, and Uruguay—efficient 
agricultural production overshadowed the local agriculture in Europe 
(Federico 2005) putting even more pressure on the landed elites and 
impoverishing the rural working class. Militant labor resistance became a 
major political crisis following the First World War. In the United States, 
the Red Scare of 1919 combined with the suppression of the antiwar left 
to crush the most militant labor organizations such as the Industrial 
Workers of the World (IWW). In Europe, elites turned to other means.
Italian Fascism
At first, movements across the political spectrum in Italy included the 
term “fascist,” a reference to the ancient fasces, which was a symbol of 
power, vitality, and unity dating back to Etruscan times. In 1919, Mussolini 
founded the Fasci di Combattimento, a movement that combined militant 
nationalism with vociferous demands for political and social renewal. Its 
strident antisocialist actions included Black Shirt(camicie nere, CCNN, or 
squadristi) attacks on socialist and labor demonstrations. In the elections 
of April 1921, the Fascist political party (Parito Nazionale Fascista, PNF) 
gained 35 out of 535 parliamentary seats, relying mainly on member-
ship from unemployed veterans of the war with its political base in the 
urban, industrialized north. Its antisocialism and anti-Bolshevism drew 
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support from industrialists made uneasy by massive strike waves. Large 
estate owners soon joined in after rural strikes in 1919 and 1920. Although 
originally conceived as a military assault, the March on Rome in October 
1922 drew support from financiers, industrialists, landowners, and impor-
tant elements of the aristocracy and royal family, not least King Vittorio 
Emmanuele III himself, who appointed Mussolini prime minister on 
October 30. Benito Mussolini presided over a coalition government domi-
nated by non-Fascists. A combination of government acts such as dismiss-
ing striking railway workers and Blackshirt local violence fomented fear of 
revolution or civil war. Under anxieties of civil dissolution, the parliament 
voted to change the election laws on July 15, 1923, giving the Fascists a 
majority. Mussolini’s fascist political party (PNF) and its allies won the 
elections of 1924 with a two-thirds majority. Fascist assassins murdered 
Giacomo Matteotti, a socialist member of parliament on June 11, 1924, 
soon after his anti-Fascist speech in parliament. The king continued his 
support of Mussolini who used it to establish a totalitarian, Fascist state, in 
which power was concentrated in his hands, and where the Fascist move-
ment came to dominate virtually all aspects of Italian life. Trade unions 
were banned, and the judiciary came under Fascist control (Bosworth 
2006; Gallo 1964).
The speech of Benedetto Croce in the Italian Senate demonstrates 
liberal bourgeois capitulation to Fascism during a time of social cri-
ses, fears of mass uprisings, and leftist political movements. Although 
later a staunch critic of Fascism, when he could have said something to 
stem Fascism’s advance, Croce helped persuade the senators to support 
Mussolini after the murder of Matteotti. He concluded his address to the 
Senate saying, “We must allow time for Fascism to complete its process of 
change; our vote will be prudent and patriotic.” Subsequently the Senate 
voted 225 to 21 with 6 abstentions to support Mussolini’s government 
(Gallo 1964:188). 
It is frequently forgotten that the word “totalitarian” originated in Italy. 
First applied to Mussolini’s rule in May 1923 by critics, the title totalitarian 
was taken up by the regime after 1925 and applied to itself. On 28 October 
that year, for the third anniversary of the March on Rome, Mussolini 
coined the formula that Fascism meant a system in which “all is for the 
state, nothing is outside the state, nothing and no one are against the state” 
(Bosworth 2006:215).
German Nazism
The First World War ended with a revolution. Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated 
November 9, 1918, and a parliamentary government under Friedrich Ebert 
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of the Socialist Party (SPD) took control of the state, agreeing that an armi-
stice would commence on November 11. The interim government eventu-
ally led to the establishment of the Weimar Republic. By December 31, the 
Spartacist League of revolutionary socialists under the leadership of Rosa 
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht formed the Communist Party(KPD). 
By January 1919, the KPD led mass uprisings against the government, 
which used the remnants of the army to crush the revolt and assassinate 
Luxemburg and Liebknecht. In Germany, the socialists played the role 
of the left wing of the bourgeoisie, preferring order to equality. Having 
gained control of the government, they used the armed force of the state to 
ensure against revolution. Nonetheless, the socialists failed to win over the 
right wing and reactionary movements, which fashioned their own armed 
forces from disgruntled and unemployed veterans such as the Freikorps 
and Stahlhelm.
From 1920 to 1923, reactionary forces continued fighting against the 
Weimar Republic and left-wing political opponents. In 1920, Wolfgang 
Kapp in the Kapp Putsch briefly overthrew the German government. Mass 
public demonstrations forced the short-lived regime out of power. The 
newly formed National Socialist German Worker’s Party (Nationalsozial-
istische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP)—Nazis—under the leadership 
of Adolf Hitler and with the support of former German army commander 
in chief Erich von Ludendorff, entered into political violence against the 
government and leftist political forces as well. On November 9, 1923, in 
what is now known as the Beer Hall Putsch, the Nazis took control of 
parts of Munich, arresting the President of Bavaria, the chief of police, 
and others and forced them to sign an agreement in which they endorsed 
the Nazi takeover and the Nazi objective to overthrow the German 
government. The putsch came to an end when the German army and police 
were called in to put it down resulting in an armed confrontation where a 
number of Nazis and some police were killed. Tried for treason before 
an openly sympathetic court, Hitler and his coconspirators served only 
months in prison.
The bourgeois socialism of the Weimar Republic appeared to offer a 
solution similar to that of liberal bourgeois regimes in the United States 
and Britain. In fact, it paved the way for the Nazi seizure of power in 
1933 and the establishment of the Third Reich. Once the Nazis seized the 
 government, they passed a series of laws giving them control of the state 
and centralizing state power: the Enabling Act of March 23, 1933, gave law-
making power to the Nazi government while two Gleichschaltung laws of 
March 31 and April 7, 1933, centralized state power in Berlin and diluted 
the authority of the federated German states. Also, a series of decrees 
and organizational laws forbid competing political parties established a 
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unified state labor council, subordinated churches to a Ministry of 
Ecclesiastical Affairs, and generally took command of all organizations and 
cultural apparatuses. As in the case of Mussolini and his fascists, Hitler and 
the Nazis quickly gained hegemony.
Stalinist USSR
Though it may seem strange to argue that Stalinist authoritarianism 
responded to the falling rate of profit in the world capitalist system, it is 
not inapropos. After the Bolshevik revolution of November 1917, Russia 
plunged into civil war until 1923, with the heaviest fighting ending by 
1921. Among other consequences, it devastated the economy. Partly as a 
measure to repair the economy and partly because the Soviet leadership 
lacked enough technical expertise, the Bolshevik government promulgated 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) March 21, 1921, lasting until Stalin con-
solidated power and instituted the first five-year plan and collectivization 
of agriculture in 1928. Under the NEP, the USSR was a mixed capitalist 
economy with some socialist elements. Therefore, Stalin’s accession came 
out of a period when long-term forces affecting world capitalism still buf-
feted the country. Moreover, the world stood on the brink of the great col-
lapse triggered by the U.S. stock market crash of October 24–29, 1929.
Unlike Mussolini and Hitler, however, Stalin did not climb to rule 
through parliamentary politics, but via bureaucratic maneuvering within 
the party and state apparatuses. Beginning in 1928, the country underwent 
a second revolution, or rather its real revolution began after a mere seizure 
of state power in 1917. The five-year plans for industrialization and the 
collectivization of agriculture constituted violent class warfare. “Molotov, 
who became premier in 1930, encouraged the ‘unleashing of the revolu-
tionary forces of the working class and poor and middle peasants’” (Overy 
2004:43). In 1934, the same year that Hitler eliminated the possibility of 
intraparty challenges by his purge of Ernest Röhm and the disbanding 
of the Sturmabteilung, the Brown shirts, Stalin used the murder of Kirov 
(Sergei Kostrikov) to put himself beyond challenge and beyond law. A new 
law allowed the secret police, the OGPU, to arrest terrorist suspects, try 
them secretly and in absentia, and execute them at once (53). From then 
on, under Stalin, the USSR became an authoritarian regime controlling 
every aspect of society. 
The Role of Terror in Authoritarian Control
Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin were certainly dictators, but they were popu-
lar dictators. They, and the regimes they headed, had the kind of support 
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that elected heads of government could only envy. Continual polling and 
market research to which most people have become accustomed was in 
its infancy when these authoritarian regimes took control, but from all 
historical accounts the people of Italy, Germany, and the USSR did not just 
comply with their leaders, they adored them. That is because authoritarian-
ism is an expression of populism. The fulcrum of that populism is terror.
There is a cartoon in which two white-coated, professorial types are 
speaking over a Skinner box, and one is telling the other that placing a 
cat in the box greatly improves the speed of the rats running the maze. 
Nothing motivates like fear, and gratitude is accorded to those who promise 
protection. Authoritarian regimes rely on this simple psychology. Author-
itarian regimes do not terrorize their nations. They point to enemies who 
would terrorize without the state’s protection. Those propaganda films 
showing happy workers and the like spun out by the state in Germany and 
the USSR put an especially glossy façade on the picture, but it was not much 
of a distortion. Most Germans, Italians, and Russians found the 1930s a 
better time than the preceding years. A sense of security suffused the new 
political and economic conditions in contrast to those of the First World 
War and its aftermath. At the same time, they knew that enemies lurked. 
There were foreign, external, and internal enemies—terrorists, wreckers, 
saboteurs, and traitors. A firm hand was needed to ensure the people’s 
safety.
Stalin’s whole political outlook was shaped by a central dualism between 
virtuous Bolshevik revolutionary and counter-revolutionary opponent 
[sic]. “We have internal enemies. We have external enemies,” announced 
Stalin in 1928 during the Shakhaty show trial: “This comrades must not be 
forgotten for a single moment.” . . . Enemies  were always defined as part 
of a network of terror. 
(Overy 2004:177)
. . . Hitler’s attitude to the enemy shared the inflammatory language and 
alien characterization of the Soviet model. In a speech in 1934 he told the 
audience that his movement had saved the German people “from Red ter-
ror.” . . . The enemy was sustained, in Hitler’s view, by alien forces, predomi-
nantly by Jews and Bolsheviks (178–179). 
The Führerprinzip, or in the case of Stalin, the cult of personality 
(Khrushchev 1956), did not eliminate complaints, grumblings, or even 
straightforward political dissent in the three-model authoritarian  societies. 
For the USSR, Sarah Davies (1997); for Germany, Detelev Peukert (1987); 
and for Italy, Luisa Passerini (1986) have shown with varying degrees of 
documentation that the respective publics did not swallow the regimes’ 
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propaganda whole. Nonetheless, the great majority did not just comply 
upon threat of punishment; they actively supported their governments 
even while criticizing particular policies (Gellately 2001; Geyer and 
Fitzpatrick 2009; Bosworth 2006). Even in authoritarian polities, regimes 
do not control the masses and their opinions; they shape and manage 
them mainly through instruments of the state.
Whether, therefore, the masses of Germany, Italy, and the USSR agreed 
or dissented mattered less than their bio-emotional inclination to comply. 
The state remains instrumental in providing the foundation for a willing 
population. Fear builds on that foundation fueled by propaganda but also 
by real threats, even if those threats come from the state itself.
The very real social, economic, and political dislocations of the First 
World War, its immediate aftermath, and the global economic crisis begin-
ning in the late 1920s proved real enough threats and risks. Nonetheless, 
everyday life does not comport well with global and abstract analyses. 
The co-worker who beats a person out of a promotion, a shopkeeper 
who cheats a purchaser, the landlord who evicts, and similar figures play 
the role of concrete dangers. On top of such quotidian insults, there were 
breakdowns in providing essential goods and services, strikes, the hyper-
inflation in Germany, civil war in Russia, and other severe interruptions of 
predictable social relations. In the Soviet Union, famine presented existen-
tial threats. Some of the threats under the authoritarian regimes were of 
their own making. For example, the collectivization of agriculture initiated 
by Stalin in 1928 at least exacerbated, if not caused, famine. The social 
chaos of the 1920s and early 1930s lent itself to authoritarian regimes 
identifying particular enemies of the people who played concrete roles that 
inspired fear and terror—that is, scapegoats.
In Germany, the chaos followed on modernization, democratization, 
and economic collapse. Society had fundamentally changed as a result of 
the disintegration of class boundaries and mass impoverishment; social 
stability had simply collapsed. The question of one’s place in society and 
the meaning of one’s own existence presented itself anew with unexpected 
sharpness. Accordingly, a cultural orientation with changed perceptions of 
reality emerged in the postwar years. Tradition and cultural legacy no lon-
ger constituted the defining categories of this orientation; rather it formed 
around the desire for a new order with long term stability. “Space” (Raum) 
with “people” (Volk) could be understood as eternal concepts, as could 
“soil,” “race,” and “art” (Baberowski and Doering-Manteuffel 2009:187).
Similarly in Russia, disruptions of the defeat in the First World War, the 
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 civil war, and the contradictions of the New 
Economic Policy combined with state-engineered modernization begun 
under the Czarist regime. Ambiguity edging into social chaos had been a 
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reality in the USSR for almost two decades by the time Stalin asserted his 
suzerainty. Not entirely unfounded paranoia found purchase in the USSR of 
the 1930s: the Nazis in Germany and fascist regimes in southern and east-
ern Europe, spy mania, fear of foreigners, and xenophobia combined with 
the capitalist powers invasions during the civil war and their support for 
 subversives (210). These factors provided the background of fear. The terror 
and police state repression secured the fear in the authoritarian regimes.
Terrorizing the Masses
The Czarist regime doubtless deserved its reputation as the most repres-
sive in Europe well before the Bolshevik Revolution. Nonetheless, the 
Bolsheviks did not do away with police state tactics once they seized 
control of the state. Soon after the October 1917 revolution, Lenin estab-
lished the Cheka (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating 
Counter-Revolution and Sabotage) as a secret police organization. It was 
succeeded by the OGPU, NKVD, KGB, and FSB (currently under the 
new Russia). Despite name changes, their main functions have remained 
remarkably similar.
 “In the 1930s the Stalinists never felt they controlled the country. 
Transportation and communication were poor, and the regime’s repre-
sentatives were few in number, especially outside the cities” (Getty and 
Naumov 1999:15). The Stalinist terror began in the highest levels of the 
ruling party. The expulsion of Trotsky and his followers was followed 
by a purge of the so-called rightists—Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky. 
Nonetheless, police state tactics were already operating in the countryside 
against peasants resisting collectivization and more generally against ban-
dits who roamed relatively freely in a nation not yet recovered from war 
and economic disruption. While Stalin consolidated his power 1928–1932, 
“the Bolsheviks believed that they were involved in a life-or-death ‘class 
war’ against ‘capitalist elements in society. . . . Party discipline took on 
an even more military character than before” (43). The party and its 
police apparatus enforced the Bolshevik revolution violently resulting 
in untold deaths, possibly in the millions. Most such deaths came from 
famine and other generalized conditions and not from deliberate execu-
tions (Thurston 1996). The focused terror began in 1937 when the NKVD 
killed about three quarters of a million, some of whom were party leaders 
but most were ordinary citizens and foreigners (Baberowski and Doering-
Manteuffel 2009; Getty and Naumov 1999). This latter was the Great 
Terror of 1937–1938.
The Nazi terror was far less deadly until the Second World War 
began. Part of the reason resides in the greater degree of development 
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in Germany. Living conditions were less perilous. The Gestapo and 
SS (Sicherheitdienst, SD) arrested tens of thousands. They executed some 
leading Communists and union leaders, but most went to concentration 
camps. Many were tortured, but not interred. Of those sent to the camps, 
most were mistreated, and then released. About 80,000 spent some time 
in the camps prior to Kristallnacht, November 9–10, 1938 (Gellately 
2007:302–303). “Coercion and violence were limited and predictable and 
thus different from the arbitrary and sweeping terror of the Soviet Union” 
(303). Popular media informed the Germans that these measures coun-
teracted Communism. Consequently, public opinion generally supported 
it, and even applauded it. “The Nazis had grown so confident about their 
support from the population by the end of 1933 that they seriously con-
sidered getting rid of both the Gestapo and the camps” (303). Gradually, 
the same tactics applied to outcast ethnic groups, most notably Jews and 
other so-called asocials such as homosexuals. The mass pogrom marked by 
Kristallnacht began a new and different kind of terror eventuating in the 
Final Solution. Nonetheless, most Germans supported this focused kind 
of terror (Burleigh 2001; Burleigh and Wippermann 1991; Fritzsche 1990, 
1998; Gellately 1990; Johnson 1999).
The years 1933–1934 marked social upheaval and economic depriva-
tion throughout the world. In the United States, Franklin Roosevelt’s New 
Deal constituted the remedy. It followed and promoted the liberal welfare-
state solution. It also put the state into the daily lives of most Americans 
to a degree unimaginable just decades before. Moreover, FDR carried out 
many New Deal policies and practices as if acting with plenary powers 
under a state of emergency. Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin faced similar 
disruptive social conditions, albeit with great variation among those 
countries. Their anodyne followed the authoritarian strategy. At some 
point, certainly by September 2001, many of the authoritarian strategies 
displayed by the authoritarian triumvirate came to the United States. 
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Chapter 4
Law and Terror
The United States—especially since the 9/11 attacks, but beginning even before—ran the biggest counterterror apparatus in the world. It has 
many components including the military and various national defense and 
intelligence agencies. A main part of the counterterror effort involves the 
criminal justice system. The 9/11 attacks transformed this already formi-
dable bureaucracy into a veritable leviathan, or maybe behemoth would 
be more apt. In any case, after 9/11, the federal government undertook the 
largest single reorganization in more than forty years by, inter alia, creat-
ing the Department of Homeland Security. The FBI alone conducts over 
10,000 terror investigations a year (TRAC 2003). As of May 2006, federal 
agencies maintained surveillance and ongoing investigation of 6,472 indi-
viduals as terror suspects (TRAC 2006). Despite over 4,000 referrals for 
prosecution, the U.S. Justice Department prosecuted only about a third 
and only about a fifth of the suspects were convicted. The median sentence 
upon conviction was less than a month—28 days (TRAC 2006). What 
accounts for such meager results on such an enormous effort?
Despite far reaching antiterror laws, the United States, like other coun-
tries with a common law tradition, uses procedural accountability in its 
criminal justice system. The backbone of this accountability traces its 
ancestry and logic to the common law. Common law procedural require-
ments have been and continue to be a bulwark protecting individuals 
against state power. Therefore, whenever the state wields its penal power 
in new ways or in new areas, the common law can stymie freebooting state 
control. While that is one explanation for the inefficient counterterror law 
enforcement, there are other perspectives offering a more revealing picture 
of the relationships among the state, its laws and subjects, and common 
law procedures. While the common law reins in state abuse, it acts on a 
case-by-case, individual basis. Prosecution in a rational legal system, how-
ever, is not necessarily the best measure of the state’s counterterror policy. 
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While prosecutions may suffer inefficiencies, the effect of greater social 
control and aggrandized state power through policing and surveillance is 
perhaps the real point of state counterterrorism.
Law and the State
Almost all governments, which exist at present or of which there remains 
any record in history, have been founded originally—by usurpation or 
conquest, or both—without any pretence of a fair consent or voluntary 
subjection of the people (Hume 1758:189–190).
All law expresses the power of the state. It articulates the parts of society 
organized under state polity. “Law channels and imposes the force of the 
state” (Merry 1990:10). Law is ideological. It makes a framework for sym-
bols and categories. For example, the current ideology of law in the United 
States includes categories such as public versus private law, criminal versus 
civil, regulatory and administrative law, and so on. Law creates entities 
such as citizens and other persons, both fictive and natural. It creates con-
cepts such as terrorism, fraud, unfair labor practices, and so on ad infini-
tum. No matter the circumstance, force is always in the offing. Commonly, 
violent force remains umbral, but as Robert Cover observed, “Legal inter-
pretation takes place in a field of pain and death” (1986:1601).
Transgressions of the law are always at their foundation lese-majesty, 
because they challenge state power. This applies to all laws, no matter 
how removed from the paradigm of lese-majesty, that is, treason. In those 
legal areas where state hegemony is most solidly established, because of 
long usage and accommodation to the interests of the most powerful 
social elements, the violent force of the law remains clothed in a velvet 
glove. Consider an intellectual property lawsuit in a most decorous fed-
eral courtroom. Let one of the parties refuse to comply with the judge’s 
order and insult the bench, and armed guards may drag the individual to 
be locked in irons. For an extreme version, recall the courtroom setting 
of the Chicago Eight. Following the 1968 Democratic National Conven-
tion, the United States charged eight individuals with inciting a riot: 
David Dellinger, Rennie Davis, Tom Hayden, Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, 
Lee Weiner, John Froines, and Bobby Seale. The last was the special target 
of the ire of federal Judge Julius Hoffman who had him bound to his chair 
and gagged. Ultimately, law brings to bear the power of the state wherever 
and whenever someone calls it into play.
Law is closest to enforcing prohibitions on lese-majesty and most 
directly uses violent force at times and places where the state’s hegemony 
is unclear. It may be unclear for a variety of reasons, for example when 
the state has moved into a new arena such as labor management in the 
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post–Civil War era, or because there are real challenges to state authority. 
At such times, law’s iron fist breaks through the velvet glove.
The state’s use of law regarding terror illustrates the generalization. 
Especially since 9/11, but originating before then, countries throughout the 
world have passed new legislation on terror. Among them are the common 
law countries—Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. In addition to the common law tradition, these countries trace 
direct ancestry to the British Empire—the largest empire in history. At its 
height, it contained about one-fourth of the world’s population (Maddison 
2001:98, 242) and land surface (Ferguson 2004:4, 15). The imperial lineage 
has direct bearing on the establishment of the legal antiterror apparatus. 
The main U.S. terror law is codified as a criminal statute at 18 USC 
2331 et seq. It originated in 1984 with a major extension in the 1996 Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. After the attacks of 9/11, the 
USA Patriot Act amended the law, and there have been regular amendments 
since. The Australian laws include the Criminal Code Amendment (Hamas 
and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba) Act 2003, the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation Amendment Act 2003, and the Criminal Code Amendment 
(Terrorist Organisations) Act 2004. For Canada, it is Bill C-36, The Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2006, and finally, the UK Terrorism Act of 2000 as 
amended through 2006. All punish crimes against state authority—the 
lese-majesty principle. The laws of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States—Canada provides the exception—also contain the concept 
of crimes of association or status. That is, they outlaw certain kinds of 
social relations as opposed to specific behavior.
With slight variation, the terror laws of these countries define terror-
ism in ways similar to the U.S. terrorism law: “As used in this chapter 
[18 USCS §§ 2331 et seq.]—(1) the term ‘international terrorism’ means 
activities that—(A) involve violent acts . . . ; (B) appear to be intended—
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy 
of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct 
of a government . . . ”
In short, the laws define terrorism as a political crime against the state. 
In addition, they go beyond the usual kind of criminal statute, say a law 
against homicide or armed robbery, in that terrorism is not confined to 
acts of theft and mayhem. Instead, terrorism is a crime of association and 
intention. They even go beyond typical criminal statutes against conspiracy. 
Criminal conspiracy requires more than loose talk. Conspirators must 
have definite and concrete plans—not just, for example, saying it would be 
a good idea to blow up an airliner. Also, conspirators must take concrete 
action to put their plans into play. Prosecutors would be unlikely to get a 
conspiracy conviction for the so-called London airplane bomb plot, since 
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the would-be plotters lacked flight reservations, and some did not even 
have passports (Roston, Myers, and NBC 2006).
Terror laws and agents of the state who enforce them make arrests based 
on Internet chat room dialogue, purchase of otherwise innocuous material 
like hydrogen peroxide or nail polish remover, contributions to charities, 
artworks, and the like. This is not the stuff to gain convictions for crimi-
nal conspiracies. Terror legislation makes a crime of association and of 
thought. It more closely resembles political crimes familiar from the past, 
those concerned with sedition and red scares.
Nonetheless, terror laws do not differ from other criminal laws at a more 
basic level. Today’s criminal codes bear the results of centuries of smooth-
ing over and refinement stemming from their clashes with the common 
law, especially the requirements of due process, rules of evidence, and the 
like. Countless criminal trials, in which defense lawyers evaded convictions 
for their clients based on procedural missteps, have worn off the sharpest 
edges of most criminal statutes. Still, like pebbles in a riverbed, they share 
the same composition as rocks sheltered from the elements that still show 
signs of their violent birth. As those sheltered rocks will reveal more about 
their origins than riverbed pebbles, the terror laws reveal more about the 
nature of the law.
Law, Custom, and the State
In his critical history of the state, Fredrick Engels (1891) observed that 
“an essential characteristic of the state is the existence of a public force 
differentiated from the mass of people (106). The lowest police officer in 
the civilized state has more ‘authority’ than all the organs of gentile [tribal] 
society put together” (156).
My argument has three parts. First, the criminal justice policies of these 
states reveal the iron fist of the law, stemming from perceived challenges to 
their authority, which the laws denote as terrorism; second, all laws origi-
nate as assertions of state authority by calling upon the state’s power of 
violent force; and third, common law principles of due process and justice 
offer some defense against the state’s power, but the common law is really 
a formal, recorded expression of custom, which differs from law and can 
thwart it only through political action.
Stanley Diamond (1978) argued that “[t]he relation between custom 
and law is, basically, one of contradiction not continuity” (241). Paul 
Bohannon made the alternative argument that law grows out of custom 
in his 1968 article on law (73–78). Relying on Jeremy Bentham and Henry 
Maine, Diamond said the formation of the state and law are mutually 
dependent processes. There is no state without law and no law without a 
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state. He contrasts social rules in nonstate societies where custom reigns. 
A distinguishing characteristic of nonstate societies are alternative social 
formations—corporate kin groups, age-grade sets, secret societies, and so 
on—and corporate responsibility for delicts and debts. State formation is 
a process. States do not just come into being and then carry on business 
as usual. All states, whenever they may have first appeared, continually 
reform in a dialectical process, perhaps not unlike the continual adapta-
tion of biological species in evolutionary dialectics.
The processual view applies to all states, from those that are nascent 
and fragile to mature, cohesive states such as those of western Europe and 
North America, and to decrepit or disintegrating states. As states extend 
their authority throughout a society, they override and subsume alterna-
tive sources of authority—corporate kin groups, religious organizations, 
and whatever stands in the way of total hegemony. A principal means by 
which they gain hegemony is law. The state makes laws that create and 
take account of individualized, legal persons. The law substitutes these 
persons for families, religious orders, and so on. The state creates indi-
vidual as opposed to corporate or group responsibility under law. It makes 
legal subjects. State formation relies on individualization through law. 
It appears most clearly when examining archaic protostates. Emerging 
states characteristically create a census-tax-conscription system. The cen-
sus enumerates individuals, taxes them, and conscripts them into armies 
or public labor. Individuals become assets of the state (Diamond 1978).
Courts of law appear as states emerge. Courts settle social conflicts that 
previously relied on customary ritual cycles ratified by councils of elders. 
During early state formation, laws slowly supplant customs as the rules for 
conflict resolution. Diamond cites the case of the emerging protostate of 
Dahomey to illustrate. The Dahomean king would send a certain category 
of his women to reside in villages. Local men who had sexual intercourse 
with these women were charged with the crime of rape. After a summary 
trial, the men were conscripted into the king’s army as punishment. The 
crime of rape served the state’s purpose, whereas, before the emergence of 
the state, the wrong would be corrected by composition—ritualized giving 
of goods to the injured party (Diamond 1978:251). Usually, the injured 
party was a corporate kin group. Other punishments in nonstate societies 
include ritual purification, ridicule, and, ultimately, banishment for severe 
recidivists. These kinds of punishments are easily recognizable as typical 
for nonstate societies governed by custom rather than law. They do not 
serve the economic or political needs of the state.
What had been private issues, calling for bargaining over compensa-
tion between kin groups or other corporate entities, increasingly became 
crimes as regulation of labor came to be a concern of the state. By the time 
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of successful assertion of state authority in the mid-seventeenth century, 
Hobbes and other literate apologists for state violence created an ideologi-
cal framework in which individualism was key. As Henry Maine famously 
pointed out, law moved from status to contract as the state suppressed, 
redefined, and regulated other, potentially competing social formations.
Penal systems, criminal justice systems, and all systems of law respond 
to changes of the state and its social environs. The state always disciplines. 
That is its primary function and its main modus operandi. Styles of pun-
ishment and law change and so do the theoretical discourses that purport 
to explain but in fact rationalize them.
Terrorists and the laws and security procedures purporting to nab them 
are but the forms of state structures of symbolic violence. State symbolic 
violence uses the forms of law and regulation to inscribe its demands on 
the bodies of citizens, much as “the apparatus” inscribed the crimes com-
mitted by miscreants in Kafka’s “In the Penal Colony” (1919). Air travel-
ers and other citizens of the English-speaking hegemonic states do not 
decide to comply with the current absurdities. They do not evaluate and 
judge through some public or even private discourse. Their submission 
comes from lifetimes of training. In day cares, nursery schools, and kin-
dergartens, children’s bodies get used to queuing in lines. Put Americans, 
Britons, Canadians, or Australians in front of a gate, and they will form a 
line without a word said. Compliance is a physical act; all the rest is later 
rationalization. Drivers attending to their cell phones or switching CDs 
catch a traffic signal turning red out of the corner of their eyes. They slam 
on the brakes, without thinking. When we learn another language or play 
a musical instrument, we strive for fluency or accomplishment by train-
ing our bodies to perform automatically. We strive to respond to signs of 
language or musical notation without thinking, automatically, or as Freud 
would have it, preconsciously. So the state strives to train the populace.
The intellectualization of bodily conformity finds cognitive schema 
ready to be filled. Socialization consists first of training but also mental 
categories molded by a succession of state apparatuses—families, schools, 
factories, offices, etc. Moreover, these mental appurtenances reflect the 
prevailing social structures. Pierre Bourdieu (2000) put it thus.
For the problem is that, for the most part, the established order is not a 
problem; outside crisis situations, the question of the legitimacy of the State 
does not arise. The State does not necessarily need to give orders and to exert 
physical coercion, or disciplinary constraint, to produce an ordered social 
world, so long as it is able to produce incorporated cognitive structures 
attuned to the objective [social] structures and so secure doxic submission 
to the established order (178). 
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Terror laws are the explicit linguistic signs of implicit obedience. Written 
laws are part of a dialectical process encompassing agents of the state and the 
apparatuses where they work that inscribe obedience. The red traffic signal 
that causes inattentive drivers to brake suddenly has volumes of traffic rules 
behind it. Modern legal codes legitimize state apparatuses and depend on 
them to enforce the laws, and both rely on habits of obedience from a popu-
lace who rationalize their submission as per an invented logic of the law. It 
is a dialectical process of Aufhebung in which each element depends on the 
other to continually construct the edifice of the state. Today’s terror laws 
reveal an expansion of state authority—a whole new wing of state control—
ostensibly in response to terrorist threats and a crisis of state legitimacy.
Nonetheless, they did not arise in the United States at a time of crisis, 
at least not the kind of crisis threatening the state. They arose on the brink 
of triumph, when the Unites States was about to find itself alone as a 
superpower. The first U.S. law outlawing terror prohibited international 
terrorism. Attacks by local resistance groups on a U.S. occupying force 
in Lebanon prompted the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism 
to be passed. Not until 1996 did the law prohibit domestic terrorism, at 
the time occasioned by the Oklahoma City bombing. The 1996 law, the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, came quickly on the heels 
of the bombing, because the legislation replicated and extended what the 
Justice Department had wanted to pass after the first bombing of the World 
Trade Center in 1993. That had been the work of Muslim Middle Easterners, 
not Euro-American Christians. Political infighting at the time prevented 
passage of the law after 1993. By the time of the USA Patriot Act—a law 
miraculously written in all its almost four hundred pages within weeks 
after the attacks of 9/11—the basics of outlawing terrorism already were 
in place. The Patriot Act merely put finishing touches on state power and 
control.
The twenty-year period from the mid-1980s to the middle of the first 
decade of the twenty-first century significantly includes the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the projection of state control by the United States into 
central Asia. The terror laws are the effects of that extension of U.S. state 
power.
Rounding up the Usual Suspects
So long as the people do not care to exercise their freedom, those who wish 
to tyrannize will do so; for tyrants are active and ardent, and will devote 
themselves in the name of any number of gods, religious and otherwise, to 
put shackles upon sleeping men. 
(Voltaire [François Marie Arouet] 1764)
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Within hours of the 9/11 attacks, teams of Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (formerly INS, now Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE) 
agents, accompanied by FBI agents and local police officers, fanned out 
in Muslim-American communities across the United States. They began 
arresting male Muslim noncitizens from Arab and South Asian coun-
tries who had overstayed their visas or otherwise appeared to be out of 
status. These individuals were designated as “of special interest” to the 
government’s terrorism investigation notwithstanding the absence of 
evidence linking them to terrorism. Hundreds of post-9/11 detainees 
were presumed guilty of terrorism until proven innocent to the satisfac-
tion of law enforcement authorities (CCR 2006). The last detainee from 
these 9/11 sweeps was released July 21, 2006. He had been cleared of all 
links to terrorism in November 2001 (Hays 2006). Some of those rounded 
up had various, mainly technical, visa violations. A few have begun civil 
lawsuits against the U.S. Justice Department. Ruling on the government’s 
motion to dismiss, the trial judge, John Gleeson, summarized the issues 
concisely.
This case raises important issues concerning the arrest, detention, and treat-
ment of aliens of Middle Eastern origin in the immediate aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The plaintiffs were illegal aliens at 
the time. In broad strokes, their claims in this case fall into two categories. 
First they contend that the government used their status as illegal aliens as 
a cover, as an excuse to hold them in jail while it pursued its real interest—
determining whether they were terrorists, or could help catch terrorists. 
Second, the plaintiffs claim the conditions of their confinement flagrantly 
violated the U.S. Constitution. 
In general, the latter claims survive this motion to dismiss, largely for 
reasons set forth in Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134 
(E. D. N. Y.).
The claims in the first category are, however, dismissed. After the 
September 11 attacks, our government used all available law enforcement 
tools to ferret out the persons responsible for those atrocities and to prevent 
additional acts of terrorism. We should expect nothing less. One of those 
tools was the authority to arrest and detain illegal aliens. If the plaintiffs’ 
allegations are true . . . then the government held them in jail for months 
not because that amount of time was necessary to remove them to their 
countries of citizenship, but because it wanted to have them available here 
in the United States in the event criminal charges could be brought against 
them. 
But the government was allowed to do that. An ulterior motive in this 
context does not render illegal conduct that was within the bounds of the 
government’s authority (Turkmen v. Ashcroft 2006:2–3).
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In the trial court’s decision in Elmaghraby, Judge Gleeson went on to 
compare the roundup of Middle Easterners to police who want to look for 
guns, pulling over a car for failing to give a lane signal change, citing United 
States v. Scopo (1994). Today’s federal bench shares much of his reasoning, 
doubtless contributing to the fact that the United States has catapulted to 
world leader in locking up people, with minorities and especially African 
Americans out of all proportion among them. Implicit is the notion that 
Middle Easterners, or those with related attributes, are usual and expected 
suspects for terrorism. Subsequent criminal investigations of such usual 
suspects have led to mixed results. 
In Afghanistan, and later Iraq, U.S. invading forces captured  prisoners, 
or accepted custody of prisoners captured by allies such as Afghani war-
lords and Pakistan’s ISI (secret police). Hundreds went to hastily readied 
internment camps in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Bagram, Afghanistan, 
Abu Ghraib, Iraq, or various camps and prisons in central Asia. Some are 
in secret prisons around the world (Amnesty 2005). Some of those cap-
tured and imprisoned have gone to court. The results have been mixed. 
The common law cannot be a bulwark against state power run rampant, 
but it can be a weapon in the hands of those who would resist tyranny.
John Walker Lindh made a plea bargain, receiving a twenty-year prison 
sentence (Kayyem 2002). Lindh made admissions under death threats 
and conditional offers of treating his gunshot wounds. Remarkably, these 
tortured admissions are on videotape records (Stanley 2001; Doran 2002). 
To this day, it is unclear what criminal acts Lindh may have committed. 
He had been found among those identified as Taliban by his initial cap-
tors, Afghan warlords temporarily allied with the United States. According 
a 2009 interview with his parents, he had joined the Taliban to fight the 
Northern Alliance, which, at the time, Russia supported. He was unaware 
the United States had invaded Afghanistan (Democracy Now 2009).
President George W. Bush in his January 2003 State of the Union 
address said “We’ve broken Al Qaeda cells in Hamburg, London, Paris, as 
well as Buffalo, New York.” The al Qaeda cell consisted of six young U.S. 
citizens from Lackawanna, New York, who went to Afghanistan in the 
spring of 2001 to train in supporting the worldwide Muslim cause. They 
returned in June. After 9/11, they were charged under 18 USC § 2339A: 
“Providing material support to terrorists.” Material support is defined 
under subsection b as follows: 
In this section, the term “material support or resources” means currency 
or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodg-
ing, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation 
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or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, 
except medicine or religious materials.
The six Muslim Americans had provided nothing like material support. 
Government prosecutors entertained charging them with one count for 
each time they had fired a rifle, which would have resulted in effective life 
sentences. The White House and Justice Department identified them as 
crucial to their public relations campaign, and the local U.S. Attorney’s 
office took heed. Perhaps most importantly, they came to court in the 
spring of 2002, when the U.S. populace, including judges and potential 
jurors harbored fresh rage over the attacks of 9/11. It would have been a 
hanging jury. So, the Lackawanna Six, as they came to be called, accepted 
plea bargains of seven to ten-year sentences (Buffalo Case 2003a; Buffalo 
Case 2003b; Purdy and Bergman 2003; Daalder 2003; Temple-Raston 2007).
In Detroit, just six days after the 9/11 attacks, FBI agents arrested three 
men who appeared to be of Middle Eastern extraction. They were indicted 
for having phony identification papers, but, on October 31, U.S. Attorney 
General John Ashcroft publicly said the men had knowledge of the 9/11 
attacks. He later retracted the charge. By January 2002, the lead U.S. prose-
cutor in the case said he was trying to build a terrorism case. The terrorism 
indictment came down on August 28, 2002. Their trial began March 26, 
2003. It was the first terrorism trial in the United States after 9/11. A plea-
bargain witness, Youssef Hmimssa, a Moroccan who also faced unrelated 
fraud charges, linked the defendants to 9/11. During the trial, Attorney 
General Ashcroft praised Hmimssa. The jury convicted two defendants of 
the terrorism charges. The case began to unravel after the verdict. Evidence 
gained by the FBI showed Hmimssa, the main government witness, to have 
lied about the links to terrorism, and the prosecutor as having withheld 
the evidence of his duplicity. In January 2004, the Detroit U.S. Attorney’s 
office gave secret documents from the CIA and other intelligence sources 
to the judge in the case, Gerald E. Rosen (Detroit News 2004). Two defen-
dants’ convictions were overturned and a third, Karim Koubriti from 
Morocco, still faces charges of mail fraud (United States v. Koubriti 2006) 
but not terrorism. The federal prosecutor, Richard Covertino resigned in 
May 2005, and was charged with obstructing justice and lying to the court 
(Ashenfelter 2006). Covertino escaped conviction by claiming he had not 
deliberately withheld evidence but only inadvertently hid documents and 
photographs from the defense (Rosen-Molina 2007). As the wheels of jus-
tice slowly ground on, all the defendants were behind bars.
The last strictly domestic case involves the paintball terrorists. Three men, 
again with Middle Eastern backgrounds, were convicted of a conspiracy 
9780230103498_05_cha04.indd   72 3/31/2010   5:55:58 PM
LAW AND TERROR  73
to wage armed conflict against the United States for practicing paintball 
combat in the Virginia countryside. The case against them included 
attending the Dar al Arqam Islamic Center in Falls Church, Virginia, where 
one Ali Timimi “spoke of the necessity to engage in violent jihad against 
enemies of Islam and the ‘end of time’ battle between Muslims and non-
Muslims” (United States v. Khan 2006:2–3). They and their friends had ties 
to a Pakistani mujahedeen organization formed to fight the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. One member of the paintball group, not 
one of the defendants, discussed his alleged combat experience in Kashmir 
and urged the destruction of India, Israel, and the United States. Seifulah 
Chapman, a defendant, traveled to Pakistan in the summer of 2001, where 
he fired rifles and handguns. He also met another nondefendant there, 
a man named Singh, the South Asian version of “Smith.” Singh allegedly 
tried to purchase an airborne video system from England, but could not 
provide a valid credit card to pay for it. In February 2003, the FBI searched 
Timimi’s house. The three defendants were indicted along with eight oth-
ers in June 2003 for various offenses concerning a conspiracy to engage in 
military expeditions against India and the United States. In a bench trial, 
the three defendants Khan, Chapman, and Hammad were convicted. They 
appealed. The appellate court, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, upheld the convictions as follows:
The essential elements of Count One . . . (1) a conspiracy; (2) to enlist or 
engage within the United States or any place . . . (3) with intent to serve 
in armed hostility against the United States. 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2390. The 
essential elements of Count Two are (1) a conspiracy (2) to overthrow, put 
down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy 
war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force 
prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 2384. The essential elements of Count Four are (1) a conspiracy 
(2) to willfully make or receive any contribution of funds, goods, or services, 
to or for the benefit of the Taliban. 
(50 U.S.C. § 1705(b); 31 C.F.R.§ 545.201–545.208 
[United States v. Khan 2006:15])
The appellate court went on to conclude that “[t]here was sufficient 
evidence to support the district court’s finding of guilt on all of these 
counts” (16). 
All these cases show that men of Middle Eastern background, whether 
legally resident aliens, as in the Detroit and Virginia cases, or U.S. citizens 
by birth, as in the Lackawanna Six case, are rounded up, jailed, and usually 
convicted of terrorism or terrorism-related crimes. Their acts, the actus 
reus, consists of loose talk, sometimes travel to the Middle East or South 
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Asia, and sometimes gun training. John Walker Lindh is an exception, as 
he is of Northern European extraction and from several generations of 
Americans. Overzealous policing and prosecutions following 9/11 might 
be blamed on a first reaction to the shock of the attack like that after Pearl 
Harbor. Still, the pattern continued years later. The more recent efforts, car-
ried out mainly by the FBI, typically employ informants, sometimes even 
agents, as provocateurs. The FBI and other federal police agencies have 
long relied on that technique as in the campaign against the Black Panthers 
in the late 1960s and 1970s or the War on Drugs that preceded the War on 
Terror. In 2007, a group—consisting largely of African Americans—was 
accused of plotting to blow up the Sears Tower in Chicago. After two hung 
juries, federal prosecutors have yet to gain a conviction but are planning a 
third trial (New York Times 2009a). Another group, men of Middle Eastern 
descent, was convicted of plotting to bomb Fort Dix, New Jersey, in 2007 
(Belczyk 2009). In 2009, the FBI arrested a group of U.S. citizens including 
Euro-Americans in North Carolina for making plans to engage in gue-
rilla warfare in foreign countries. They have been charged with weapons 
violations. Each of these cases used agents provocateurs, and each involved 
arrests long before the accused took any concrete violent actions.
According to public opinion polls in the 1990s, years before 9/11, most 
Americans, fuelled by inflammatory political rhetoric and racially biased 
news media coverage, saw Arabs as violent, religious fanatical terrorists. 
The general public in the United States have been conditioned for decades 
to support government regimes that pursue military adventures abroad—
mainly against racially defined enemies—and authoritarian policing at 
home (Steuter and Wills 2008; Welch 2006). “Edward Said (1978) reminds 
us that all knowledge is codified through a political and cultural filter rep-
resenting certain interests as well as collective fears and anxieties” (Welch 
2006:14). Shaped by hegemonic practices by the elite that use apparatuses 
of the state and control of cultural outlets, a consensual and complicit pub-
lic has disdained individual rights and freedoms to secure their own fear.
Rights, Writs, and Remedies
No man shall be taken (that is) restrained of liberty, by petition or sugges-
tion to the king or to his councell, unless it be by indictment or present-
ment of good and lawfull men. . . . Every oppression against law, by colour 
of any usurped authority, is a kind of destruction . . . and it is the worse 
 oppression, that is done by colour of justice . . . it be contained in the great 
charter [Magna Carta], that no man may be taken, imprisoned or put out of 
his freehold, without process of the law. . . . He may have an habeas corpus 
out of the king’s bench. 
(Coke 1642)
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In a series of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued rulings that limit 
the military and executive from seizing and imprisoning various persons 
under the banner of its Global War on Terror. Many of these rulings hinge, 
either directly or indirectly, on the writ of habeas corpus ad subjicicen-
dum or habeas corpus. The writ, issued by a court, orders one who holds 
another person to bring that person to court where the reasons for the 
detention can be tested under law.
The first Supreme Court ruling came in 2004 concerning Yaser Esam 
Hamdi, who had been captured in Afghanistan by warlords who then 
turned him over to U.S. military authorities. The military sent him to a 
Navy brig in Virginia and later to South Carolina. Originally held incom-
municado and without recourse to counsel, the authorities discovered he 
was a U.S. citizen, and his father acted as “next friend” to bring legal action 
for his release. The government fought against court intervention tooth 
and nail at every step of the process. A very divided court ruled that while 
the Congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force Resolution 
(2001) allowed the President to jail citizens as “enemy combatants,” such 
persons still had the right to a hearing (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 2004). The 
disposition of the case was that Hamdi accepted deportation in lieu of 
contesting what would have been a weak but protracted prosecution, 
which would have exacted a heavy price from the defendant, even if he 
prevailed.
On the same day as Hamdi, the Court ruled that U.S. District Courts 
could hear habeas petitions from foreign nationals held at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba (Rasul v. Bush 2004). The main catch to this ruling is that it 
was not based on the Constitutional right to habeas corpus, which is 
derived from the common law, but on federal statute (28 USCS § 2241). 
By implication, Congress could nullify the right. It tried to do just that by 
passing the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. It contains the Graham-Levin 
Amendment eliminating federal courts’ jurisdiction on foreigners’ habeas 
claims from the Guantanamo prison. This provision specifically names 
Guantanamo and no other detention facility. Moreover, the other sec-
tions of the act require so-called combatant status reviews by “Tribunals 
of Propriety of Detention.” The decisions of the tribunal are appeal-
able to Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The act 
allows coerced testimony and immunizes U.S. personnel from lawsuits 
or criminal prosecution for their actions in detaining or interrogating 
suspected terrorists.
Before moving to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Detainee 
Treatment Act, it is noteworthy that the trial court in the Rasul case 
on remand found that the detainees do have rights under the Fifth 
Amendment to due process. Further, Judge Green, in ruling against the 
9780230103498_05_cha04.indd   75 3/31/2010   5:55:58 PM
76  SOCIAL THEORY OF FEAR
government’s motion to dismiss, found that the citizenship of those 
claiming rights is not relevant (Rasul v. Bush 2005).
On June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court rejected the limitations Congress 
tried to place on federal courts. Salim Ahmed Hamdan, the alleged 
bodyguard and driver for Osama Bin Laden, challenged the Secretary of 
Defense’s plan to try him for war crimes before a military commission. 
Hamdan argued that the military commission’s rules were inconsistent 
with the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and that he had the right to be 
treated as a prisoner of war. U.S. District Court Judge Robertson agreed 
(Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 2004). The government appealed, and the Circuit 
Court reversed (Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 2005). The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari on Hamdan’s appeal, ruling on the applicability of the Geneva 
Conventions and finding that the military commissions are not competent 
tribunals (Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 2006). The next day, however, the Court 
denied Hamdan’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus without opinion. 
The effect of the Supreme Court’s ruling is to nullify the limitation of fed-
eral courts by the Detainee Treatment Act. Nonetheless, that did not end 
the conflict between the common law and the state.
Almost exactly three months after the Supreme Court’s Hamdan 
decision, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act on Thursday, 
September 28, 2006. It specifically rejected an amendment that would have 
retained the right to habeas corpus. The Military Commissions Act also 
reiterates provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act that permit coerced 
testimony and immunize U.S. personnel against lawsuits and prosecution 
for abuse and mistreatment of prisoners.
The following Monday, October 2, the Center for Constitutional 
Rights filed a habeas petition in the U.S. District Court of the District of 
Columbia (Mohammed v. Rumsfeld 2006). The petition was for25 men of 
the over 500 held at Bagram Air Force Base, Afghanistan, who had been 
imprisoned without charges, many since the U.S. invasion in November 
2001. They are held under President Bush’s detention order of November 
13, 2001 (Order on Detention 2001). The petition, inter alia, first claims 
the writ under the common law (Mohammed v. Rumsfeld 2006:20), and 
its sixth claim is that the suspension of habeas corpus violates the U.S. 
Constitution, Article 1 § 9, clause 2 (p. 22).
Historical Perspective
In 1957, the U.S. Supreme Court heard a pair of cases arising from crimes 
committed by dependents of U.S. service personnel stationed in Germany 
and Japan, respectively. Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert killed their husbands 
who were servicemen. The two women were tried and convicted by the 
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military in military courts. In an opinion written by Hugo Black, joined 
by Earl Warren and William Douglas (Reid v Covert 1957:5–6), the Court 
rejected the jurisdiction of the military over civilians.
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United States acts against 
citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights. The United States is 
entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no 
other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed 
by the Constitution. When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen 
who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the 
Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped 
away just because he happens to be in another land. This is not a novel 
concept. To the contrary, it is as old as government. It was recognized long 
before Paul successfully invoked his right as a Roman citizen to be tried in 
strict accordance with Roman law.
And many centuries later an English historian wrote:
“In a Settled Colony the inhabitants have all the rights of Englishmen. They 
take with them, in the first place, that which no Englishman can by expa-
triation put off, namely, allegiance to the Crown, the duty of obedience to 
the lawful commands of the Sovereign, and obedience to the Laws which 
Parliament may think proper to make with reference to such a Colony. But, 
on the other hand, they take with them all the rights and liberties of British 
Subjects; all the rights and liberties as against the Prerogative of the Crown, 
which they would enjoy in this country.”
Black enunciated the strength of the common law in his opinion and the 
historical reference. First, government—the state—is subordinate to law. 
Second, rights limit state power. Finally, those rights come from ancient 
custom, not just written laws. In these cases, Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Covert 
found protection from the state. But the same Justice Black wrote the 
opinion on Korematsu (Korematsu v. US 1944), which was probably the 
most infamous Supreme Court opinion since Dred Scott (Scott v. Sanford 
1856). Korematsu, of Japanese descent, was a U.S. citizen by birth who was 
arrested for living in an American city, instead of one of the concentra-
tion camps set up for those of his ilk during the Second World War. The 
laws and regulations arising out of the war, and especially the panic and 
rage prompted by the attack on Pearl Harbor, pitted the power of the state 
against common law rights. The state won.
What distinguishes Second World War Black from 1950s Black is 
neither a change of heart nor change in the common law. The difference 
lies in the politics of the times. Law is a product of the state; although it is 
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difficult to say which comes first and which spawns the other. Common 
law rights go behind the law, as their history grounds them in custom, 
which in turn derives from corporate entities that precede state formation. 
In practice, rights are nothing more than emblems allowing their bearers 
to call for support. That is, rights require enforcement. Only during times 
of business as usual can individuals count on some state apparatuses to 
oppose other state apparatuses. Therein lies the difference between the 
Hugo Black of 1944 and the Hugo Black of 1957. The United States of 1957 
was carrying on business as usual.
The most autocratic regime among modern states, Nazi Germany, 
had to bow to political pressure, even during wartime. Before setting up 
the death camps, the Nazi government began a euthanasia program in 
Germany. Political opposition caused them to curtail it (Friedlander 1995). 
Also, when “Aryan” spouses of German Jewish men protested their impris-
onment in February 1943, even after the beginning of the “Final Solution,” 
the government released them (Stoltzfus 1996, 2001). The politics of the 
Second World War anathematized those of Japanese descent in the United 
States, and so they lost their common law rights. Immediately after the 
9/11 attacks, the political winds favored roundups of Middle Easterners, 
invasions of foreign countries, secret imprisonment, and so on. There 
is still political support for wholesale restrictions on ordinary freedoms, 
and so the U.S. government can search air travelers, monitor all kinds of 
electronic communications, and use a variety of Gestapo-like tactics to 
control the masses. Well-meaning civil liberties organizations and their 
lawyers can mount legal battles, but they will be of little avail without 
political opposition.
Custom, the soil from which common law rights have grown, is just 
another word for everyday practices of a people. Without collective change 
in those practices, that is to say without political changes, the common 
law remains feeble and rights are weapons made of paper. When the rul-
ing class and the state secure the fear of the people, the people remain 
powerless. It is only when the people relinquish their fear that they can 
take the power that is theirs.
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Terror, Law, and Torture
The United States of America has always been a torturing state, but it has professionally institutionalized the practice only recently. Its 
political leaders offer denials, but blatant practices and tortuous legal 
arguments make the denials oxymoronic. The history of torture by the 
United States supports a more general theoretical proposition: the more 
states legislate against terrorism, the more likely they will use torture as an 
instrument of terror. Other examples of this proposition include Britain in 
Northern Ireland, Russia in Chechnya, and of course Nazi Germany. Terror 
legislation and torture can accompany an imperialist effort or internal 
national security regimes to suppress dissent. Both motives apply in the 
case of the United States. 
The recent development of torture falls into three stages. After the 
Second World War, the United States assembled torture expertise and 
apparatus in line with a national security ideology springing from the 
anti-Communist crusade. In a backlash against liberation and equality 
movements of the 1950s and 1960s, crime hysteria led to criminal justice 
restructuring beginning in the mid-1970s and continuing into the twenty-
first century. Often described as a turn toward punitiveness, crime hysteria 
and control prepared the United States institutionally and its people ideo-
logically to embark on its current course of terror law and torture.
The U.S. torture regime depends on basic structural characteristics of 
American society, especially its racism and competitive and individualistic 
capitalism. These in turn give a particular character to its imperial expan-
sion and assertions of world hegemony. Imperialism is central, so is rac-
ism. They are intertwined in the Anglophone history of colonialism, but 
imperialism and racism so often go together, especially since the advent of 
European imperialism in the late fifteenth century, as to make their pair-
ing a general rule. At the same time, the United States has countervailing 
institutions: most prominently, its historical commitment to democracy, 
equality, and protection of laws.
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Expansion of U.S. hegemony after the Second World War, and again 
after the fall of the USSR and Eastern Bloc, put special demands on the 
U.S. polity. Ruling classes and power elites faced a pressing need. As rec-
ognized at least since the time of Metternich and Talleyrand (Kissinger 
1964), expansion of influence and control beyond state borders requires 
a compliant, if not docile, domestic populace. Dangerous classes must be 
controlled, especially when, as seemed imminent in 1968, they threaten 
the status quo of wealth, privilege, and power. The United States used 
the criminal justice system to control the domestic dangerous classes and 
counterinsurgency tactics including torture to control foreigners.
The History of U.S. Torture
It was not that state agents did not torture before the end of the Second 
World War, but the torturers were agents of local governments and the 
several states of the union. There was no national policy of torture. Settlers 
and soldiers routinely tortured Native Americans (Churchill 1997; Slotkin 
1985). Slave owners tortured slaves, and after 1865, racial lynching often 
included torture before the coup de grace (Waldrep 2002). Police regularly 
used the third degree to extract confessions and information. They also 
punished miscreants by physical abuse, either in lieu of arrest or prior 
to it. Convicts in state penitentiaries often suffered abuse. Federal police 
and correctional agencies, if they did employ the use of torture, did so 
covertly. Beginning in 1936 with the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Brown v. Mississippi (1936), federal courts increasingly intervened in state 
criminal justice systems to curtail official torture. During the Second 
World War, in the Pacific theater, but rarely in the European theater, units 
of the U.S. military used torture against Japanese soldiers as part of the 
overall brutalization of what both sides viewed as a racial war (Horne 
2005). Nonetheless, torture was not national policy, even covertly.
As the war in Europe wound down, overtures between Nazi leaders 
and U.S. intelligence operatives such as Allen Dulles in the OSS (Office 
of Strategic Services) set the stage for acquiring German expertise; opera-
tions Overcast and Paperclip resulted. The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized 
Operation Overcast 6 July, 1945, to bring German scientists to the United 
States, despite possible past membership in the Nazi Party and the SS. 
In September 1946 President Truman directed bringing various desired 
specialists to the United States in an operation called Paperclip. Some of 
the experts were accused of participating in murderous medical experi-
ments on human subjects at concentration camps and brutalizing slave 
laborers (Simpson 1988:36). Between 1945 and 1955, the United States 
welcomed 765 German specialists, of whom perhaps 80 percent were Nazi 
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Party members or SS veterans (Lasby 1975). Some became well known. 
Werner von Braun appeared on the Walt Disney TV program in the 
1950s, for example. Others remained in shadow; among them were those 
employed in mind control and interrogation techniques.
In April 1950, the CIA launched Operation Bluebird to discover 
more effective interrogation techniques. Boris Pash—an anticommunist 
since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, counterintelligence chief for the 
Manhattan Project, and recruiter of German specialists in Operation 
Paperclip—reviewed Nazi techniques for use in the Cold War (McCoy 
2006:26–7; Simpson 1988). By April 1953, the CIA unified various mind 
control and interrogation researches into MKUltra under the direction 
of Sidney Gottlieb of its Technical Services Division. Gottlieb reported 
directly to Chief of Operations Richard Helms, who later became CIA 
director. The sensory deprivation experiments by Donald O. Hebb, a 
Canadian psychological researcher, caught the eye of Gottlieb. A few years 
later, more research at Harvard found that sensory deprivation causes 
unbearable stress, which progressively leads to hallucinations and delu-
sions (Wexler et al. 1958). Next, a Princeton psychologist, Jack A. Vernon, 
received lavish funding from the Army and National Science Foundation 
to pursue this line of research with the view to applying it to interroga-
tion. Vernon noted that physical violence is often counterproductive, but 
sensory deprivation could be an effective tool for extracting compliance, 
dependence, and information (Vernon 1963). Whereas Vernon’s stated 
intentions seem benign—he ends his book on sensory deprivation by 
recommending everyone try it to better appreciate the small things in 
life—the CIA had applications that were more dubious.
In 1963, the same year Vernon published his book on sensory depri-
vation, the CIA wrote the Kubark Counterintelligence manual. Originally 
secret, leaks and successful FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) struggles 
have made it readily available on the Internet. The Web site post, “Prisoner 
Abuse: Patterns from the Past,” by the National Security Archive links to a 
wealth of information on the topic and related matters.
Kubark defined CIA interrogation methods for the next forty years, 
until the photographs from Abu Ghraib forced worldwide exposure. 
Kubark premises its techniques for interrogation on inducing regression. 
Interrogators create existential chaos from the moment of arrest (McCoy 
2006:51). The essence of effective interrogation—civil police questioning, 
military field interrogation of POWs, and even for clandestine work—is to 
make the subject want to tell the interrogator the desired information. That 
objective is best reached by creating dependence on the interrogator. While 
it can be achieved by physical violence, resistance or false compliance is 
also possible. False compliance occurs when the subject says  whatever 
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seems necessary to stop the pain. Psychological torture is more likely to 
produce reliable, if not always accurate, information. Of course, reliable 
information comes from a sincere but not necessarily well-informed 
subject. McCoy (2006:53) points out another advantage to psychological 
torture. It leaves none of the usual signs, and thus eludes the strictest 
human rights protections.
Having given up on drugs such as LSD, electroshock, psychosurgery, 
and similar invasive techniques, Kubark reflects the distillation of research 
since the end of the Second World War. Once set down in the Kubark 
manual, the CIA lost no time in exporting the expertise to Cold War allies. 
Britain used some of them against Northern Ireland guerrillas. Among 
them are what came to be called the five techniques. They are as follows. 
 1. Wall standing: forcing detainees to remain in stress positions;
 2. Hooding: keeping a light-resistant bag or hood over the detainees’ 
heads;
 3. Noise: subjection to continuous loud noises;
 4. Sleep deprivation; 
 5. Reduced diet (Ireland v. United Kingdom 1978:96, pp. 35–36) 
These are the same techniques applied to Jose Padilla, who also avers 
that he was given mind-altering drugs, possibly LSD or PCP (Gerstein 
2006; Hegarty 2007). Ireland complained to the European Human Rights 
Commission against British use of such tactics. The Commission issued 
its 8,400-page report finding that the five techniques were torture. When 
the complaint proceeded to the European Court of Human Rights, the 
British Attorney General assured the Court that “The Government of 
the United Kingdom . . . now give[s] this unqualified undertaking, that 
the “five techniques” will not in any circumstances be reintroduced as an 
aid to interrogation” (Ireland v. United Kingdom 102, p. 36). This became, in 
effect, a consent decree. Britain promised not to do it again, and the Court 
found Britain not guilty of torture by a vote of thirteen to four, but only 
inhuman treatment, unanimously (Ireland v. United Kingdom, Holdings 
of the Court on Article 3, p. 86). The court later repudiated the principle 
in Selmouni v. France (Application no. 25803/94) July 28, 1999, where it 
found similar treatment to constitute torture. Although it may seem a 
distinction without a difference, the Ireland ruling looms large in current 
U.S. policies and practices of torture. It opened the door to making tor-
ture an ambiguous term. Its claimed ambiguity allows U.S. officials to aver 
that the United States does not torture. At the same time, the U.S. regime 
sought and got legislation that permits torture by assuring its secrecy and 
lack of legal recourse under the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
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The United States did not export the techniques outlined in Kubark 
only to its special ally and former world colonial power—Britain. It also 
disseminated them to countries that became the battlefield of the Cold 
War—that is, the Third World. Nowhere is this better documented than in 
Latin America (Chomsky and Herman 1979).
The Cuban Revolution of January 1959 and Khrushchev’s avowed sup-
port for wars of national liberation in January 1961 led the United States 
to view Latin America as the new battleground of the Cold War (Loveman 
and Davies 1997:20; Hilsman 1961; Rostow 1962). Soon after Khrushchev’s 
declaration, President Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress as the 
U.S. response. The idea was to fight communism in two ways: counterin-
surgency and social support programs for the poor to make communism 
less attractive to them. The second method ensured the first. The Alliance 
for Progress raised expectations and threatened the local elites (Loveman 
and Davies 1997:23). Agitation by the masses led to crackdowns by Latin 
American governments. It also prompted large landowners and industrial-
ists to hire private militias. Both the masses and the elites began to believe 
that governments could no longer govern. These trends culminated in a 
series of right-wing coups typically led by elements of the military. The 
age of the junta was the fruit of the liberal program of anti-Communism 
in Latin America.
Brazil, in 1964, was the first (Archdiocese of São Paulo 1986). Others 
followed. Soon, military dictatorships ruled most of South America. They 
used torture freely to come to and keep power. Many of the torturers 
learned their trade at the School of the Americas run by the U.S. Army 
in Panama. Now known as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security 
Cooperation, it moved to Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1984. Prior to the U.S. 
Army taking over in 1963, it was the Latin American Ground School. Its 
purpose under all its names was to ensure U.S. influence among cadres of 
Latin American military, police, and state security officials. Kubark, its 1983 
update, Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual, and subsequent 
editions put out by the Army were standard textbooks for students at the 
School of the Americas. They were withdrawn in 1991 because of adverse 
publicity (Haugaard 1997). Under actual conditions, Latin American 
officials augmented the psychological techniques favored by the CIA with 
physical violence. One reason for the addition was that torture did not 
serve a purely interrogatory function. It was part of regimes of terror. The 
juntas used assassinations, death squads, disappearances, and even geno-
cide to rule the masses. These police state regimes made sure people knew 
they could expect torture if they came to the attention of the authorities.
Torture serves several purposes. Christopher Tindale (1996) identified 
a torture typology. Interrogational torture is used to extract information. 
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Deterrent torture discourages (or encourages) a population regarding cer-
tain activities. Dehumanizing torture changes the victim’s self-conception. 
For this last type—dehumanizing torture—Tindale adverts to Bruno 
Bettleheim (1979) and Primo Levi (1989), and their descriptions of the 
Nazi camps during the Second World War. Tindale explained that the 
purpose of dehumanizing torture is to “break people as individuals and 
change them into docile masses” (Tindale 1996: 351). His conception 
brings to mind the torture described in George Orwell’s 1984. Elaine Scarry 
noted that torture’s goal is betrayal as the torturer has “a covert disdain for 
confession.” Therefore, confession is not the goal, as “[t]he nature of confes-
sion is falsified . . . one betrays oneself and all those aspects of the world—
friend, family, country, cause—that the self is made up of” (1985: 29).
Perhaps a fourth type, or possibly a combinatory category, is what Daniel 
Rothenberg calls “public presentational torture,” which he says is a form 
of state terrorism (Rothenberg 2003). His illustrative case is Guatemala, 
where a thirty-six-year history of internal armed conflict is called La 
Violencia. He couches the history in the Cold War and severe domestic 
inequity. Guatemala is one of the better-known targets of CIA intervention 
beginning with the regime change of President Arbenz in 1954. Jacobo 
Arbenz Guzman (1913–1971) served as president 1951–1954 through 
Guatemala’s first ever universal suffrage election. United Fruit enlisted the 
assistance of the CIA, which initiated Operation PBFORTUNE. Later, the 
United States supported a line of dictators by, inter alia, training police in 
counterinsurgency and torture techniques at the School of the Americas. 
A tactic of state forces was to leave mutilated corpses in public places.
Counter-insurgency strategies, including the “the appearance of corpses 
bearing signs of torture” defined a situation of brutal intimidation and 
overwhelming violence: “the horror was so massive and so flagrant that it 
defied the imagination.” The Guatemalan state’s reliance on institutional-
ized human rights violations became the central mechanism of daily rule.
 . . . 
[T]orture defines the most primary component of an individual—his 
or her body—as a site for state action. This is done against the will of the 
individual and in a manner that deprives him/her of the most basic respect 
for autonomy, freedom, and self-protection. . . . [T]orture turns responsible 
government on its head . . . the state is transformed from being the key 
guarantor of social stability to an agent of intimate brutality. 
(Rothenberg 2003:482)
What these displays left ambiguous was whether the person had been 
tortured or the body mutilated after death to suggest torture. In cases 
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of actual torture, the torturers might have sought information from the 
victim, but not necessarily. As Elizabeth Stanley (2004:13) says regarding 
another regime supported by the United States, Chile under Pinochet, 
Despite the common idea that torture is used solely as a means to extract 
information, Chilean torturers often knew all about their victims’ lives and 
used torture as a way to demonstrate the ‘all-seeing-eye’ and the power of 
the state. Officials engaged in torture to demonstrate to the victim and asso-
ciates that they are watching, that they are in charge and can act at will. 
This seems to have been the purpose at Abu Ghraib, because the torture 
revealed in the U.S. media in spring 2004 (Hersh 2004) was not part 
of interrogations. Erroll Morris’ documentary movie, Standard Operat-
ing Procedure (2008) shows the main objective was domination and 
humiliation.
The Domestic Groundwork for Abu Ghraib
Torture regimes do not fall from the sky. Modern mass societies do not 
allow their state apparatuses to do just any old thing, including torture. 
The political system need not be democratic. The Nazi regime, even in 
wartime, had to bow to public opinion when it stopped its euthanasia 
campaign (Friedlander 1995) and released Jewish husbands of “Aryan” 
wives (Stoltzfus 1996). 
The people have to be prepared. During the Cold War, the United 
States exported torture. It relied on proxy regimes to use the torture 
techniques they had learned from the United States. It tried to keep secret 
the pedagogical relation. In the last decades of the twentieth century, 
American public sensibilities changed. Mass incarceration, a policy of 
incapacitation, and increasingly punitive penal systems produced a public 
ready to consider, if not fully countenance, torture. As Ronald Crelinsten 
explained, “the torture regime must endeavor to ensure that it is reflected 
in all aspects of social and political life. . . . [T]he techniques used to train 
torturers . . . are but a reflection of a much wider process: the transforma-
tion of society” (2003:295).
An important part of transforming societies is transforming how 
people in those societies perceive them. How do Americans perceive 
America? How do they perceive one another? How do they perceive its 
main institutions? Before getting knee-deep in social-construction-of-
reality diversions (Berger and Luckmann 1966), it is useful to recall how 
Americans thought about the world—in say, 1945—and compare it 
to how they thought about it in 1950–1955. In a few years, and it took 
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longer for some than others, the people Americans wanted to slaughter 
in 1945—Germans and Japanese—became bosom buddies (or at least 
confederates in the case of Japanese). At the same time, those Russian pals, 
Chinese innocents, and Korean victims were out to get Americans. This 
did not occur as part of some inchoate groundswell, a mystical sea change 
in the conscience collectif. Deliberate public policies brought it about. There 
is an essential ingredient. “A central feature of this reality construction is 
the creation of a dangerous enemy that threatens the social fabric. Laws are 
directed against this enemy” (Crelinsten 2003:296). 
Beginning in 1933, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidency resonated 
with reassurance. He began his four terms in office with an inaugural 
address assuring Americans that we have nothing to fear but fear itself. 
After the Second World War, the preferred theme of political discourse 
shifted to inducing fear. The first project was the Cold War and Red Scare. 
Richard Nixon cobbled together the next project in his run for the presi-
dency in 1968. He made crime in the streets a campaign slogan. The slogan 
coded racial antagonisms, political dissent against the Vietnam War, and 
a raft of lifestyle images roughly conveyed by sex, drugs, and rock-n-roll. 
Although the drug war and crime control measures leveled off during the 
Carter administration, they came back with a vengeance under Reagan. 
During the entire period beginning in the late 1960s, a backlash mili-
tated against social changes connected to the extension of civil rights as 
a broadly construed concept. These include antidiscrimination laws and 
policies based on race, gender, age, and disabilities along with exposure 
and eventual reduction of repressive government tactics such as surveil-
lance and interference with political dissent. The backlash was a reaction 
that increasingly took the form of criminalizing deviant behavior.
David Altheide (2002) said fear is cumulatively integrated over time 
and in the process becomes associated with certain topics. Those topics are 
then associated with terms, as if there were an invisible hyphen. Eventually, 
the fear becomes implied and unstated. Altheide went on to link fear of 
crime with fear about major events, such as the 9/11 attacks. Especially 
since the mid 1960s, a growing fear linked outsiders and deviants to chal-
lenges to, and eventual loosening of formerly rock solid values and norms 
about, sex and gender, race, and America as the land of opportunity. 
A main part of the fear concerned crime. Specific discourses and public 
policies focused the unease arising from social change.
Over roughly the last thirty years, a discourse of fear in the United States 
has focused on crime. Such discourses trickle down from the top levels of 
ivory towers to popular culture outlets. They culminated in several books. 
Harvard academics such as James Q. Wilson and Richard J. Herrenstein 
(1985), revived a thinly disguised racist criminology rooted in a nineteenth 
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century vulgar Darwinism of Cesare Lombroso. Michael Gottfredson and 
Travis Hirschi (1990) tiptoe around a biological argument opting for par-
ent blaming instead. They asserted that parents are to blame for delinquent 
children, because they fail to instill self-control. The lack of self-control does 
not just manifest as law breaking. It includes other acts they say are equiva-
lent to crimes such as smoking, drinking, and out-of-wedlock sex and 
pregnancy. The resemblance to culture of poverty ideas of Oscar Lewis (1961 
and 1966) and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1965) is not happenstance.
Paralleling these pseudoscholarly discourses, public policy poured 
resources into policing, crime (especially drug control) proliferating 
criminal laws (especially federal crimes) (American Bar Association 1998), 
and incarceration (Mauer 2006). All the while, popular media kept pump-
ing up fear of criminals who were inevitably portrayed as impoverished 
minorities—the dangerous classes (Beckett and Sasson 2000; Best 1999; 
Glassner 1999; and Kappeler and Potter 2005). Two results follow that 
are essential for a regime of torture: first, acquiescent public opinion, and 
second, a supply of potential torturers. Physician and medical ethicist 
Steven Miles noted, “a torturing nation uses fear, persuasion, and pro-
paganda to secure the assent to torture from society in general and from 
members of its legal, academic, journalistic, and medical professions” 
(Miles 2006: xii). He went on to observe that “[m]oral responsibility in a 
torturing society is broadly shared” (p. 6).
In her critique of the ticking-time-bomb excuse for torture, Jessica 
Wolfendale (2006) pointed out that most torturers are soldiers or military 
police trained in elite units. Among Western imperialist states, she cites the 
British and Australian Special Air Services (SAS) and the U.S. Army’s Delta 
Force and Green Berets as illustrative. She explains that the basic training 
for such units includes brutalization, which inures the soldiers to their 
own suffering, and by the same token, that of others. Further, their train-
ing involves interrogation, survival, and resistance. Citing the Web site 
for the British SAS, http://geocities.com/sascenter/train.htm, Wolfendale 
explained that the training includes blindfolding, sleep deprivation, stress 
positions, reduced food and water, and noise, matching the “five tech-
niques” that the European Court of Human Rights found “inhuman.” 
Consequences for trainees are stressful and can produce mental disrup-
tion such as dissociation. Wolfendale cited the John F. Kennedy Special 
Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, http://training.sfahq.com.com/survival_
training.htm.
Torture also needs routinization, as Herbert Kelman (1993) called it. 
Torturers have to be socialized in the profession beyond learning particu-
lar torture techniques (Conroy 2000; Huggins et al 2002). Torture requires 
institutionalization, a network of organizations cooperating to share 
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information, methods, and personnel (Arrigo 2004). Cold War counter-
insurgency prepared the national military and intelligence apparatuses. 
Crime hysteria and the rise of a network of criminal justice apparatuses 
prepared public opinion. Both lead to social control of the nonmarginal 
parts of the populace as they prepare people to accept control and put con-
trol apparatuses in place (Chevigny 2003). Finally, the expansive criminal 
justice apparatuses created a pool of potential torturers. The crime control 
industry began growing by leaps and bounds in the 1970s (Chambliss 
1994; Christie 1993; Gordon 1990). The growth spurt had a reciprocal rela-
tion to political racial polarization (Beckett 1997; Edsall and Edsall 1991) 
Its model was Nixon’s Southern strategy engineered by Kevin Philipps 
(1969). It also managed to control a burgeoning pool of redundant work-
ers (Davey 1995; Parenti 1999). As the welfare apparatus shrank, crime 
control replaced informal social controls or capillary control mechanisms 
as Foucault put it (1975). Crime control drew down potentially dangerous 
concentrations of minority youths in central cities, removing them to pris-
ons in rural areas (Wacquant 2000). Perhaps the main contribution to con-
structing the professional institution of torture in the United States was the 
production of a supply of personnel trained and socialized to use force to 
control others. Most were relatively unskilled workers, the common labor-
ers in the vineyards of torture, such as Corporal Graner of Abu Ghraib 
infamy who had been a prison guard in civilian life (Williams 2006).
The Vietnam War ended in 1975, just about the time the crime control 
industry took off. The volunteer military replaced the draft, resulting in a 
self-selected cohort of youths who favored employment in total institu-
tions (Goffman 1961). The military, police, and corrections establishments 
crossrecruited, and their personnel entered revolving-door employment 
among the various uniformed organizations. A number of anecdotal 
accounts link employment in U.S. prisons with personnel assigned to pris-
ons in Iraq and Afghanistan (Gordon 2006; Finkel and Davenport 2004; 
Bastian et al. 2004). As yet, there is no systematic study of brutal practices 
in U.S. civilian law enforcement and corrections with torture in overseas 
operations. Nonetheless, Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler (1997) have 
studied one part of the obverse—the militarization of police. The central 
point is that police, prisons, and the military are all armed control organi-
zations. Their personnel are schooled in obedience. When their command-
ers expect or allow for brutality, they will produce it (Cornwell 2006).
Imperialism and Torture
The populism of fear is an enormously successful policy because it serves to 
intimidate and demonize some, and at the same time to discipline the rest 
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who are taught to be afraid of those demons. Since 11 September 2001, the 
focus has shifted toward international crime. It is easy to demonize foreign 
terrorists as criminals, to combine the fear of crime with the fear of the 
foreign invader. 
(Chevigny 2003:81)
Paul Chevigny’s analysis in the preceding quotation needs elaboration. 
The U.S. government mobilized popular fear against external and internal 
communists during the Cold War. The Nixon political machine mobilized 
and focused fear of crime by linking it to traditions of American racism 
and Puritanism. Ronald Reagan’s political ploy directed that racism and 
religious intolerance outward, toward so-called international terrorism 
in Iran and Lebanon, but he linked it to his determination to destroy the 
Soviet Union as the ultimate source of all terrorism (Evans and Novak 
1981; Wills 2003). The collapse of the Soviet Union created a crisis in the 
U.S. national security state with its massive military and related industries. 
During the 1990s, the United States pursued a policy of gradualism in 
extending its hegemony. No one enemy could give it focus. For a while, 
international crime was a contender—as John Kerry argued in his 1997 
book, The New War: The Web of Crime That Threatens America’s Security. 
Four years later, attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon rescued 
the U.S. security state from its doldrums.
Terrorism combines all the elements tapped by preceding governments. 
It has foreign and domestic enemies who are racially and religiously set 
off. The war on terrorism is both a military and internal security endeavor. 
The crime control apparatus can be folded into a Homeland Security 
Department to extend control over Chevigny’s demons and the mass of 
Americans. Anyone who has traveled by air since 9/11, has experienced 
the control firsthand. All this security tumult blurs the extension of U.S. 
imperialism. The target of that expansion has been central Asia. U.S. mili-
tary bases now dot southeastern Europe, which had been Soviet satellites, 
and new states surrounding the Caspian and Aral Seas, which had been 
part of the Soviet Union. Of course, the best known are the U.S. invasions 
of Afghanistan and Iraq. All of these imperialist forays are justified by the 
Global War on Terrorism.
The U.S. terror laws are linchpins articulating this global war on ter-
rorism. Imperialism is what connects them. The Global War on Terrorism 
was not inevitable. Without the attacks of 9/11, torture would still be 
covert and limited to a few selected individuals, the lumpen masses would 
still be fodder for the domestic crime control industry, U.S. imperial-
ism would still be extending global hegemony through neoliberal eco-
nomic institutions and collaborative but contained military intrusions 
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such as in the former Yugoslavia. But 9/11 did occur. The United States 
seconded by Britain and Australia—other countries participated because 
of arm-twisting and opportunism—embarked on a twenty-first century 
imperial expansion. Led by the United States, those countries generated 
mountains of terror legislation. U.S. terror legislation has added laws 
every year since the USA Patriot Act in November 2001. At the same 
time, the United States used torture immediately with almost punctili-
ous attention to legal justifications—for example the Yoo memoranda of 
September 25, 2001, January 9, 2002, and August 1, 2002; the Bybee 
memoranda of January 22, 7 February, and August 1, 2002; the Gonzales 
memorandum of January 25, 2002; and the Ashcroft memorandum of 
February 1, 2002 (Greenberg and Dratel 2005). U.S. forces tortured pris-
oners in Afghanistan and then Iraq, but covertly until the revelations of 
the Abu Ghraib photographs. Nonetheless, the news accounts of John 
Walker Lindh’s capture contained enough information to lead attentive 
people to learn about the torture. A video showed a CIA officer ques-
tioning him, threatening his life, making medical attention contingent 
on confession and information, and news accounts said he had been 
transported naked in a freezing plane to the United States (Doran 2002; 
Stanley 2001). 
Torture is a form of what Mark Brown (2002) called penal excess. 
Brown used the British Empire in nineteenth-century India as his case in 
point. Two examples illustrate: execution by cannon of the Sepoy muti-
neers/revolutionaries of 1857 and a law of the Indian Penal Code of 1871 
criminalizing certain tribes without proof of particular criminal acts.
The execution by cannon was terrorism. It was a spectacle and terrify-
ing retribution to any who would defy British authority. Brown described 
it. One British officer, Sir John Lawrence, wrote “Our object is to make 
an example to terrify others” (Brown 2002:408). Citing Malleson (1897: 
367–368), Brown gave the following quotation of Sir John: “I think suf-
ficient example will then be made. . . . The Sipahis will see that we punish 
to deter, and not for vengeance. . . . [O]therwise they will fight desperately 
to the last” (Brown 2002:409). Brown’s point is to show the modern 
state using penal excess as exemplary punishment. Deterrence relies on 
terrifying spectacle much as modern deterrence uses long prison terms, 
capital punishment, three strikes laws, sexual predator laws, and so on—
a far cry from Cesare Beccaria’s (1764) minimalist brand of punishment: 
to punish only enough to deter.
The next example fits better as analogy with current terror laws, which 
criminalize membership and association along with intention, rather than 
illegal acts. The Criminal Tribes Act of 1871 targeted traditional, semino-
madic tribes that fit Hobsbawm’s (1981) definition of bandits—groups 
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opposing central authorities and fitting with social structures to keep 
traditional values and norms. The 1871 Act required tribal registration, 
and confined them to their home villages or forcibly settled them in special 
areas. It resembled the reservation system for American Indians. Three-
time violation of the Act carried a mandatory seven-year prison sentence 
or penal transportation. It precluded the state having to prove guilt for a 
particular criminal act.
Brown makes an explicit comparison. “The members of the USA’s 
underclass represent a contemporary analogue of the ‘suspect’ groups 
brought under the criminal tribes policy in 19th-century India: groups who 
stood outside and in opposition to the new extractive colonial economy” 
(Brown 2002:417). He went on to cite a campaign platform of George W. 
Bush as the governor “of the killing state, Texas” (418). A more precise 
analogy, however, is with U.S. treatment of its native inhabitants in the 
nineteenth century and also with current treatment of outsiders associ-
ated with terrorism. The latter group includes ethnic-religious minorities 
within the United States who are Muslim, Near or Middle Eastern, or 
otherwise associated in collective imagery with such social categories. The 
foregoing description is cumbersome and even vague, because it captures 
a sensibility and set of images and icons instead of discursively defined 
categories. In addition, the 1871 Act and British policy resemble U.S. laws 
and policies about those groups and individuals outside the United States 
who are also associated with terrorism under law. It includes “Al Qaeda,” 
questionably any sort of organization, perhaps a network, but most likely 
merely a movement. The U.S. terror laws target people who fall into these 
categories. Within the United States, they are liable to prosecution and 
imprisonment. Outside U.S. borders, they are subject to assassination or 
imprisonment and torture. 
Another example of imperial policy is that of the British designation of 
the Mau Mau as a terrorist organization in 1950s Kenya. “To define ‘ter-
rorism’ or ‘terrorist acts’ as crimes creates a process of reification which 
may produce undesired and unanticipated consequences. . . . The a priori 
definition of ‘terrorism’ as evil assumes . . . that terrorism is a zero sum 
game” (Anderson-Sherman 1982:87). Arnold Anderson-Sherman traced 
British imperial policy and the Kikuyu’s response, resistance, and adapta-
tions to it. He argued that it was the terror laws themselves that portrayed 
these Kikuyu responses as terrorism, and brought about violent conflict in 
1950s Kenya. He concluded by observing that the British-Kikuyu conflict 
might have been resolved otherwise “what is needed is less reification of 
particularistic self-interest and more adequate diagnosis of the alternative 
possibilities contained within particular historical contexts” (Anderson-
Sherman 1982:99).
9780230103498_06_cha05.indd   91 3/31/2010   5:56:16 PM
92  SOCIAL THEORY OF FEAR
The reification of terrorism and terrorists is analogous to the reifica-
tion of criminality. The U.S. criminal justice system reifies and recursively 
defines crime as something criminals do. Criminals are members of 
subordinate social categories who are redundant to the production and 
profit-making political economy. Criminals, according to these defini-
tions, are also statistically associated with racial minorities. The infamous 
Willie Horton television ads during the 1988 presidential campaign cap-
ture in iconic form these reifying processes. Criminalization processes 
in the 1970s aimed at controlling insurgent masses in the United States 
who threatened the structural stability and social hierarchy. Part of the 
criminalization process molded and manipulated public opinion to redi-
rect fears toward a criminal class and support expansion of state control, 
especially police and corrections. Criminalization of terrorism beginning 
in the 1980s mirrored the criminalization process begun ten years before. 
Terrorism laws built on fertile ground. They combined a well-established 
public fear of the internal-external enemy of communism with a colonial-
ist racism deeply embedded in America’s history. After the attacks of 9/11, 
terror laws and terror fears coincided with a U.S. imperialist thrust into 
central Asia. Those in the way became subject to the terror laws.
Torture had largely disappeared from the U.S. criminal justice system 
by the 1970s, mainly because of U.S. Supreme Court decisions extending 
Bill of Rights restrictions to state governments. Another part of the U.S. 
state went in the other direction. The U.S. military and intelligence appa-
ratuses had been building a covert torture capability since the end of the 
Second World War. First developing modern torture techniques, they then 
exported and taught them as part of Cold War imperialism in the Third 
World. Coming full circle, the CIA has used extraordinary rendition to 
countries practicing torture, often learned from the United States (Grey 
2006). By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the United States had 
techniques and a leadership cadre of torturers in place.
Imperial expansion and invasions brought about a convergence of orga-
nizations, personnel, knowledge, and law to produce the torture regime in 
the United States. It included a public prepared for compliance, personnel 
in police and corrections for deployment in conquered territories, and 
terror laws that, arguably, legitimized torture procedures.
Public Opinion and Torture
The American public may have been prepared for compliance with a 
regime of torture, but the relation between the public and government is 
not a one-way street. In mass societies the relation between public opin-
ion and the government is dialectic. The originator of public relations, 
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Edward L. Bernays, recognized and exploited the phenomenon. According 
to Bernays, shaping public opinion requires constant monitoring, and it is 
always a matter of shaping, not creating (1934, 1955). With the advent of 
universal White suffrage in the United States after the First World War and 
Nineteenth Amendment, racial minorities remained largely excluded until 
the 1965 Voting Rights Act, when managing and measuring public opinion 
took on crucial political importance. Polling became a new profession and 
grew increasingly scientific. While never completely capturing what people 
believe, modern poll results reveal a public that interacts with government 
policies and practices.
In her column in The Nation, Patricia Williams (2001 cited in Welch 
2006) referred to a CNN poll taken shortly after 9/11, which showed that 
45 percent of Americans would not object to torture if it provided infor-
mation about terrorism. Public opinion has changed little subsequently. In 
contrast, more than 80 percent of people in Western Europe reject torture 
under any circumstances (Pew 2007:25; World Public Opinion 2008). 
Revelations of torture—including graphic imagery from Abu Ghraib, tele-
vised on 60 Minutes II April 28, 2004—became public in the intervening 
years. Nonetheless, the stability of sentiment suggests a deep-seated view-
point. These data raise several questions. First, why do so many Americans 
accept torture? Second, how do such sentiments fit with democratic 
values? Third, what has been the dynamic between the sentiment and the 
practice of torture by military and intelligence apparatuses?
October 7, 2001, Karl Rove, President George W. Bush’s political guide, 
conveyed a message to him from Roger Ailes. Ailes had been the political 
adviser of the senior Bush, George H. W., and was at the time head of 
FOX News. He told the president that the American public expected their 
president to use “the harshest measures possible. Support would dissipate 
if the public did not see Bush acting harshly” (Woodward 2002: 207). 
The incident reveals a crucial third actor, articulating the relation between 
the government and the people—mass media. The media are more than a 
simple conduit. The media shape and channel public opinion. The govern-
ment relies on the media to build and sustain compliance.
The media designated the attacks of 9/11 on the World Trade Center 
and Pentagon as an “attack on America.” The government designed a war 
on terror as its reaction. 
The war on terror . . . is a violent rejection of the unthinkable and intolera-
ble. It is a disgusting revulsion against something (that America calls ‘terror’ 
or ‘evil’) that does not make sense, that was/is still horrifying, that allegedly 
comes from ‘elsewhere’ (although it was and may still be within ‘us’), that 
cannot be identified as a traditional object of geopolitics. . . . As media 
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pundits and intellectuals of statecraft have reminded Americans, the war 
on terror is a different war, with no really distinguishable home and away 
fronts. )
(Debrix 2008:75)
With erasure of a distinction between home and away fronts, an irrational 
revulsion, free-floating fear, and pervasive rage, the government embarked 
on a war against evil. The “attack on America” represented a mystical evil. 
The government called on the people to support a messianic crusade 
(Welch 2006:8). The post-9/11 war on terror resonated with, and built 
on, fear of and war against crime. Just as the crime wars of the preceding 
decades shifted the focus from crime to criminals (Welch 2006:41), so the 
war on terror shifted from the problem of terrorism to evildoers employ-
ing terrorist tactics. “[T]he war on terror is a sustained illusion and mythic 
cleansing—of terrorists, of evil, of our own fear” (Welch 2006:61 citing 
Lifton 2003). In this media-fueled and government-orchestrated cru-
sade, mass psychology turns away from focused, rational anger against a 
threatening enemy—such as the mass anger against Japan following Pearl 
Harbor. Instead, the mass psychology in the age of terror has become nar-
cissistic rage. The government and media turned the attacks of 9/11 into 
attacks against the collective self.
Aggression, when employed in the pursuit of maturely experienced 
causes, is not limitless. However vigorously this aggression is mobilized, 
its aim is limited and definite: the defeat of the enemy who blocks the 
way to a cherished goal. As soon as the aim is reached, the rage is gone.
The narcissistically injured on the other hand, cannot rest until he has 
blotted out a vaguely experienced offender who dared to oppose him, to 
disagree with him, or to outshine him. It can never find rest because it can 
never wipe out the evidence that has contradicted its conviction it is unique 
and perfect. This archaic rage goes on and on and on. Furthermore, the 
enemy who calls forth the archaic rage of the narcissistically vulnerable is 
seen by him not as an autonomous source of impulsions, but as a flaw in a 
narcissistically perceived reality. The enemy is experienced as a recalcitrant 
part of an expanded self over which the narcissistically vulnerable person 
had expected to exercise full control. 
(Wolf 2001:2)
Consider how the mass media might otherwise have designated the 9/11 
attacks. Instead of an “attack on America,” it could have been an attack 
on the command and control center of world capitalism or international 
business and corporations and an attack on the command and control 
center of global militarism or the central U.S. military headquarters. 
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Such constructions would militate against narcissistic rage, and encour-
age reasoned and focused aggressive action. In contrast, the war on terror 
has become endless and global in which any means, including torture, are 
justified.
Darius Rejali identified three uses of torture in democracies: national 
security, civic discipline, and judicial. These uses correspond to the 
three main purposes for governments’ torture: intimidation, coercion, 
and interrogation (2007:22–23). Rejali argued that democracies rely on 
stealthy torture that does not leave marks to hide the torture or at least 
make it deniable. Most techniques used by U.S. military and intelligence 
personnel in the war on terror favor the stealthy type of torture. Stress 
positions, water boarding, and sensory deprivation, for instance, leave no 
marks. There are no images of mangled bodies, and no disfigured torture 
victims to accuse their torturers. 
Americans can accept torture—and even those who reject it are not 
trying to overthrow the government to stop it—because U.S. government 
officials keep assuring the public that America does not torture. “The 
gloves are off,” but the bruises are invisible. The public can know that the 
government is using the “harshest measures possible” without having to 
confront their reality. Mass narcissistic rage can be vented without shame 
or guilt.
Securing Fear through Torture
Torture and terror (and counterterrorism) go together. Historically, ter-
ror legislation and torture have coincided, as in Latin America in the 
1970s and 1980s. Countries that have used torture as part of their justice 
systems—for example Turkey, Syria, China, and so on—also have fairly 
extensive terror laws. In contrast, those countries and political confed-
erations, such as the European Union, that have eschewed reified terror 
legislation, have not employed torture.
The relationship between terror laws and torture is not a simple 
causal relation. One does not cause the other. Both are indicators of state 
control. Moreover, in mass societies such as the United States, commu-
nications media play a crucial role. Government, public consciousness, 
and media produce state policies. Recent U.S. history shows how this 
dialectic resulted in a moral panic (Cohen 2002) about crime in the late 
twentieth century, which overlapped and blended into a moral panic 
about terrorism.
Expansion of state control is a definitive part of imperialism. When 
states embark on imperialist projects, they employ terror legislation and 
torture. Security states, built in response to perceived threats against 
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the social and political order, often use both terror laws and torture. 
Nonetheless, the history of Latin America links antiterrorism crusades 
and torture to U.S. imperialism. The imperialist effect may not include 
the government using torture but the result of imperialist influence by an 
outside force. Racism is also a common, though perhaps not necessary, 
factor. Racism helps to mark social categories as potential terrorists. It also 
promotes the dehumanization and distancing that is so much a part of the 
social psychology of torture. Of course, it is especially central to the U.S. 
case as part of the long history of torture of African Americans and Native 
Americans.
Writing in 1946 in an editorial entitled “The Century of Fear” in the 
once underground newspaper, Combat, Camus explained. 
Our twentieth century is the century of fear. . . . My view, however, is that 
rather than blame our fear, we should regard it as a basic element of the 
situation and try to remedy it.
In order to come to terms with fear, we need to understand what it signi-
fies and what it rejects. It signifies and rejects the same fact: a world in which 
murder is legitimate and human life is considered futile. . . . Before we can 
build anything, we need to ask two questions: “Yes or no, directly or indi-
rectly, do you want to be killed or assaulted? Yes or no, directly or indirectly, 
do you want to kill or assault. 
(Camus 1946:257–259)
In The Origins of Totalitarianism (1958), Hannah Arendt proffered the 
thesis that aggressive warfare against external foes coincides with totalitar-
ian regimes’ treatment of their domestic population—that is, the regimes 
carry out warfare against both. Michael Stohl, in part, building from 
Arendt’s idea, carried out a historical study comparing domestic violence 
in the United States with states of war in which it participated. He found 
an unmistakable pattern: increased political violence at home accompa-
nies warfare abroad (1976). Repressive political violence against dissenters 
and rebels played handmaiden in the United States during the Vietnam 
War. The U.S. military and intelligence apparatuses used torture and 
facilitated its use by allied South Vietnamese. Police used torture against 
dissident racial minorities in the United States. The case of the Black 
Panthers—accused of a 1973 bank robbery in San Francisco—is but one 
example. Convicted by tortured confessions, a federal court reversed the 
convictions (Algeria et al. 2007). The police surveilled, harassed, and jailed 
White dissidents. They tortured and murdered Black dissidents, as in the 
Cook County State Attorney’s Office murder of Fred Hampton and Mark 
Clark in Chicago, December 4, 1969 (Alk 1971, Eyes on the Prize II:13). 
Torture marks minorities and secures the fear of majorities. 
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Chapter 6
Camps, Gallows, Ghettos, 
Gulags, and Prisons
States’ engines of social control are the most fearsome: camps (Lagers), gallows, ghettos, gulags, and prisons. The state uses them to control 
domestic, but not always internal, enemies. Against foreign enemies, 
it employs war. These engines of domestic control depend on popular 
compliance—that is, the state could not long maintain them unless the 
bulk of the population accepted them, if only tacitly. Outside of war, they 
show the most terrible visage of state power. They are secular societies’ 
divine violence before which citizenry are supposed to stand in “fear and 
trembling.” Unlike Søren Kierkegaard’s (1843) exploration of faith by 
that title, there is nothing holy in the state’s divine violence. Also, unlike 
Kierkegaard’s explication and meditation on the binding of Isaac (Genesis 
22:1–24), the victims of the state’s divine violence are not sacrifices. The 
state means to show that those upon whom it inflicts its power are not 
worthy of sacrifice. They are bare life (Agamben 1995). Domestically, the 
state imposes its divine violence in a different way from when it is at war. 
Once the war concludes, “Where frontiers are decided the adversary is not 
simply annihilated; indeed he is accorded rights even when the victor’s 
superiority in power is complete” (Benjamin 1921:295). The state’s divine 
violence against its domestic enemies has to be impersonal, dispassionate, 
and implacable, because those qualities are essential to the rationale for 
the secular state, since the state has displaced the gods. Nonetheless, the 
state needs a mythology for its violence, which it finds in law and justice. 
Inmates of the state’s places of confinement and those sent to the gallows 
have become the objects of law and justice. No longer its subjects, they 
play their parts in the state’s reiteration of its authority. They have become 
enemies of the people (Ibsen 1882), and therefore the fear they both 
represent, and which they themselves suffer, is political.
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To understand how and why fear is used, consider what happened in 
the United States after 9/11. “Convinced that we lack moral or political 
principles to bind us together, we savor the experience of being afraid . . . 
for only fear, we believe, can turn us from isolated men and women into 
a united people. . . . We blind ourselves to the real-world conflicts that 
make fear an instrument of political rule and advance” (Robin 2004:3). 
The operative word is “rule.” Having forsaken burning witches, the gov-
ernments of capitalist Europe began hanging forgers, “and gentlemen 
knew why: ‘Forgery is a stab to commerce’” (Hay 1975:19 citing Holliday 
1797:149). In England, history makes it clear. The eighteenth century saw 
the establishment of banks’ promissory notes as a medium of exchange, 
thus providing negotiable paper—that is, money. “The result was a rash 
of capital statutes against forgeries and frauds of all kinds” (Hay 1975:21). 
Criminal law and its cousins, such as immigration law and all other insti-
tutions that identify populations as outsiders and enemies of the people, 
always enforce authority and rule. “The criminal law was critically impor-
tant in maintaining bonds of obedience and deference, in legitimizing 
the status quo, in constantly recreating the structure of authority which 
arose from property and in turn protected its interests. . . . Terror alone 
could never have accomplished those ends” (25). The engines of control 
require acquiescence. Hannah Arendt (1958) attributed fear mainly if not 
exclusively to totalitarian regimes, and their use of camps, among other 
things. Nonetheless, parliamentary, liberal democracies use them and 
other forms of confinement and punishment for much the same ends. 
Bourgeois liberalism regularly casts aspersions for its own practices on 
what its lettered apologists call totalitarianism. Citing Richard Hofstadter, 
Daniel Bell, Talcott Parsons, Seymour Martin Lipset, Nathan Glazer, and 
David Riesman, Cory Robin noted that Hofstadter blamed the people of 
the United States for the political repression now called McCarthyism. 
According to such lights, “McCarthyism . . . was not an instrument of 
elite or institutional power, nor was it the product of liberal government. 
It was . . . ‘the paranoid style of American politics’” (Robin 2004:15 citing 
Hofstadter 1965). Political fear, which makes the bulk of the people afraid 
of some much smaller segment, comes from societies’ management of 
class. The engines of state social control need firm hands on the controls, 
and those are the hands of the state’s managers. A particular group of what 
C. Wright Mills (1956) called the power elite, the political leaders and 
bureaucrats, operate the levers of state power.
But political fear . . . is not the saving agent of self and society. Nor does 
it reside beyond the domain of politics, liberal or otherwise. It is instead a 
political tool, an instrument of elite rule or insurgent advance, created and 
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sustained by political leaders or activists who stand to gain something from 
it, either because fear helps them pursue a specific political goal or because 
it reflects or lends support to their moral and political beliefs—or both. 
(Robin 2004:16)
Finally, the elite use political fear as an instrument of control over the 
masses. “[T]he most salient political fear, the one that structures our lives 
and limits our possibilities, is the fear among the less powerful of the more 
powerful.” (20). The fear has two moments. First, the less powerful fear 
some designated subpopulation among them—ironically and usually, but 
not always, drawn from the least powerful. They become the enemies of 
the people for a time. Second, the less powerful have to fear the controls 
used by the more powerful against those designated enemies. The Nazis 
had the German people fear first communists, then Jews and a raft of 
others excluded from ein Volk. Secondarily, the German people had to 
fear that what the Nazis used to control those designated undesirables, 
might be used against any one of them, hence, the fear of concentration 
camps that Hannah Arendt cited. Closer in time and space, late-twentieth-
century Americans learned to fear criminals, or more specifically a par-
ticular criminal class, and they also feared what the state did to those 
criminals, ostensibly in the name of the people.
The Imprisonment of America
As of the end of 2007, the United States incarcerated 2.3 million adults in 
prisons and jails. The U.S. Justice Department reported 1,610,584 in state 
and federal prisons and 785,556 in jails. Over 7.3 million were on proba-
tion or parole, calculated as 3.2 percent of the resident adult population 
(BJS 2009). The next closest in the world is China with about 1.5 million, 
but of course China’s population is over four times larger than that of the 
United States. These numbers translate to an incarceration rate of about 
767 prisoners per one hundred thousand of the U.S. population, more 
than seven times the average incarceration rate that fluctuated around 
one hundred for most of the twentieth century. In addition, residential 
juvenile facilities held 104,959 as of 2006 (OJJDP 2009). Those are just 
the adjudicated prisoners. Furthermore, the United States holds an untold 
number of children and adults in concentration camps or, euphemistically, 
detention centers. The number remains secret, according to claims by the 
Department of Homeland Security because revealing it would breach 
national security. Most of the camp inmates have no criminal proceed-
ings against them. They are held on immigration violations, which are 
civil matters, not criminal. Consequently, the Bill of Rights that safeguards 
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those accused of crimes does not apply to them. Finally, prisons camps 
and so-called Black Sites around the world contain prisoners whom U.S. 
intelligence agencies deem worthy of their attention. 
The watershed year for this imprisonment explosion was 1975. Only in 
the past few decades have scholars begun to analyze and try to explain how 
and why America, the land of the free, turned into the most imprisoned 
nation in the world and arguably in human history. Paul Hirschi blamed a 
“populist political response to public fear of rising crime” (2000:280–282). 
He went on to say that the populist response led to a rapidly growing 
volume of laws and inspectorates of police. Burgeoning social regulation 
is not spread evenly. Hirschi (2000) stressed its class distribution. It crimi-
nalizes street life, and therefore those whose lives are most exposed to the 
street, the lower classes. The upper classes retreat to gated communities, 
leaving those in the middle to live with a heightened sense of risk: they 
“cannot afford total security, their kids go to public schools, and they regu-
larly have to use the streets” (282). Hence, those in the middle, who make 
up the bulk of the vocal electorate, turn to the state. The consequences are 
a carceral society beyond the imagination of Michel Foucault (1975).
Intensified normalizing regulation by a new class of supervisory profession-
als is also self-defeating and contradictory in its effects. . . . The principal 
danger of such intensified regulation by the state is that it undermines the 
rule of law. This is firstly by the sheer volume of rules produced, which baf-
fles even specialist lawyers. . . . Laws do not aim at the citizen, but at officials 
in their capacities as regulators of citizens’ activities. . . . Government ceases 
to be limited, it is everywhere, despite all the talk of the “retreat of the state.” 
One might call this a nouveau ancien regime. 
(Hirschi 2000:283)
In a history of U.S. punishment policies, Michael Tonry identified four fac-
tors that explain the imprisonment binge and set the United States apart 
from comparable countries. The first relies on Richard Hofstadter’s (1965) 
paranoid style of American politics. The second comes from a moral certi-
tude in the American puritanical tradition, mainly associated with colonial 
New England. The third, Tonry attributes to what he called “obsolete con-
stitutional arrangements” (Tonry 2009:379). The fourth arises from the 
racism basic to U.S. history, politics, and social structure; that exacerbates 
the first three. Tonry dismissed several alternative explanations. Rising 
crime rates fail to account for the incarceration explosion, since “crime 
rates were much the same throughout the Western world after 1970” (379), 
but other countries did not indulge in so much imprisonment. The same 
applies to their public opinion, which fluctuated similarly to that in the 
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United States during the last forty years, at least in regard to crime and 
punishment. Tonry also rejected David Garland’s (2001a) late modernity 
thesis that the United States and United Kingdom promulgated expressive 
penal policies to show that the respective governments were doing their 
job and protecting the populace. Tonry pointed out that the problem with 
Garland’s analysis is that it cannot account for mild penal policies in most 
Western European countries and Canada. Another explanation he found 
wanting centered on a distinction between neoliberal countries such as 
the United States, Great Britain, and New Zealand and social democratic 
corporatist nations like those of Scandinavia (Cavadino and Dignan 2005) 
or majoritarian versus consensus democracies (Green 2008; Lappi-Seppälä 
2008; Lijphart 1999). Finally, Tonry found fault with the notion that mild 
or moderate penal policies go with relative wealth equality, high popular 
legitimacy of government, and a professionalized as opposed to politicized 
criminal justice (380–381). He argued that low levels of equality, legiti-
macy, and professionalism support a punitive policy in the United States 
with low levels of each, as opposed to countries with high levels of those 
social and political characteristics that have mild policies. 
Although Tonry’s four factors work, they do not offer a cogent expla-
nation, because they explain why people accept or even support punitive 
penal policies and practices, but they do not clarify why they were pursued. 
The closest Tonry comes to that explanation is his claim that “[c]ynical 
politicians took advantage of recurring features of American political 
culture in order to win elections and wields power, but their appeals suc-
ceeded only because of deeper elements of American culture and history” 
(381). Without gainsaying the depths of cynicism and ambition of politi-
cians, the fact remains that political opportunism cannot account for why 
they succeeded with the appeal for punitiveness at a particular moment in 
American history. The factors or features Tonry identified—paranoid style, 
puritanical morality, obsolete governmental structure, and racism—are 
not new, a point he himself stresses in favor of his argument. Nonetheless, 
the punitive surge suddenly appeared in the mid-1970s, not, for example, 
the mid-1990s or mid-1950s. Those cynical politicians drew on fear and 
anger from the U.S. public to enact punitive penal policies, but the ques-
tion of why they chose punitive penal policies, and why the populace had 
so much fear and suspiciousness in the 1970s, remains unexplained.
Structural racism, tied to class structure and coupled with ruling class 
fears, combined not so much with Hofstadter’s paranoid style of politics, 
but with an emerging postmodern political economy. A focused study 
of public opinion found that anger about crime coincided with bleak 
expectations of personal economic well-being among White males in 
Florida (Costelloe et al. 2009). The researchers concluded that the iconic 
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“angry white male,” as they called the abstract personage, provided a 
base of support for punitive penal policies in part because he was poorly 
educated and harbored economic insecurities. That population segment 
also supported George Wallace’s presidential campaigns in the 1960s and 
gave Richard Nixon his presidential victories in the late 1960s and 1970s. 
Doubtless, George W. Bush could rely on them in the twenty-first century. 
Furthermore, that subpopulation can claim a well-deserved reputation for 
racism and general xenophobia. As with Tonry’s argument, however, they 
alone do not explain the success of punitive penality. Their predecessors, 
for example, formed the backbone of the Ku Klux Klan and similar move-
ments, and whatever their local successes, they did not turn the ship of 
American politics throughout the twentieth century.
For example, the enactment of a harsher death penalty statute in 
Delaware in the early 1990s drew on sentiments associated with the “angry 
white male.” Even so, racist, xenophobic populism remains insufficient in 
explanatory power. “[I]nstead it was the re-creation of a particular politi-
cal geography of capital punishment in which marginalized voices are 
silenced and jurors’ voices muted” (Fleury-Steiner et al. 2009:19–20). The 
new law eliminated the jury from sentencing in capital cases, so it may 
have been populist, but it also was antidemocratic. The civil rights era and 
the movement for racial equality and redress of the 1960s and early 1970s 
“transformed crime in Delaware from a local to a broad, highly amor-
phous problem that was presented in the media as threatening the state’s 
residents as a whole. . . . Rather the dramatic breech that the ‘invaders’ from 
Philadelphia represented, tapped into the public and political representa-
tives’ deeply held commonsense of a moral universe” (20). This conclusion 
points to more than just cynical politicians. The commonsense morality 
refers to a basic value orientation tied to long-standing social structures, 
particularly structural racism in the United States. Structural racism har-
kens back to the founding structures of the nation. The European invasion 
slaughtered the native inhabitants to secure the land, and kidnapped slaves 
provided the labor to make it into a capital resource. Since the seventeenth 
century, social structural hierarchy at every level of society depended on 
racial divisions coupled with class relations. The commonsense morality 
provides a cultural basis rooted in dominant values, cultural identities, 
explanatory narratives, and cognitive toolkits (Green 2009; Saguy and 
Stuart 2008; Swidler 1986). All these elements remain quiescent unless 
called to the fore through representation, which requires not just local 
politicians but the control of representational media.
Looking at the regulation of British society with respect to punitiveness, 
surveillance, and a general culture of control, Stuart Waiton argued that 
the impetus and wherewithal for mobilizing populist sentiments came 
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from “the incapacity of the elite to govern . . . that led to the necessity—or 
perhaps more accurately—the preoccupation with the need to regulate 
society more directly. The growth of crime as a form of ‘governing’ was 
one aspect of this development” (Waiton 2009:361–362). Although Waiton 
focuses almost exclusively on the political ruling class—the leaders of Tory 
and Labour governments from Thatcher through Blair—he is identifying 
postmodern politics, which he characterized as “politics without purpose” 
(362). Increasingly, they intensified and broadened the issue of crime as 
a political issue, similar to the pattern in the United States. There, a war 
on drugs and crime in the streets gave way to a host of criminalizations 
with publicity about incidents of child abduction, stalking, superpredator 
juveniles, and an almost endless variety of scary stories. In Britain in the 
1990s, with the triumph of New Labour, “[t]he ‘individual’ that emerged . . . 
was individuated rather than individualized” (366).
Here New Labour redefined begging not as an offense against the laws of 
society or a political or social problem of welfare cheats but specifically as 
an offense against the public (or more accurately, individuals’) sense of 
well-being. Now, rather than the illegal act of begging being the problem—it 
was the previously legal “attitude” and behavior of the beggar that was 
criminalized: to protect the newly conceptualized vulnerable public “aggres-
siveness” needed to be outlawed on British streets (369). 
The politicization . . . and problematization of aggressive begging was 
dependent upon an outlook that understood the problem of this “crime” 
as one of incivility that undermined the peoples’ feeling of security. . . . The 
connection between the individual and the State was now more direct and 
based less on the collective will of the people . . . than in the protection of 
the atomized individual’s emotional well-being.
The significance of the “victim” for the representation of arguments was 
ultimately central to both sides of the aggressive beggars debate (369–370). 
The debate took place between the government and charitable organiza-
tions. The government spoke of beggars victimizing the public, and the 
charities noted that beggars, the poorest of the public, were more often 
the victims. These terms of the debate have a double effect. By creating 
atomized individuals, the public no longer has the political power of being 
a democratic force for their own governance. The elevation of internal 
emotional states, rather than persons’ public acts, turns everyone into 
objects of the state, instead of its subjects. As the state and its laws first 
created (legal) subjects, it now converts them into objects, as criminal 
justice formally converts designated criminals from subjects into objects. 
Now everyone is a convict, which is the real meaning of governing through 
crime (Simon 2007).
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The other crucial element to the antibegging campaign by New Labour 
has less to do with party politics in Britain and more with the global strug-
gle to maintain hegemony by the capitalist ruling class. As late modernity 
gave way to postmodernity and world capitalism moved into senescence, 
the elites clutched at every advantage to keep their wealth and stay on 
top. The production of images of victimhood, the media campaign in 
Delaware to mute one of the wellsprings of democracy, the jury, and the 
recourse to the votes of angry white males and Protestant fundamentalist 
morality are the symptoms of the ruling class’ desperation in the unpre-
dictability of postmodernity. Waiton wrote of “politics without purpose.” It 
is less a lack of purpose than a disguise. The pageant of electoral politics in 
bourgeois democracies has forever obscured their real power and purpose. 
It was not that Tory and Labour governments did not know how to govern. 
They all knew their role was to serve ruling class interests. Their problem 
was how to do it and keep that purpose obscured or at least distorted. One 
way was the construction of the crime problem and the encouragement 
of fear of criminals and anger at their supposed impunity. The issue of 
begging reveals it. More pithily, the acquiescence of the public to control 
mechanisms such as CCTV cameras covering much of the public space in 
Britain and Transportation Security Administration guards in the United 
States, show the objectification of the public. The objectification of the 
public renders democracy a dead letter, and so one of the main, historic 
limitations on ruling class power becomes ineffectual.
The Centrality of Racism
More than 60% of the people in prison are now racial and ethnic minorities. 
For Black males in their twenties, 1 in every 8 is in prison or jail on any given 
day. These trends have been intensified by the disproportionate impact of 
the “war on drugs,” in which three-fourths of all persons in prison for drug 
offenses are people of color. 
(Sentencing Project 2009)
Prison and related projects such as capital punishment increasingly show 
racial disparities. “[T]he whole experience of the black man in America 
can be summed up in one word: prison” (Knight et al. 1970:5 quoted in 
Gottschalk 2006:183). Marie Gottschalk, while recognizing the salience of 
David Garland’s (2001a) culture of control, argued that “the combination 
of elite behavior and broader cultural trends are insufficient to explain why 
the United States embraced imprisonment and other get-tough policies so 
whole heartedly” (Gottschalk 2006:36). She offered two correctives. First, 
she pointed to a history of punitiveness, especially in the United States. 
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Second, she tried to show that Garland’s thesis was too broad to account 
for differences between the United States and Great Britain since both 
national policies moved toward greater punitiveness in the last several 
decades. She said that “a nuanced focus reveals that the politics of crime 
and punishment that built the carceral state were more fluid, multilayered, 
and less deterministic than is commonly assumed” (36). Although her 
study exposes and explains variation between the United States and United 
Kingdom particularly, and within each country, its main contribution, 
merely shows the details at various levels of the two societies. If noth-
ing else, the U.S. federal system has produced great variation among the 
states. Nonetheless, her detailed history does not derail Garland’s cogency. 
Nonetheless, both Garland and Gottschalk underrate the explanatory 
power of racism. One rather small illustration comes from Gottschalk’s 
discussion that refers to “moralistic campaigns” such as the Salem witch 
trials in 1692 and the prostitution sweep of thirty thousand women dur-
ing the First World War. She points to the rudimentary and amateurish 
approach to law enforcement in U.S. history. “Colonial justice was a 
‘business of amateurs’ (Friedman 1993:27) with lay magistrates and no 
real police force” (Gottschalk 2006:42). On the other hand, the same his-
tory could mean that the United States had rudimentary government in 
general, and that local law enforcement remained a matter of local poli-
tics until the second half of the twentieth century. More importantly, it 
neglects the role of racism in state building for the United States with its 
genocidal controls of the native populations and the bondage and terror 
visited on the kidnapped African populations whose labor was essential 
for capitalism’s success in the New World.
The History of Imperialism and White Supremacy
In his technocentric interpretation of world history, William H. McNeill 
identified three elements of Western Europe that allowed its peoples 
to dominate the earth beginning about the year 1500. First, he noted a 
character trait: deep-rooted pugnacity and a reckless way of doing things. 
Second, he noted that by that time they had developed a complex mili-
tary technology. Finally, he said the region had a population “inured to 
a variety of diseases which had long been endemic throughout the Old 
World ecumene” (McNeill 1963:569). More recently, more succinctly, and 
with out the amateur mass psychology, Jared Diamond (1997) wrote that 
guns, germs, and steel set Western Europeans on their path to imperial 
domination. Neither Diamond nor McNeill can account for why it was 
Western Europe rather than China that conquered the world, since China 
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too had guns, germs, steel, superior naval navigation, and what is more, the 
kind of imperial state that had extended its rule over much of the landmass 
of eastern Asia. Regardless of any singular explanation or several-factor 
approach, the fact remains that Western imperialism went hand-in-hand 
with the rise of the world capitalist system at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century. Along with imperialism, racism with its presumption of white 
supremacy appeared in its modern form. Although not accidental, impe-
rialism and racism conditioned one another; the one did not depend on 
the other. Another way to put it is that racism was neither a necessary nor 
sufficient condition of Western imperialism for the rise of world capi-
talism, but it did coincide with its emergence. That Western cultural 
legacy of racism became foundational for the American colonies where 
the European invaders genocidally conquered and subdued the native 
inhabitants—the Spanish and Portuguese in the south and the British 
and French in the north. National cultural variations along with differ-
ences in economic and political exploitation of the conquered territories 
led to different forms of racism. Nonetheless, that cultural element was 
integral to their social structure. Therefore, any social structural analysis 
of the United States that fails to take in the basic structural legacy of rac-
ism must perforce remain incomplete if not incorrect. That general rule 
applies to control of racially defined populations in the United States 
through concentration, confinement, death, and fear.
Terrorism against African Americans: Slavery through Jim Crow
The European invaders and Settlers of North America used kidnapped 
people from Africa as slaves to make the New World economically 
productive. Since the work of slaves requires their mobility, they rarely had 
physical restraints on them. Instead, the master class defined them as a race, 
and controlled them through punishment and fear. Beginning in the late 
seventeenth century, the plantation economies of the South used an early 
form of police—slave patrols (Hadden 2001). “In the Old South slave hold-
ing classes and their nonslave-owning neighbors lived in constant fear of 
uprisings  . . .  slaves posed a constant threat” (Fry 1975:38). To counter loss 
of their property by flight and rebellion, planters relied on armed Whites. 
The relationship between slave patrols and militias was blurred (Hadden 
2001:42). In addition to physical abuse, patrollers used psychological 
warfare. They encouraged supernatural fear among slaves by ambushing 
them at night. The nightriders used demonic disguises and costumes as 
in the more modern ghost-like apparel of the Ku Klux Klan (Fry 1975:
86–8). Vigilance bands of Whites augmented slave patrols on the eve of 
the Civil War amid growing anxieties of revolt (Hadden 2001:167–72). 
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Slave patrolling did not end abruptly after the war. The Reconstruction Act 
and Fourteenth Amendment ended the formal institution of patrolling, 
but their techniques and personnel merely transferred to informal orga-
nizations, most notoriously the Ku Klux Klan (198–200). Whites allayed 
their own fears by reasserting psychological domination over freed slaves 
through terrorism. The Klan and similar organizations such as the White 
Camelia terrorized African Americans and White Republicans. In effect 
these terrorist bands were paramilitary units of the Southern Democratic 
Party (MacPherson 1982:564). The anti-Klan Acts of 1870 and 1871 and 
the determined prosecution by the Grant administration finally put an 
end to them, sometimes by invoking martial law.
C. Vann Woodward (1957), supported by W. E. B. DuBois (1935) and 
Eric Foner’s (1988) findings, has argued that the South in the gilded 
age did not revert to antebellum race relations. The laws and political 
institutions protected the freed status of African Americans. One way of 
controlling freed slaves and exploiting their labor was the convict leas-
ing system. It used the criminal justice system for convicting African 
Americans, sentencing them to prison, and then leasing them to White 
employers. 90 percent of the leased convicts were African Americans 
(MacPherson 1982:613–614). In and outside of prisons, the combination 
of sadistic guards, lack of food, clothing and shelter, and forced labor 
produced death rates rivaling the Nazi work camps (Lichtenstein 1996; 
MacPherson 1982:614; Hilberg 1985). Mississippi’s Parchman Farm was 
among the most notorious state prisons (Oshinsky 1996).
Whites used lynching as another social control. Beginning in the 1880s 
and becoming increasingly prevalent in the South, White lynch mobs 
replaced the surreptitious violence of the night riders. “Gilded Age lynch-
ers acted with community approval, rarely donning the masks and robes 
favored by the Klan” (Waldrep 2002:83). Occasions of lynching became 
public rites of intensification that reaffirmed community solidarity. 
Lynching differed from Klan or night rider terrorism, as it followed accu-
sations of crimes. During the nineteenth century, throughout the United 
States it targeted many persons not of African descent—Asians, Latinos, 
and Europeans from recent immigrant groups such as Jews and Italians. 
It was not until the twentieth century that it took on its almost exclusively 
racial character. In the South, racial lynching followed from the Jim Crow 
laws that began to appear in the 1890s. They coincided with and reacted 
to a wave of populism sweeping rural America, not just the South. The 
Southern bourbon hierarchy could not tolerate biracial populism in which 
poor Whites joined with African Americans. Jim Crow was one solution. 
Laws enforcing segregation erected barriers to racial intermingling among 
the lower classes. They also set invidious differential access to social goods 
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and services. For African Americans, violating Jim Crow became a route to 
Parchman Farm or lynching. 
Fear, Violence, and Ghettoization in the Twentieth Century
The North had always practiced de facto discrimination and segregation, 
but the Great Migration, more or less coincident with the First World 
War, brought new African American migrants to northern and west-
ern cities. Between 1916 and 1927, 1.2 million African Americans fled 
north and west (Jones 1992:213). Far from halcyon havens, the urban 
centers in the first decades of the twentieth century had plenty of inter-
group antagonisms. White enmity toward African Americans just added 
to the mix. The end of the First World War saw exacerbation of racial 
strife and political oppression represented by the Red Summer of 1919. 
So-called race riots were really pogroms in which White mobs invaded 
Black enclaves beating, burning, killing, and raping. Part of the motiva-
tion was economic. A Black diaspora produced self-supporting enclaves in 
places like the greenwood district of Tulsa, Oklahoma (Oliver and Shapiro 
1995:48–50), Phillips County, Arkansas (Cortner 1988), and Rosewood, 
Florida (D’Orso 1996). What made the Red Summer of 1919 in Chicago 
unusual was that the Black community fought back. 
In Chicago, by late July 1919, shortly before the White attacks on the 
Black Belt, two-hundred-and-fifty thousand workers were on strike or 
locked out, a quarter of the city’s workforce (Tuttle 1970:141). The stock-
yards were a focus of the labor conflict, struck since July 18. Organized 
along craft lines, 90 percent of the White workers were unionized; 
90 percent of the Black workers were not (142). Employers, especially 
the meat packers, used racial antagonisms to further their own interests 
in the conflict. In addition to workplace antagonisms, Chicago’s south 
side had seen bombings and bloodshed as African Americans moved into 
previously all-White neighborhoods. White mobs, spearheaded by neigh-
borhood street gangs, stormed Black Belt neighborhoods. Young Black 
men met them. Among them, was a recently mustered out all-Black Army 
unit from the war, the Eighth Illinois. Consequently African Americans 
were not the only casualties. After the conflagration in Chicago, Omaha, 
other cities had riots in which White authorities stood by, often arresting 
Black victims of White violence. White pogroms did not subside until the 
mid-1920s.
Roughly at the same time as Red Summer, the Red Scare of 1919 tar-
geted those on the political left, communists, socialists, and Wobblies, 
members of the Industrial Workers of the World. Led by the Bureau of 
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Investigation, later the FBI, federal authorities conducted the Palmer raids 
in 1919–1920. One target became African Americans who had joined 
or allied themselves with the left political groups seeking racial equality. 
In this the Bureau anticipated its later role in the 1960s and 1970s. “The 
Bureau’s first priority was to protect the existing racial hierarchy” (Schmidt 
2000:202–203). At about the same time, the Military Intelligence Division 
of the Army shifted from passive to active defense of White supremacy 
(Kornweibel 1998, 2002).
By the 1960s, agencies of the United States, coordinated by the FBI., 
moved from surveillance and harassment to outright terrorism. J. Edgar 
Hoover’s decision to destroy the civil rights movement marked the tip-
ping point. Prompted by the 1963 march on Washington, the FBI directly 
engaged in, or coordinated illegal surveillance, burglary, forgery, and 
assassination of civil rights leaders and political militants (Churchill and 
Vanderwall 1990a, b; O’Reilly 1989:355, 1995; Swearingen 1995). In this, 
Hoover was aided and abetted by Richard M. Nixon. In private remarks, 
he “emphasized that you have to face the fact that the whole problem is 
really the blacks. The key is to devise a system that recognizes this while 
not appearing to” (Haldeman 1994:53). Although he said it in the context 
of welfare, it also fit with the already established strategy of linking crime, 
poverty, welfare, race, and political militancy. That culturally defined 
strategy of repression gave voice to populist White America’s racial ressen-
timent, and resulted in government strategies serving the interests of the 
White ruling class. The policies fueled the White animus, and produced 
racial ghettos with increasingly concentrated poverty. At the same time, 
criminal justice strategies removed potentially revolutionary Black leader-
ship and cadres of political workers and intimidated the Black population 
against pursuing their militant agendas.
The Nixon approach combined ghettoization with criminal justice. 
It led to what Michael Tonry (1995) described as “malign neglect.” He 
said that crime and welfare became inextricably linked (7), concluding 
that African Americans’ disadvantages in basic social economic condi-
tions “cause their disproportionate involvement in crime” (39). Christian 
Parenti offered a more radical assessment.
[C]rime and fear of crime are forms of social control. Strong-arm robbery, 
rape, homicide, and general thuggery in poor communities leave people 
scared, divided, cynical, and politically confused; ultimately these acts drive 
victims of capitalism, racism, and sexism into the arms of the racist, pro-
business, sexist state. In short, crime justifies state violence and even creates 
popular demand for state repression. 
(Parenti 2000:44)
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Moreover, as Loïc Wacquant has argued (2000, 2001, 2007), ghettos—
whether Black or Latin in the United States or the immigrant banlieues 
of Paris—create imprisoning residential barriers. Especially in the United 
States, the ghettos suffer from policing strategies that turn them into 
catchment areas for filling the nations prisons, not unlike the Nazi ghettos 
did for the concentration camps.
A similar phenomenon obtains in and around Indian reservations. In a 
study of the Rose Bud Reservation for the Lakota, Thomas Biolsi showed 
how the supposed endemic animosity between Indians and Whites derived 
from federal Indian laws and policies. The reservation system itself, abet-
ted by restrictions on real sovereignty for the tribe, set the spatial condi-
tions for the conflict, and produced, as the title of his book intimated, 
deadliest enemies.
“Equality before the law” deradicalizes the law by excluding class, race, 
and gender inequalities from its cognizance and from practical political 
struggles it underwrites. If such “bourgeois” equality and property rights 
thus amount to a “coded denial of experience,” so does “sovereignty” as 
constructed in federal Indian law. 
 (Biolsi 2007:189)
Concentration camps, reservations, or ghettos when coupled with invidi-
ous racialist discourses do not need explicit legal sanction. They produce 
similar results whether the legal discourse is one of equality as in the 
Anglo-American system, or one of race as in the Nazi system. Camps and 
ghettos foster self-destructive behavior among their inmates. They attack 
each other rather than attacking their oppressors.
The Death Penalty: Terror and Social Control
David Garland (2005) has argued that capital punishment’s most salient 
function in the United States is expressive as opposed to instrumental, 
and therefore is best understood in cultural terms. He has also argued that 
the reasons the United States retained capital punishment while all other 
Western, industrialized countries abolished it depend on a general author-
itarian shift in politics and culture beginning around 1970. The United 
States is the only developed Western nation to retain it, whereas 138 
countries have abolished the practice for any crime and another 36 have 
abolished de facto if not de jure. Not surprisingly, African Americans are 
disproportionately represented on U.S. death rows, comprising about half 
of those inmates. Despite its rarity as a sentence, and therefore its arguably 
slight effect on deterrence or operations of criminal justice systems, capital 
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punishment disproportionately affects the political and legal culture. 
As Garland (1990, 2002, and 2005) and others (Allen and Chubb 2008; 
Hood 2002; Lifton and Mitchell 2000; Sarat 2001; Sarat & Boulanger 2005; 
and Zimring 2003) have observed, the practices of capital punishment 
and the cultures of both abolitionist and retentionist societies condition 
each other dialectically. States with the greatest number of executions are 
disproportionately in the South, excepting mainly California with its mas-
sive penal population. James W. Clarke argued that the state-sanctioned 
death penalty replaced lynching as a way of terrorizing and controlling 
African Americans (1998).
In line with Garland’s thesis, public opinion and the judicial sector of 
U.S. criminal justice tended toward abolition into the 1970s. Nonetheless, 
the political right stirred up public sentiment in favor of retention. 
A particular instance comes from California. When Ronald Reagan ran for 
governor, he stressed his support for the death penalty as part of a broadly 
reactionary program. His campaigns pushed public opinion, which had 
been split on the death penalty, toward a two-thirds support for it (Hamm 
2001:148–155). The relation between the death penalty and public opin-
ion seems similar throughout the world—that is, public opinion follows 
politics and policy. The history of abolition in Europe reveals the relation 
most clearly. Before its abolition, the public generally supported it; after 
its abolition support gradually declined (Zimring 2003). Public opinion 
continues to think of capital punishment in populist retributive terms 
even in long-standing abolitionist countries. In Latin America, where the 
death penalty has been abolished longest, public opinion is nearly split 
(Briceño-León, Carmadiel and Avila 2006). In contrast, public opinion in 
retentionist countries, including the United States and China, shows two-
thirds to three-fourths in favor of capital punishment. Laws, politically 
framed discourses, and public policy shape, channel, and articulate public 
opinion thereby giving form to the meaning of the death penalty.
Democratic mythology says laws and public policies follow public 
opinion. Whatever its validity for other things, with the death penalty, 
the opposite applies. Generally, political and social elites have led their 
countries toward abolition. They have not in the United States, because it 
serves their strategy of using fear to maintain their hegemony and control 
otherwise demanding masses.
The Gray Zone
Garland’s culture of control (2001a) and system of governing through 
crime, whether Jonathan Simon’s (2007) version or Christopher Parenti’s 
(2000), spring from a culture of fear (Glassner 1999). Fear always divides 
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and never promotes solidarity. First, a culture of fear creates fear among a 
majority against a marginalized minority, second it generates fear 
among the majority of those they have given the power to protect them 
against the minority. It culminates in pervasive fear where everyone fears 
everyone else. Joseph Kessel and Haakon Chevalier (1944) called it the 
Army of Shadows, a roman à clef about the French resistance against the 
Nazi occupation. The resistance became shot through with spies and 
collaborators. In attempts to root out betrayals, resistance cadres too 
often turned against each other. Primo Levi called it the gray zone. The 
latter refers to the culture of fear, collaboration, and divisiveness created 
by the Nazi SS in the camps. Everyone remained silent. The civilian wit-
nesses remained silent through willed ignorance and fear (Levi 1986). The 
inmates remained silent out of shame, and fear (70–87). The Kapos, the 
inmate overseers and collaborators with the camp regime, remained silent 
out of guilt and fear because of their collaboration. The SS guards bound 
them by burdening them with guilt, covering them with blood, and com-
promising them as much as possible. 
[T]he harsher the oppression, the more widespread among the oppressed 
is the willingness, with its infinite nuances and motivations, to collabo-
rate: terror, ideological seduction, servile imitation of the victor, myopic 
desire for any power whatsoever. . . . All these motives, singly or combined 
have come into play in the creation of this gray zone, whose components 
are bonded together by the wish to preserve and consolidate established 
privilege vis- à-vis those without privilege (43). 
Even outside of, and before the camps in the ghetto, there are the collabo-
rators. One has become notorious—Chaim Rumkowski, the head of the 
Judenrat—the Jewish council, of the Łódź ghetto in occupied Poland. He 
directed the slow crushing of its population up until final liquidation—
a euphemism for removal to the death camps.
Like Rumkowski, we too are so dazzled by power and prestige as to forget 
our essential fragility. Willingly or not we come to terms with power, forget-
ting that we are all in the ghetto, that the ghetto is walled in, that outside the 
ghetto reign the lords of death, and that close by the train is waiting (69). 
Camps, gallows, ghettos, gulags, and prisons all follow the same logic and 
have the same origin: the desire to dominate, to gain advantage, and fear 
of being dominated. “[T]he concentration camp system even from its ori-
gins . . . had as its primary purpose shattering the adversaries’ capacity to 
resist” (38). The culture of fear pervades the postmodern world. The elite 
fear loss of privilege and control. The managers, like the collaborators they 
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are, are burdened with guilt and fear loss of the protections of their offices. 
The mass majority fears the marginalized minorities and the manager, and 
eventually each other. The excluded, the others, the minorities fear every-
body, not the least each other. It is that way by design, in part, and partly 
by unforeseen consequence. In either case, the culture of fear has become 
an inevitable accompaniment to postmodernity. 
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Chapter 7
The Rise of the Icon
The rise of iconic representation as the dominant form of communica-tion and consciousness marks an even greater epochal shift than the 
transition from a capitalist to a postcapitalist world system of political 
economy. The shift from the logocentric to the iconocentric began approx-
imately in the mid-twentieth century. The advent of television signaled 
it, but should not be confused as its cause. Image began to replace text 
as the preeminently authoritative sign. The iconic shift strengthened the 
effectiveness of the fear culture, as characteristics of icons lend themselves 
to more emotional and less analytic styles of thought.
An analogous shift occurred in Greece roughly twenty-five hundred 
years before. Eric Havelock (1983) argued for an epochal shift in commu-
nication and consciousness among Greeks of the classical age. He placed it 
sometime in the fifth century BCE. The dominant form of discourse before 
the shift he called mythos. Its paradigm was the performances of the great 
epics, the Iliad and Odyssey. Poets and their entourages recited the mythic 
stories. These performances constituted the primary form of socialization. 
Havelock argued that performance characterized discourse and conscious-
ness using mythic history. It was an oral culture in a tribal social order.
Adopting an alphabetic writing system in the seventh or eighth century 
BCE, the ancient Greeks employed it gradually and increasingly to record 
the poetic epics, along with more pedestrian uses such as recording tax 
receipts and the other ancient applications of writing. Adoption of writing 
as the main form for the ruling epics signified the shift from mythos to 
logos, a shift from an oral to a written culture, from the performative to 
the lexical. Whereas Homer exemplified mythos, Plato became the exem-
plar of logos. The shift in classical Greece set the stage for a logocentric 
Western culture (Derrida 1967). It had particular application to law and 
criminal justice. Indeed it was in those institutions that the shift took some 
of its most dramatic forms.
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Today, common usage of the word “icon” has several meanings. 
Religious icons like those of eastern Christianity depict holy figures such 
as Jesus and Mary, angels, or saints through portraiture or sculpture. 
A more modern usage refers to the public personages of exemplary 
persons. It can also refer to a representation of any object, which occurs 
 frequently in advertising. Most recently, the icon refers to figures that 
appear on computer screens indicating programs or functions. Apparently 
disparate, these meanings have a core definition found in the philosophical 
and semiotic writing of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914). 
Peirce introduced iconicity as an element of semiosis, his general theory 
of signs. He distinguished three kinds of sign relations—icon, index, and 
 symbol. In indexical sign relations, the sign and object relate contiguously, 
as in smoke and fire, wind and weather vanes, or disease and symptoms. 
Symbolic sign relations are arbitrary and conventional. A symbol “refers to 
the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general 
ideas” (Peirce 1960 vol. 2:249). Iconic sign relations are those in which the sign 
represents the object “by virtue of a character which it possesses in itself. . . . 
[It] does not draw any distinction between itself and its object” (vol. 5:73–74). 
The sign represents itself “by virtue of its being an immediate image, that is 
to say by virtue of characters which belong to it in itself as a sensible object, 
and which it would possess just the same were there no object in nature that it 
resembled” (vol. 4:447 emphasis added). Images constitute the most familiar 
form of iconic representation. A shorthand version denotes icons as based on 
resemblance, indexes as pointers, and symbols as meaningful.
The iconic relies most heavily on metaphor, or more exactly, metaform, 
compared to mythos and logos. Metaform is a connective kind of model-
ing resulting from representing abstractions in concrete terms (Sebeok 
and Danesi 2000:38). Willie Horton gave concrete representation to 
abstractions. So, an image combining Islam, the Middle East, and violence 
has the implicating force that makes them seem related. Part of the meta-
phorical maneuver uses domain transference, as in the metaphor “fishing” 
for information. One domain of food-gathering activities transfers to the 
domain of communication (Geeraerts 2002). The metaphor naturalizes 
the transfer, making it seem inherently logical. The image makes the con-
nections concrete, and condenses fields of meaning into one.
Condensation is another characteristic of iconos. Each step in the 
mythocentric-logocentric-iconocentric evolution increasingly condensed 
the representation of information. The old saw that a picture has a 
 tho usand words catches the sense of condensation. Although aural icons 
abound, onomatopoeia for example, visual icons carry more power. They 
exert power because they carry a heavy informational load and because 
their impact involves more intense emotional responses. The aftermath 
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of the destruction of the World Trade Center on 9/11 illustrates the 
emotional impact. The two kinds of power can operate independently. 
Emotional power of images does not depend on extensive cognitive 
knowledge, unlike mythic and symbolic representations. The reactions of 
people to the repeated images of the World Trade Center on 9/11 needed 
little in the way of higher-level intellectual work.
Icons’ ability to bring forth emotional responses makes them especially 
suited to entertainment or infotainment (Postman 1985). Icons increas-
ingly formed the structure of journalism as television replaced print media 
as the main source of news. Imagine a nightly news program without 
images. While a mythocentric, performance-based public discourse also 
involves entertainment (Bevan 1936), its performative character includes 
an element largely lacking in electronic mediated discourse: immediate 
social interaction. Ancient Greek theater, or for that matter Athenian 
trial courts, performed informational and entertainment functions, but 
they depended on physically present audiences. Indeed, their effectiveness 
partly arose from their affirming and intensifying effects on ancient social 
structure and social relations. Today’s mediated observers often engage 
alone or with a few intimates. Audience engagement by contemporary, 
electronically mediated observers has become virtual.
Icons stand in contrast to symbolic systems like language, mathematics, 
or music, which require linear perception. People perceive icons synchro-
nously. Although several icons can follow a linear arrangement, which pro-
duce linear perceptions and consciousness—say a series of photographs, 
statues, or even motion pictures—each one in the series has a synchronic 
effect. Viewing the stars illustrates the difference between linear and syn-
chronic perception. We see the image of a star years after its visible light 
originated from its body. A linear perception of the star would perceive 
the stream of light as it made its way to earth. Having arrived, we perceive 
the star as a steady image, even when the star may have flamed out and 
died centuries ago. Performances—plays, dance, television programs, 
or  movies—present their narratives in a linear way. Talking and reading 
both use linear presentations. Some kinds of knowledge are better suited 
to linear representations; others fit better with the synchronous style. For 
instance, baseball is a linear sport well suited to radio reportage, but radio 
coverage of football and basketball suffers in comparison to televised 
games. Radio, of course, is a quintessential linear medium, television 
largely a  synchronous one.
Richard L. Fox and Robert W. Van Sickel (2001:3) made a typical 
 comment: “[T]he United States has entered an era of tabloid justice, in 
which the mass media in both their traditional and emerging forms now 
tend to focus on sensationalistic, personal, lurid, and tawdry details.” 
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Television takes the brunt of the criticism, as its increasing  tabloidization 
plays out in infotainment, where journalism blends with  dramatized fic-
tion. This is not limited to television or criminal justice, as Neil Gabler 
(1998:3–10) argued that all the mass media present fact as if it were fiction, 
life as entertainment. Nonetheless, the consequences of the late modern or 
postmodern trends have powerful effects on national policies, according to 
the critics. Much of the effect comes from  imagery appearing on television, 
which has replaced print media as the main source of news for 80 percent 
of U.S. adults (Fox and Van Sickel 2001:61).
Kevin Glynn (2000:17–18) gave the most comprehensive description of 
tabloid culture, linking it to postmodernity.
media and image saturation
prioritization of images over “the real”
instability and uncertainty over modernist categories—e.g., public 
versus private and reality versus representation
pluralization, relativization, and fragmentation of discourses
cultural products marked by stylistic eclecticism and bricolage
incredulity about narratives, especially those claiming universality 
and scientific objectivity and rationalism
According to Glynn, tabloid culture “is immersed in image rearticulation 
and appropriation” (2000:18 citing Collins 1992:333). Furthermore, Glynn 
said, tabloid media exemplify the commodification of culture that lies at 
the heart of postmodernity. Finally, Glynn, relying on Frederic Jameson, 
argued that the postmodern news media relegate recent historical experi-
ences to the past. The logic of “‘you are there’ is taken to the nth degree” 
(Glynn 2000:18 citing Jameson 1983:125). Once relegated to the past, 
media representations deposit residual collective memory traces preparing 
the way for subsequent media reappropriation. The built-in obsolescence 
of popular media “thwart[s] precisely those forms of understanding that 
are needed” (Glynn 2000:19). Consider the fact that the U.S. government 
never presented any clear and convincing evidence that Osama bin Laden 
and his organization they dubbed “al Qaeda” planned and carried out the 
attacks of 9/11, although today the media treat the speculation as estab-
lished fact based on continual reappropriation of the televised images.
Once the images of 9/11 became established as iconic signs, they con-
tributed to ideological formations. 
In actual fact, each living ideological sign has two faces, like Janus . . . any 
current truth must inevitably sound to many other people as the greatest lie. 
This inner dialectic quality [sic] of the sign comes out fully in the open only 
●
●
●
●
●
●
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in times of social crises or revolutionary changes. In the ordinary conditions 
of life, the contradiction embedded in every ideological sign cannot emerge 
fully because the ideological sign in an established, dominant ideology is 
always somewhat reactionary . . . so accentuating yesterday’s truth as to 
make it appear today’s. And that is what is responsible for the refracting and 
distorting peculiarity of the ideological sign within the dominant ideology. 
(Vološinov 1973:23–24)
In trials of those accused of terrorism, the prosecution regularly has intro-
duced images and film footage of the 9/11 attacks as part of its  evidence. 
The image, having been embedded in an ideological formation, subse-
quently proves the truth of the ideology.
Fear of Terrorism and Crime
The events justifying antiterrorism legislation are not immediately under-
standable as instances of terrorism, but they are understandable as sources 
of generalized anxiety. The 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism was 
prompted by an attack on a military installation in a war zone—the Marine 
barracks in Beirut. The Oklahoma City bombing was part revenge for the 
Waco siege and Ruby Ridge fiasco, and if fiction is to be believed, the opening 
shot in an armed rebellion against the United States. The attacks of 9/11 are 
the most problematic, and therefore, the most instructive when analyzed.
The French intellectual Jean Baudrillard attracted vituperative oppro-
brium when he said that the attacks of 9/11 were real events, unlike the 
Gulf War of 1991, but that they were events in a terrorism constructed 
largely by the United States. He said that the attacks were a “spectacle of 
terrorism [which] forces the terrorism of spectacle upon us.” (Baudrillard 
2002:30). He argued that Western capitalism, militarism, and imperialism 
had already created a regime of terror in the world, and 9/11 was a token of 
a type. The type is the reality of terrorism engineered by the United States. 
That, in Baudrillard’s terms, is what makes the 9/11 attacks real events. 
Ward Churchill said much the same thing in an essay. Later he explicated 
and expanded the proposition in his 2003 book On the Justice of Roosting 
Chickens: Reflections on the Consequences of U. S. Imperial Arrogance and 
Criminality. By the time his book came out, he became noticed and had 
to fend off attacks against his tenure at the University of Colorado. The 
British philosopher, Ted Honderich (2002), made a similar argument and 
encountered similar ad hominem criticism.
The targets of the attacks were symbols. The World Trade Center sym-
bolized global capitalism. The Pentagon symbolized global militarism. 
And if one believes a third plane was headed for either the White House 
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or the United States Capitol, they symbolize imperialism. It is true that 
the World Trade Center attack made a significant material dent in global 
 capitalism, producing loss in the stock market of billions of dollars and 
killing functionaries with important technical skills, as Churchill pointed 
out. Nevertheless, the greater effect was the attack on the World Trade 
Center as a symbol. Notwithstanding a precious analogy, the 9/11 attacks 
were also attacks of the iconocentric against the logocentric, icon against 
symbol.
Begin with the image of the plane striking the tower on 9/11. At the 
first level of semiosis, the object of representation is an icon, an image: 
the plane striking the building. All signs need something to interpret 
them. Peirce called it the interpretant. In the case of the planes striking the 
World Trade Center, the image comes from imagination, or from movies 
depicting high-rise disasters or monsters stalking through New York. At 
the second moment of semiosis, the interpretant shifts field from fiction 
to spectacle, a media event. At this stage in the semiosis of 9/11, mean-
ing remains amorphous. Structured meaning awaits the logical discourse 
to make sense of images of the burning, smoking, and finally collapsing 
World Trade Center Towers. The federal terrorism statutes are an impor-
tant part of the discourse. They embody an ideology going back directly to 
Ronald Reagan’s war on terrorism. The discourse of terrorism interprets 
the icon of 9/11. Terrorism discourse gave meaning to the event, but the 
icon, the image, stimulated the fear.
Fear itself has become a master interpretant at least since the Reagan 
era, beginning around 1980. David Altheide (2002) said fear is cumula-
tively integrated over time and in the process becomes associated with cer-
tain topics. The process is semiotic, in which object, sign, and interpretant 
are bound together through concerted action, ideology, and policy. Certain 
topics are associated with terms as if there were an invisible hyphen. 
Eventually, the “fear” term becomes implied and unstated. Altheide goes 
on to link fear of crime with fears about major events, such as the 9/11 
attacks. The resulting linkage becomes part of an ideology of fear as 
described by Vološinov (1930), the aim of which is social control.
Since the beginning of the Reagan era, around 1980, political discourse 
explicitly used fear as a master interpretant, binding sign and object. 
Repeated recourse to fear as a master interpretant increasingly produces a 
pervasive culture of terror. The phrase “culture of terror” is what Michael 
Taussig uses to capture the representation of killing, torture, and sorcery 
in southwest Colombia from 1969 to 1985. He related it to the horrors of 
the nineteenth century colonial rubber trade in the Congo under King 
Leopold of Belgium. Taussig makes a point of referring to Joseph Conrad’s 
descriptions in the novel Heart of Darkness. As with McVeigh and the 
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Oklahoma City bombing, there is no strict line between fact and fiction, 
event and representation. Recently, Philippe Bourgois adopted Taussig’s 
term to describe the ghetto of East Harlem in New York City during the 
crescendo of crack dealing in the 1980s.
Over roughly the last thirty years, a discourse of fear in the United 
States has focused on crime. Such discourses trickle down from the top 
levels of ivory towers to popular culture outlets. These discourses inter-
sect with simmering racism in American culture, but also play on other 
deep fears wherein women are victims of stalking, children are sexually 
exploited, serial killers lurk in shadows everywhere, and so on. The icon 
of Willie Horton from the Bush-Dukakis presidential campaign of 1988 
signified the fear of crime. The icon of the planes hitting the World Trade 
Center signified fear of terrorism.
Repressive Use of Icons
Propaganda campaigns prepared public opinion for the invasions of 
Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003. Such campaigns to get countries 
into wars hardly qualify as innovative. One of the best-known examples, 
typically included in high school American history texts, refers to the 
campaign leading to the U.S. war against Spain in 1898 known under the 
sobriquet of the Spanish-American War. A quote from Wikipedia illus-
trates what has now entered common parlance and knowledge.
The revolution in Havana prompted the United States to send in the war-
ship USS Maine to indicate high national interest. Tension among the 
American people was raised because of the explosion of the USS Maine, and 
the yellow journalist newspapers that accused the Spanish of oppression in 
their colonies, agitating American public opinion. The war ended after the 
United States earned victories in the Philippine Islands and Cuba.
Upon the destruction of the Maine, newspaper owners such as William 
Randolph Hearst came to the conclusion that Spanish officials in Cuba 
were to blame, and they widely publicized this theory as fact. They fueled 
American anger by publishing sensationalistic and astonishing accounts 
of “atrocities” committed by Spain in Cuba. A common myth states that 
Hearst responded to the opinion of his illustrator Frederic Remington, that 
conditions in Cuba were not bad enough to warrant hostilities with: “You 
furnish the pictures and I’ll furnish the war.” Lashed to fury, in part by such 
press, the American cry of the hour became, “Remember the Maine, To Hell 
with Spain!” President William McKinley, Speaker of the House Thomas 
Brackett Reed and the business community opposed the growing public 
demand for war. 
(Wikipedia 2009 Spanish-American War)
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Despite its hoary pedigree, war propaganda took another turn with the 
U.S. wars following 9/11. David Altheide has argued for the change. He 
cited an institutionalized coordination that preempts criticism or even 
critical analysis. He discerned what he called “war programming” that fol-
lowed a well-defined sequence.
 1. Reportage and visual reports of the most recent war (or two);
 2. Anticipation, planning, and preparing the audiences for the impend-
ing war, including demonizing certain individual leaders, for example, 
Noriega, Hussein;
 3. Coverage of the subsegments of the current war, using the best visu-
als available to capture the basic scenes and themes involving the 
battle lines, the home front, the media coverage, the international 
reaction, and anticipation of the war’s aftermath;
 4. Following the war, journalists’ reaction and reflection on various 
governmental restriction, suggestions for the future (which are 
seldom implemented);
 5. Journalists’ and academics’ diaries, biographies, exposes, critiques 
and studies about the war, and, increasingly, the media coverage;
 6. Media reports about such studies, and so on, which are often cast 
quite negatively and often lead to the widespread conclusion that 
perhaps the war was unnecessary, other options were available, and 
that the price was too high; all of this will be useful for the coverage 
of the next war.
 7. For the next war, return to step 1 (Altheide 2009b:17).
Early justification for the invasion of Iraq centered on the claim that the 
Hussein government possessed so-called weapons of mass destruction, 
itself something of a neologism in public discourse. They included chemi-
cal and biological weapons. Furthermore, U.S. officials repeatedly asserted 
that Saddam Hussein planned to produce nuclear weapons. Of course, 
Iraq had long before destroyed the chemical and biological weapons it 
had used in its war against Iran (1980–1988). The nuclear weapons claim 
depended on, inter alia, doctored intelligence. While U.S. officials prof-
fered spurious evidence in support of their claims, major mass media news 
outlets remained notably uncritical, even to the point of cheerleading. 
They resorted to the kind of sensationalistic reportage that today is associ-
ated with received wisdom and common knowledge attributes to William 
Randolph Hearst and other newspapers with their yellow journalism. At 
the same time, such claims put the Hussein government in a quandary. If 
it categorically denied the weapons and publicly proved it, the country’s 
military weakness might have moved Iran to renew the war with disastrous 
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results for Iraq because of its decimated military after the First Gulf War 
(1990–1991).
Altheide concluded his analysis of media and war propaganda by say-
ing that
The Iraq War was partially produced by the PNAC through an exhaustive 
propaganda campaign that stressed fear and threats to the United States by 
Iraqi and al Qaeda forces. Specific claims were made about the likely use of 
WMD as well as more terrorist attacks. These messages were systematically 
carried by major news media as a feature of a war programming narrative, 
which refers to the selective use of claims makers/news sources within a 
normative pattern, which includes occasional detractors to give the appear-
ance of debate. 
(Altheide 2009b:20)
Without taking anything away from Altheide’s analysis, the kind of war 
programming he outlined does not always work. Arguably, it might 
not have worked in 2002 and 2003 even with the connivance of the 
journalistic media. There were voices of dissent raised elsewhere. Mass 
demonstrations in the United States and around the world gave a large 
and loud public voice against the Iraq invasion. Other countries, long-
standing staunch allies demurred about jumping on the war wagon. 
Several members of the UN Security Council, including France and 
Germany, did not support the United States. Another major war in U.S. 
history shows similar divisions among the public. The Wilson govern-
ment took the country into the First World War after earlier proclaiming 
steadfast opposition and commitment to neutrality. Even his Secretary 
of State, William Jennings Bryan, dissented. Bryan resigned in protest 
against what he called Wilson’s war mongering. Even after the U.S. entry, 
popular agitation against the war and against the draft remained part of 
public discourse, and the government had to use censorship and arrests to 
suppress it.
The effectives of U.S. war propaganda and war programming rested on 
the by then well-established culture of fear; metonymic connections between 
Afghanistan, Iraq, al Qaeda, and 9/11; and the icons of 9/11,  particularly the 
world trade Center attack. The icons of terrorism served as interpretants for 
the propaganda. The 9/11 icons could interpret the propaganda, because 
they partook of the master interpretant of fear. The images of 9/11 had 
become more real and authentic than the actual events. Partly they seemed 
more real, because for those who experienced the events “live,” so to speak, 
trauma interfered with acceptance of the reality. More  importantly, they 
attained greater authenticity, because of the epochal iconocentric shift that 
affects mass consciousness. Therefore, invading Afghanistan and Iraq could 
9780230103498_08_cha07.indd   123 3/31/2010   5:56:54 PM
124  SOCIAL THEORY OF FEAR
count as protective measures, not as colonial adventures in favor of centers 
of U.S. capital associated with oil and gas.
Icons, Simulacra, and Spectacles in an Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction
Walter Benjamin said that “[t]he presence of the original is the prerequisite 
to the concept of authenticity” (Benjamin 1936:220). Benjamin, however, 
dealt with mechanical, not virtual reproduction: photographs, gramo-
phone records, movies, and the like—the modern as opposed to postmod-
ern kind of reproduction. Even at that, he noted the perception does not 
just depend on anatomy, physiology, and the physics of light and sound. It 
also depends on the political economy, by historical circumstance.
The degree to which our eyes and ears have been conditioned by mediatiza-
tion was clear well before the advent of compact discs, stereo television, and 
sampling: think of people who long brought portable radios or television 
sets to the baseball park. 
(Auslander 2008:38)
Auslander continued with Benjamin’s observation that modern culture 
encourages people to seek proximity and intimacy. Nonetheless, repro-
duction, whether mechanical, electronic, or virtual, always depreciates the 
original. That kind of depreciation had gone on so long by the twenty-first 
century that live presence generally played second fiddle to its representa-
tion by mass media. Jean Baudrillard (1981) called such representations 
simulacra, copies without an original, or in this case, a devalued original. 
Guy Debord (1967) had anticipated Baudrillard’s concept of simulacra 
by his explication of the spectacle. The spectacle embodies reified and 
congealed capital in which reproduction is all, because reproductions are 
commodities. Their ontological status as commodities makes them more 
authentic, because they are sources of profit and capital.
The postmodern shift to spectacle and simulacra and the change in 
communication and consciousness toward the iconocentric age have made 
presence irrelevant. To illustrate by way of contrast, the mythocentric age 
depended on presence. Even when representation seemed remote, its effect 
on communication came from a sense of presence. For instance, in ancient 
times, prior to the logocentric age, writing often appeared on monumen-
tal architecture such as temples, stele, statues, and the like. Cuneiform 
script and glyphs appear to the modern mind as text. Nonetheless, the art 
historian Zania Bahrani (2003) made a strong argument that the writing 
really was part of what they represented. A statue of the emperor with 
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 inscriptions was experienced as if he were actually present. The mythocen-
tric age of performance communication and consciousness depended on 
presence even in its absence. Just so, in the iconocentric age, live presence 
occurs as iconic representation.
Postwar Society, Culture, and the Rise of the Icon
If one development signals the emergence of iconocentrism it is  television. 
Although first broadcast before the war in 1939, television rose to domi-
nate culture and thinking after the Second World War. Before that, popular 
entertainment looked to movies as a main site for  representations of life. 
“Going out” often included a movie. Television began to replace movies 
while moving the venue inside homes. More and more of those homes 
were suburban. Also, more than any other electronic form, television 
mediatized culture. Such strong trends emerging in  communication, soci-
ality, and consciousness built on similarly  momentous changes in social 
relations in general and the political economy in particular.
The working class and especially industrial labor coalesced around mili-
tancy and even radicalism during the 1930s. The wave of postwar strikes in 
1945–1946 showed that the war had but created an intermission. In part, the 
strike wave came from a reaction to what must have seemed like a return to 
the great depression of the previous decade. “By the winter of 1945–46, one 
quarter of all war workers had lost their jobs. Nearly 2 million workers found 
themselves unemployed by October 1, and real income for workers fell by an 
average of 15 percent in three months” (Lipsitz 1994:99 citing Lichtenstein 
1982:99). By 1946, strikes in particular industries began to generalize. 
Public sector workers began to strike. In certain cities, such as “Rochester, 
Pittsburgh, and Oakland, defensive strikes with modest demands triggered 
mass uprisings among the entire working population” (Lipsitz 1994:151). 
Throughout the country, strikes idled basic industries—notably, coal, elec-
trical, meatpacking, rail, rubber, and steel. 
In 1937 there were 4,740 strikes involving 1,861,000 workers for over 28 
million days, by 1945 there were 4,750 strikes involving 3,470,000 workers 
for 38 million days, and in 1946 there were 4,985 strikes involving 4,600,000 
workers for 116 million days. 
(Johnson 2007)
Although the strike wave began as a series of defensive tactics in particular 
industries and cities, it soon spread throughout the working class, build-
ing on the militancy of the 1930s and the solidarity of the war. Labor 
solidarity also came in the form of wildcat strikes, mass protests, and labor 
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 holidays, otherwise called general strikes. At one such mass demonstration 
in Stamford, Connecticut, “[o]ne prominent slogan on placards at the rally 
read: ‘We will not go back to the old days’” (Johnson 2007). Government 
and corporate elites responded with a multipronged counterattack. The 
Taft Hartley Act of 1947 aimed directly at labor militancy. The Marshall 
Plan and the National Security Act of 1947 helped define the com-
mencement of the Cold War, which in turn built the military industrial 
complex over the next four decades. The postwar economy depended on 
two factors promoted by the Truman administration: a consumer-based 
as opposed to producer-based economy and the Cold War. The latter 
came from a return to an aggressive anti-Communism in international 
affairs coupled with support to important corporate industrial interests 
with public monies poured into weapons construction. These economic 
and political strategies helped control labor militancy, stop the postwar 
recession, and build a new, postwar economy. “The administration in 
fact made doubly certain that there would be no amelioration of the 
Cold War; besides fomenting anti-Soviet hysteria on the domestic front, 
it drove a deeper wedge between this country and the U.S.S.R.” (Kofsky 
1995:235). The anti-Soviet, anti-Communist campaign pervaded political 
and social life within the next few years—the so-called McCarthy period, 
although McCarthy himself was a latecomer to the political game of Red 
baiting. The anti-Communist hysteria had a huge impact on cultural 
productions, noticeably in Hollywood and broadcast media like televi-
sion. Anti-Communist propaganda went hand in hand with controlling 
labor. For instance, Taft Hartley not only curtailed unions’ power, but 
forbid Communists from executive positions within unions. Nowhere did 
the combination of anti-Communism and antiunionism play out more 
influentially than Hollywood (Ceplair and Englund 1980; Navasky 1980). 
By that time, most major studios owed their business control to Wall 
Street.
Hollywood Icons and the Almost Revolution of 1968
The culture industry has long relied on spectacle to sell its products. 
Spectacle particularly suited the product of Hollywood. Almost from the 
beginning, movies created and relied on the production of icons for their 
commercial success. When sound came so did the consolidation of New 
York’s financial control of the studios. The studios relied on the star system 
to meet their obligations to their financiers. With the postwar corporate 
and government campaign against the working class, attacks against 
Hollywood’s more militant unions joined with the goals of propaganda 
and culture industry commercial success.
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Against the backdrop of the thirties when film stars drew on their screen 
image to promote unions and the New Deal, the new anticommunist cru-
sade had transformed the structure of power and politics. The convergence 
of state interests, conservative populism, and the call of Eric Johnson to 
create a new era of labor-capital cooperation had borne fruit. Yet along 
with the elimination of radical unions and the destruction of careers of 
dissenting artists, the Cold Warriors aimed not just to eliminate subversive 
themes from the screen but to promote a positive vision of the virtues of the 
American Way of unity and consumer democracy. 
(May 2000:202–203)
The anti-Communist strategy attempted a kind of Gleichschaltung in U.S. 
culture and society. It strove for social unity and cultural conformity. 
Hollywood, a prime venue for cultural production, became a “rigidly stan-
dardized middle-class suburbia” (May 2000:219 quoting Orson Welles). 
“A central goal of the anticommunist crusade was to transform the nature 
of middle-class life” (219). Dissenters, those who retained their careers 
after the Red Scare purges, turned away from political radicalism and 
toward artistic and cultural radicalism. More subtle than propaganda 
films, a certain rebelliousness emerged in movies. First, film noir in the 
1940s and then youth films of the 1950s helped create a disguised but 
powerful rebelliousness, especially among younger consumers. Culturally 
rebellious noir productions, and by no means all noir films were rebel-
lious, rested on reorienting cultural authority from state officials and 
corporate managers to antiheroes and antiheroines (229). Later, in the 
1950s, as noir productions decreased, a new kind of narrative emerged, 
with new, iconic stars. As Larry May stated, three stars rate special 
attention for their influence on the youth generation that spearheaded 
the rebellions of the 1960s: Marlon Brando, James Dean, and Marilyn 
Monroe. Each contributed the thematic qualities of that rebellious 
decade.
Icons representing personages do not just convey communicative 
information—media stars whose own, real person often bears little resem-
blance to their personage created by the culture industry. Their public 
personage, consequently, serves as a combination of projection screen 
and mirror. Consumers of media-produced personages project their own 
personalities and values onto the personage, and the personage reflects 
them, but with colorings and additions of meaning (Merton 1943). The 
colorings of the icons could have an especially powerful impact on young 
consumers, always on the look out for models for their own identities. 
Consider one of the more important movies and stars: James Dean in 
Nicholas Ray’s Rebel Without a Cause (1955). The director helped create 
the James Dean personage. That created personage contained a good deal 
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of Ray’s (1991–1975) own cultural radicalism and rebelliousness. Larry 
May quoted from his wife:
Nick did not like his own generation. He thought them betrayers whose acts 
of betrayal were in his words like asking your kid to jump into your arms 
and then pulling your arms away. He was more at ease with my generation 
[the youth of the fifties and sixties] and he seemed to know more about 
them than I did. 
(May 2000:247 quoting Ray 1993:xxi)
Among the other effects of Brando, Dean, and Monroe, they connected 
through the screen to society, “restoring mass art and film stars as focal 
points for a counter narrative of identity” (249). Marlon Brando in The 
Wild One (1954) epitomized the rebel of the time. Leader of a motorcycle 
gang, he rode outside the law, yet his character demanded sympathy, but 
more importantly empathy. Marilyn Monroe brought another rebellious 
theme. She embodied sexuality, especially a self-determined and libratory 
sexuality at a time in U.S. culture when Victorian standards had once 
again become idealized. Posters of these three Hollywood star icons not 
uncommonly adorned the walls of rooms of the youth of the 1960s. They 
depicted Brando on his motorcycle with leather jacket, jeans, and cap; 
Dean’s intense, tormented visage from a still in Rebel; and Monroe with 
her skirt flaring up from Some Like It Hot (1959). Two of the icons, Dean 
and Monroe, died prematurely. Their deaths in a peculiar way foreshad-
owed the deaths of several icons of the 1960s. The later ones were not 
movie stars, but musical performers: Jimi Hendrix (1970), Jim Morrison 
of The Doors (1971), and Janis Joplin (1970).
It is not that movies, and still less television, provided a hotbed of 
cultural subversion, far from it. The main effects of these parts of 1940 
and 1950s culture industry followed the program of building a unified, 
White, suburban, middle-class, contented consumer society and culture. 
A victory culture, in the words of Tom Engelhardt (1995), accompanied 
the domestic tranquility of Hollywood and, more so, television land. The 
latter paraded such programs as Ozzie and Harriet (1952–1966) and Father 
Knows Best (1954–1963) as models of correct lifestyles. For every Marlon 
Brando, there were many John Waynes with their swaggering triumpha-
lism and petty bourgeois patriotism. For every Marilyn Monroe there were 
multiple Jane Wyatts with her demure, Victorian matronliness. Still, the 
Brandos, Deans, and Monroes contributed to identities of the rebellious 
youth who watched them, identified with them, and projected their own 
needs into the imagined antiheroes and antiheroines they represented. 
Those icons did not and could not promote revolution or even rebellion. 
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Nonetheless, they could and did provide personas for the prairie fire that 
scorched the nation and the world in the late 1960s, in the words of the 
Weather Underground (1974).
The Hollywood rebels, even while they turned away from politics 
to artistic rebellion, gave grounds for a dialogic contest. In the sense of 
Mikhail Bakhtin (1981), cultural productions give material form to a cul-
tural memory in which cultural and political struggles never die. “[P]opular 
art and culture compose part of a dialogic and contested terrain in which 
ideas emanating from the past and present and expectations for the future 
operate in a conversation with each other” (May 2000:261). Utopian 
expectations had been part of 1930s and postwar working-class political 
radicalism. They depended on the next generation to try to realize them 
again. “Once the political movements of the sixties spread, often admirers 
of Dean, Brando, and Monroe looked to them as models of dissent against 
prescribed gender and racial roles” (268).
Icons manufactured by the culture industry most typically serve the 
interests of the owners of those industries. The owning class, in coopera-
tion with other ruling class elites, constructs walls against rebellion. The 
culture industry, in contrast to other manufacturers, depends to a far 
greater extent on artists, who notoriously tend toward rebellion and sub-
version. Left to artistic workers, culture industry icons can offer models of 
rebellious identities.
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Chapter 8
Modernism to Postmodernism 
and Beyond
Terry Eagleton began his 1996 critique of postmodernism by distin-guishing culture and history. “The word postmodernism generally refers 
to a form of contemporary culture, whereas the term  postmodernity alludes 
to a specific historical period” (vii). “Culture” in Eagleton’s usage seems to 
refer to the arts, broadly speaking. In this discussion, in contrast, “culture” 
designates the anthropological usage. Anthropological culture refers to what 
humans make: language, social institutions, ways of life, and so on. In this 
larger sense, culture forms humans’ primary ecological niche. The arts—
dance, literature, music, painting, and theater to name a few—encompass 
those human activities that are relatively more expressive. Expressiveness 
contrasts with the instrumental, those actions aimed at practical ends. It 
also contrasts with discourse. Discourse aims at description and explana-
tion, like the sciences both natural and social. An inescapable aporia for 
culture studies resides in a refractory character of culture: dividing it into 
parcels always leaves a good bit of overlap. Few human activities or artifacts 
are purely expressive, instrumental, or discursive. Expressive endeavors 
always contain discursive and instrumental elements, and mutatis mutan-
dis for the other categories. The arts, then, merely do more expressing than 
the nonartistic aspects of culture. They are less instrumental or discursive.
So understood, arts offer social analysts a different window from which 
to view the human panorama. A common, although not definitive, nature 
of the arts involves them in representation. Again, some arts are more 
representative than others, but representation gives analysts a chance to do 
some hermeneutic analysis. A painting, for instance, depicts some objec-
tive thing, even if the thing is as amorphous and abstract as an  emotion, 
but the depiction always reflects the peculiar viewpoint of the artists who 
are embedded in their own culture. In addition, artistic  representation 
has a degree of ambiguity, thus permitting a range of  interpretation, and, 
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therefore, reflexive analysis of the interpreter’s own culture. For example, 
Frederic Jameson (1991) offered several interpretations of Vincent Van 
Gogh’s 1887 painting A Pair of Boots. Jameson called the painting “one 
of the canonical works of high modernism,” and he identified the subject 
of the painting as “peasant shoes” (6). Seemingly simple references, but 
neither has a claim on objective validity let alone truth. Taking the simplest 
part, the painting’s title names the subject only as boots. They could be 
peasant shoes, or a factory worker’s, or, as they are hobnailed, a soldier’s. 
The arts are shot through with subjectivities. Science looks askance at 
 subjectivism, but it remains crucial to art’s value as an analytic tool.
Making a different distinction, Henri Lefebvre said modernism and 
modernity are contraries.
By modernism, we mean the consciousness which successive ages, periods 
and generations had of themselves; thus modernism consists of phenom-
ena of consciousness, of triumphalist images and projections of self. . . . 
Modernism is a sociological and ideological fact. . . . By modernity, how-
ever, we understand the beginnings of a reflective process, a more-or-less 
advanced attempt at critique and autocritique, a bid for knowledge. . . . 
Modernity differs from modernism just as a concept differs from social 
phenomena themselves, just as a thought differs from actual events. . . . We 
will therefore think deeply about modernity considered objectively and as 
an essence, stripped of the appearances and illusions of modernism. 
(Lefebvre 1962:1–2)
The distinction and analysis that follows here differs from that of Lefebvre 
only in being less sanguine about objectivity. Getting at objective real-
ity often requires recourse to appearances and illusion, because we 
humans live in a universe of self-constructed appearances and illusions. 
Our way out lies in lucid analysis, intellectually rigorous evaluation, and 
self- reflective interrogation of the phenomenological world we ourselves 
create. 
One effect of art’s contribution to culture pertains to lucid analysis: art 
rounds out and gives depth to discourse. Sometimes art offers informa-
tion on patterns not yet discernible at the level of conscious discourse. In 
this latter function, art resembles the role of dreams in psychoanalysis. 
Dreams provide a window to the individual unconscious; art opens onto 
the cultural unconscious.
Meanings and Definitions of Modernism and Postmodernism
We are at the ending of what is called The Modern Age. Just as Antiquity was 
followed by several centuries of Occidental ascendancy, which Westerners 
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provincially call the Dark Ages, so now The Modern Age is succeeded by a 
postmodern period. 
(Mills 1959:166–167)
Unlike most stories, telling the story of modernism starts best in the middle 
rather than the beginning. Modernism’s middle coincides with the middle 
of the twentieth century, the post–Second World War period. Mills saw it 
as the end of an epoch. David Harvey (1989), along with many if not most 
cultural critics, called it high modernism. Harvey offered a periodization 
of modernism. Early cultural modernism began in Paris after 1848; the 
heroic period ran from about 1910 to 1945, and high modernism from 
1945 to 1973. The periods are categorized by twists and turns. They are not 
ideal types, but collections of directions and trends. Harvey quoted Charles 
Baudelaire writing in 1863 that modern art “is the transient, the fleeting, 
the contingent; it is one half of art, the other being the eternal and immu-
table.” Harvey went on to say that the history of modernism has careened 
between the ephemeral and the eternal (1989:10). Accordingly, artists 
have conveyed and tried to contain the modern experience of time, space, 
and causality as transitory, fleeting, fortuitous, and arbitrary (11). Maybe 
because of its historical proximity, high modernism shows the efforts most 
clearly. On the one hand, efforts to contain the chaos of modernity came 
in the form of the modernist architecture of Bauhaus and the city plan-
ning of Robert Moses. High modernism of that sort exuded rationality, 
predictability, and control. It was the obsessive-compulsive part of the 
neurosis of the age. It was also the main target of the postmodernist critics 
who associated that particular turn with the hegemony of what they called 
metanarratives (Lyotard 1979). The problem with metanarratives, accord-
ing to the postmodernist critics, is that they totalize and legitimate. They 
subsume everything to particular viewpoints of a class, race, or gender. So, 
high modernist metanarratives were white, male, and bourgeois. 
Not to gainsay the critique; there is a good bit of truth in it. Nonetheless, 
it leaves out the other half of high modernism: the other face of the 
ephemeral-eternal duality, the hysteria opposing the obsession. 
All art is Janus-faced. It reflects and educates on the one hand, and 
it prophesies on the other. In its first, reflective mode, high modernism 
captured the culmination of bourgeois hegemony since modernism’s 
appearance in Europe after 1848. Its pedagogical function consorts with 
reflection. Art teaches its contemporaries how to see, as John Berger 
demonstrated (1972). Since the rediscovery of linear perspective in the 
 fifteenth century (Edgerton 1975), we expect to see depictions in depth. 
That innovation culminated in 3D movies in the 1950s. Seeing is not 
limited to the visual arts but carries the broader metaphorical meaning of 
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knowing. Art socializes and enculturates. Arts inculcate a way of knowing 
according to their own cultural-historic present. 
Pierre Bourdieu examined the beginnings of modernism in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century. Liberal mass politics emerged with bour-
geois triumph and growing hegemony. In continental Europe, Paris was 
its center. Modernist art reflected its political economy—a paradoxical 
mixture of liberation and control, predictability and constant change. 
The modernists sought autonomy for their art, away from the tradition of 
aristocratic patronage. Instead of patronage, they sought autonomy in the 
market. Thoroughly bourgeois, they also strove to escape the incunabula 
of capital and the market.
[I]n a field reaching a high degree of autonomy and self-awareness, it 
is the mechanisms of competition themselves which authorize and favour 
the ordinary production of out-of-the-ordinary acts, founded on the rejec-
tion of temporal satisfactions, worldly gratifications and goals of ordinary 
action. 
(Bourdieu 1992:68)
Charles Baudelaire (1821–1867) was a founder and spokesperson of 
modernism. “The political attitude of Baudelaire, especially in 1848, is 
exemplary: he does not fight for the republic, but for the revolution” (77). 
As Bourdieu put it, modernism represented a double rupture against 
aristocratic high art and against the facile and vulgar conventionality of 
the bourgeoisie. Baudelaire and the modernists promoted a symbolic 
revolution in which they refused to recognize any master except art in 
a vain attempt to make the market disappear (81). A century later, the 
modernist spirit culminated in Albert Camus’ declaration: Je me révolte, 
donc nous sommes (Camus 1951:36). In the standard 1956 translation, 
Anthony Bower renders this as “I revolt, therefore we exist” (22), but that 
injects an unwarranted ideology of Heideggerian existentialism. “I revolt, 
therefore we are” better preserves Camus’ meaning, and better captures the 
high modernist culmination of modernism. His manifesto also shows the 
cultural rift between the ephemeral and the eternal, a contradiction both 
irreducible and dynamic, much like the contradictions in the high capital-
ism of the postwar period. Moreover, modernism in the arts resembles 
the symptoms of neurosis. Neurotics suffer, perceive, acknowledge, and 
above all are conscious of their symptoms, but they do not understand 
their meanings or causes. Lefebvre’s argument that modernism is made 
up of the conscious parts of Western culture since 1848 refers to these 
symptoms, which everyone can see and know. Impressionism, Realism, 
and all the other isms of the modern age are the symptoms of its neurosis. 
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Modernity, in contrast, allows a stripping away of the illusions, the analysis 
of the age’s unconscious. To continue the psychoanalytic metaphor, high 
modernism represented the working through of insights garnered during 
the modernity of the twentieth century.
Modernity
The onset of modernity coincides with the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Freud published The Interpretation of Dreams in 1899–1900. 
Within the next few years, Einstein’s theory of relativity, Picasso and 
Braque’s cubism, Schönberg’s deconstruction of music, Veblen’s econom-
ics, imagist poetry, and the social analyses of Durkheim, Simmel, and 
Weber tore apart and disassembled the prevailing consciousness. Despite 
Zygmunt Bauman’s claim that “[m]odernity was a sworn enemy of con-
tingency, variety, ambiguity, waywardness, and idiosyncrasy” (2000:25), 
modernity virtually demanded these conditions. Once Einstein dissolved 
space and time as rigid frameworks; Freud assured people that they did 
not know why they did what they did and thought as they did; and Picasso 
and Braque showed them they did not see reality; little remained of the 
comfort of bourgeois conventions. Modernity, far from offering metanar-
ratives, dissolved them. Modernity revealed that there is no privileged 
position, no eternal map, no vantage point; all is flux.
James Joyce’s Ulysses is exemplary. More than most artistic works, it 
thoroughly and explicitly encapsulates modernity’s problematic. Another 
literary work, Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman (1949), shows how 
high modernism provided a working through of the modernist  neurosis. 
Unfortunately, and unlike an individual psychoanalysis, the working 
through did not dissolve the neurosis. It converted it to a psychosis.
Joyce’s title obviously refers to a founding artifact of Western culture. But 
as soon as a reader dives in to Joyce’s immense tome, the contrast between 
it and Homer’s work is glaring. The Odyssey is an epic adventure, nothing if 
not a fascinating and exciting tale. Ulysses may be the most ( intentionally) 
mundane novel ever published. In Ulysses, “with all the trappings of an 
epic—masks, costumes, scenery—the quotidian steals the show.” One of 
three protagonists, Leopold Bloom’s, “overwhelming triviality is encom-
passed by the City (Dublin), the metaphysical speculations of ‘amazed 
man’ (Stephen Dedalus), and the spontaneity of instinctive impulses 
(Molly). . . . The I merges with Man and Man is engulfed in mediocrity” 
(Lefebvre 1968:3). Instead of a mythic hero, the Blooms and Dedalus are 
moderns. Instead of adventures, they opt for mere existence, although even 
that requires an enormous struggle. The modern self has been sacrificed.
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The level of mythology at which the self appears as sacrifice to itself is an 
expression not so much of the original conception of popular religion, but 
the inclusion of myth in civilization. In the history of class conflict, the 
enmity of the self to sacrifice implied a sacrifice of the self, inasmuch as it 
was paid for by a denial of nature in man for the sake of domination over 
non-human nature and over other men. This very denial, the nucleus of all 
civilizing rationality, is the germ cell of a proliferating mythic irrationality: 
with the denial of nature in man not merely the telos of the outward control 
of nature but the telos of man’s own life is distorted and befogged. . . . Man’s 
domination over himself, which grounds his selfhood, is almost always the 
destruction of the subject in whose service it is undertaken. . . . The irra-
tionalism of totalitarian capitalism, whose way of satisfying needs has an 
objectified form determined by domination which makes the satisfaction of 
needs impossible . . . has its prototype in the hero who escapes from sacrifice 
by sacrificing himself. . . . Everyone who practices renunciation gives away 
more of his life than is given back to him: and more than the life that he 
vindicates. 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 1944:54–55)
Moderns confront this irreconcilable contradiction. The more they 
dedicate themselves to humanize the world, the more they dominate the 
world and each other, and thereby sacrifice their humanity. While striving 
to make life worth living, they give away its value. In the early twentieth 
 century, society no longer seemed rational. It had lost its function and 
meaning, it coherence and cohesion, and “Ulysses shows precisely the same 
lack of internal cohesion” (Moretti 1977:183).
Franco Moretti attributed these social conditions and their artistic 
representation to the historical crisis caused by “disappearance of the 
self-regulating market” (184). Aside from the doubtful reality of a self-
regulating market, modernity first flourished during the ascendance of 
monopoly capitalism and neocolonialism. Commodity fetishism rose to 
new heights as profits increasingly depended on consumer markets in the 
capitalist centers. The characters and action of the novel depict virtually 
every aspect of daily life, except production: “[I]n Ulysses, social relation-
ships appear only through the prism of consumption” (189). Mythic heroes 
are not made from flâneurs (Benjamin 1955). As Joyce strove to represent 
modernity, he “uses myth only to desecrate it” (Moretti 1977:192). Unlike 
Homer’s Ulysses who used wit and virtù to navigate the surrounding 
world and defeat mythic threats, Joyce’s Ulysses becomes Leopold Bloom, 
an apostate Jewish advertising executive who fecklessly succumbs to mod-
ern myths. Joyce’s style relies heavily on stream of consciousness. The 
novel shows characters who are “enslaved by arcane and uncontrollable 
forces: stream of unconsciousness would be a better definition. . . . Stream 
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of  consciousness and the crisis of the ideology of the free individual meet 
under the ensign of advertising,” which boosts the commodity by making 
a fetish of it (195). Having sacrificed the self in pursuit of bare biologi-
cal existence, moderns try to buy themselves back through consumption 
of commodities. But like salty seawater that increases thirst instead of 
quenching it, the more they consume, the more they have to consume. 
The self becomes an ever elusive object that moderns chase but cannot 
retrieve.
It is, therefore, completely logical that stream of consciousness is eminently 
paratactic: the absence of internal order and of hierarchies indicates its 
reproduction of a form of consciousness which is subjugated to the principle 
of the equivalence of commodities. It indicates that use-values—the concrete 
qualities of any given commodity—are by now perceived as secondary. . . . 
What is left to fire the imagination and inflame desire is only the overall 
attraction of the chaotic and unattainable collection of commodities (197). 
The modern dilemma revolves around a search for authenticity in a world 
of simulacra where commodities, like the Sirens in Homer’s Odyssey, 
promise fulfillment. The Modern Ulysses, while searching for his life, 
only gets lifestyles. Joyce used words to reproduce “the same deranged 
mechanisms which governed society” (208). An industry grew around 
this modern quest: advertising, Bloom’s profession. In the 1920s, J. Walter 
Thompson was the world’s largest advertising agency. To quote from one 
of its internal newsletters: “To sell goods we must also sell words. In fact we 
have to go further: we must sell life” (Marchand 1985:20 citing JWT News 
Letter, Nov. 11, 1926, p. 261). In 1926 words created the image. Moreover, 
the favored advertising technique was “dramatic realism,” which imitated 
the style of romantic novels soon to be translated to radio soap operas 
(Marchand 1985:24). The technique relied on dramatizations or tableaux 
created by words. Performances usually used verbalization, and even when 
they did not, as in mime or silent movies, audiences understood them 
verbally. Performances in novels and soap operas exploited the quotidian 
in such a way as to provide a model for life. Life came to imitate art. 
Ulysses relates a single day in the lives of its main characters, June 16, 
1904. Arthur Miller’s play, Death of a Salesman, encompasses the same 
time span. Willy Loman is not an advertising executive but a traveling 
salesman. First published and performed in 1949, it is one of the pioneering 
literary works of high modernism in the postwar period. Willy Loman’s 
search for where his life took a wrong turn constitutes the play’s 
problematic. Willy Loman, aged 63, “cannot bear reality, and since he can’t 
do much to change it, he keeps changing his ideas of it” (Miller 1984:27). 
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“He is a bleeding mass of contradictions” (184). These observations are 
part of Christopher Bigsby’s introduction to the Penguin edition (1998). 
Estranged from his family, a self-perceived failure in his profession, he 
anguishes over his circumstances in the twilight of his life. Still, Willy 
Loman does not submit; he denies. “Denial becomes his mode of being. 
Whereas a tragic hero comes to self-knowledge, in Death of a Salesman 
Willy does not” (Bigsby 1998:xviii). Willy’s denial makes him a modern 
tragic figure. He refuses to submit, and denies his own being at the same 
time. The second, more personal and psychological denial befits the 
modernist neurosis. In an unrecorded television interview, Arthur Miller 
responded to a question about his own psychoanalysis by saying that he 
learned he did not know how to live. Neither does Willy Loman, but he 
refuses to give up. “[U]nder the bullshit of capitalism, this pseudo life that 
thought to touch the clouds by standing on top of a refrigerator, waving 
a paid-up mortgage at the moon, victorious at last” (Miller 1984:184), 
Willy Loman works through the neurosis of the age. Sigmund Freud 
once remarked that the goal of psychoanalysis was to substitute common 
unhappiness for neurotic pain, and that is what Willy Loman discovers. 
Leopold Bloom lived a life of trivial banality; Willy Loman one of painful 
anguish.
High Modernism
High modernism opened the possibility of self-knowledge and the pos-
sibility of dissolving the neurosis of modern capitalism. It did not and 
could not make possible their resolution. Willy Loman suffered because 
he did not know how to live, but the ability to overcome the sources of 
his unhappiness did not lie within himself alone. The main sites of Willy 
Loman’s suffering, his work and his family, are the main institutions of 
 capitalism. The one is the main site of production, the other reproduction 
of capitalist society. To ameliorate Willy’s anguish, those institutions have 
to change. Neither individual Willy Lomans nor art alone can change them. 
Their change needs social action. Without that, people face the prospect of 
being victims or executioners, suicides or murderers as Camus pointed out 
(1946:255–276). Referring to Hegel’s discussion of master and slave from 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), Camus argued that once slaves recognize 
their condition of servitude, they can escape only by suicide or murder, both 
acts of rebellion (1956:144–145). Either people give up, escape by killing 
themselves, or enslave others. The predicament of the master-slave relation 
remains insoluble outside of nihilism so long as the institution of slavery 
persists. The absurd double bind has to convert rebellion to  revolution. 
“Actually, revolution is only the logical consequence of  metaphysical 
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rebellion, and we shall discover, in our analysis of the revolutionary move-
ment, the same desperate and bloody effort to affirm the dignity of man 
in defiance of the things that deny its existence” (105). Art can suggest and 
reaffirm the path of rebellion. “Art disputes reality, but does not hide from 
it. . . .  Art thus leads back to the origins of rebellion” (258).
But art and society, creation and revolution . . . must rediscover the source 
of rebellion where refusal and acceptance, the unique and the universal, the 
individual and history balance each other. . . . Rebellion alone, in the blind 
alley in which we live, allows us to hoe for the future of which Nietzsche 
dreamed: Instead of the judge and the oppressor, the creator (273). 
Rebellion realizes itself in revolution only when the world of master and 
slave end. Rebellion takes aim against servitude, injustice, and violence. 
“Already, in fact, rebellion, without claiming to solve everything, can at 
least confront its problems” (305). Rebellion must always be for  humanity. 
Love, species love, must, therefore, be integral to rebellion. If the Willy 
Lomans of the world would end their anger and anguish, they must rebel 
with love. If any one thing marked the rebellions of the late 1960s, it 
was loving rebellion. After all, summer 1967 was called “the summer of 
love.”
The Almost Revolution
The world approached the brink of revolution in 1968: Chicago, Mexico 
City, Paris, Prague, and other places had uprisings. They were met by force 
and crushed. It marked the beginning of the end of modernity, which took 
another several decades to die. But the almost revolution involved more 
than the spectacular uprisings and equally spectacular repression. Those 
uprisings were surrounded by assaults on the cultural front, as institution 
after institution first came under question and then under attack. The 
rebellions were neither planned nor wholly spontaneous. There was no 
master strategy. No metanarratives guided them. Therefore, the rebellions 
bristled with contradictions. In some cases, they consisted of refusals and 
negations, in other cases, alternatives. But no institution could rest easy 
during the 1960s, which inconveniently did not end with 1969 but in the 
early 1970s.
One of the most intransigent contradictions lay in the commodifica-
tion of counterculture. No sooner did a challenge to the social and cultural 
status quo achieve notoriety, that it, or at least its accessories, entered the 
market. The Black Panthers, for instance, challenged racial institutions. 
9780230103498_09_cha08.indd   139 3/31/2010   5:57:11 PM
140  SOCIAL THEORY OF FEAR
Not only did the White power elite use the armed force of the state to 
destroy them, but their movement spawned a lively trade in black berets 
and leather jackets. It was to be expected. In a society so saturated by 
capitalism, everything becomes a commodity, even dissents against 
commodification (Frank and Weiland 1997; Frank 2000). Nonetheless, a 
strong theme running through the 1960s counterculture rebelled against 
commodification. Unlike Willy Loman who would wave a paid-up mort-
gage at the moon, the counterculture offered different kinds of households. 
No longer single (nuclear) family dwellings, the 1960s saw the growth of 
communes of all kinds, experiments with the family form, and even, at a 
fundamental level, alternative reproductive roles as the politics of sex and 
gender became a central issue in the latter years of the period. Frequently, 
one found a rejection of the acceptable twin roles of producer and con-
sumer as phony and vacuous. The derogatory “plastic” carried a heavy 
information load, referring to general phoniness and to the cheapened 
commodification of everything with a widely recognized allusion to an 
iconic movie of the time, The Graduate (1967). Therefore, the rebellions of 
the 1960s challenged almost all institutions and all forms of social control 
despite commodification, not because of it. A useful measure of the breadth 
of the rebellions comes from the reaction against them. The elites did not 
concentrate solely on politics and economics. The reactionary tactics of 
the 1930s that focused on labor movements and radical politics associated 
with popular discontent about class inequalities. In contrast, the reaction 
to the rebellions of the 1960s covered all fronts—political, economic, art, 
music, education, sex, families, and so on. The 1960s rebellions sparked the 
culture wars of the 1970s and 1980s. Why this should have been so illumi-
nates much about modernism, modernity, and its demise.
Revolts of High Modernism
The rebels of high modernism had at least one common goal, liberation. 
Although the liberatory theme pervaded all cultural sectors, few illustrate 
the point: dance, visual arts, and feminism. Each in its own way did not 
just offend conservative sensibilities, however much its critics claimed that 
as its main goal. Historically, cultural conservatism and political reaction 
do not naturally go hand-in-hand. Some of the most reactionary leaders 
of the Restoration, both the English of the seventeenth century and on 
the continent after Napoleon, led flamboyant lives and associated them-
selves with the artistic avant-garde. The reaction against high modernist 
revolts took a cultural turn because those revolts threatened capitalism’s 
colonized institutions. The culture industry had long since captured all the 
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arts, albeit some more than others. Feminism challenged essential parts 
of the social reproductive processes: the family, sex, and gender. The elite 
could not allow the cultural challenges to go unanswered, because they 
threatened critical institutions of social control and social reproduction.
Art
Psychedelia formed one of several axes of sixties rebellions. Humphrey 
Osmond (1917–2004), the British psychiatrist famous for experiments 
with LSD, coined the word. It derives the Greek psyche (mind) and deloun 
(to make clear). Sometimes categorized as hallucinogenic, their aficionados 
more often identified psychedelic drugs like LSD as mind or consciousness 
expanding. Bypassing the controversies over drug use and sixties revolts for 
now, psychedelic artists intentionally aimed at consciousness  expansion. 
Largely, this meant presenting the quotidian in a way that made for see-
ing it clearly. Concomitantly, high modern, psychedelic visual art com-
bined the everyday so as to efface the distinction between high and low 
art, a distinction that Theodore Adorno (1970) persisted in maintaining. 
“Unknown to one another, a group of painters have come to the common 
conclusion that the most banal and even vulgar trappings of modern civi-
lization can, when transposed literally to canvas, becomes Art” (Bourdon 
1989:110 citing Time 1962:56). Had Time published at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, it might have said the same of the Ashcan School 
(aka The Eight), who (metaphorically) painted ash cans—the most banal, 
even vulgar trappings of modern civilization (Zurier 2006). 
Arthur Danto (1997) gained notoriety for advancing the argument 
that art ended in the 1960s. His was not an empirical observation, but a 
philosophical one. Of course, artists did not stop producing or plying their 
wares. Referencing Hans Belting’s (1991) claim that people did not catego-
rize paintings as works of art until the fifteenth century, Danto pointed out 
that the history of art up to high modernism reflected a series of move-
ments or mannerisms. Throughout each successive period, the artist had 
only limited ways of presenting images. The end of art for Danto obliterat-
ed such restrictions. Therefore, the Ashcan School’s ash cans, alleys, and 
other vulgar ordinariness—maybe Toulouse-Lautrec’s similar vulgarities—
were, in Danto’s view, manifestos, protests against reigning conventions. 
Warhol’s soup cans and Brillo boxes, on the contrary, liberated art from all 
restrictions. “No art is any longer historically mandated as against other art. 
Nothing is any more true as art than anything else.” (Danto 1997:27). In the 
1960s, art reached an apotheosis of freedom for what counted as art, includ-
ing the socially profane, the everyday, what most people take for reality.
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There was a tremendous change in the fabric of society, a demand for libera-
tion which has not ended yet. . . . In my view pop art was not just a move-
ment which followed one movement and was replaced by another. It was a 
cataclysmic moment which signaled profound social and political shifts and 
which achieved profound philosophical transformations in the concept of 
art. It really proclaimed the twentieth century, which had languished for so 
long a time—sixty-four years—in the field of the nineteenth century. . . . 
One by one the terrible ideas of the nineteenth century have been exhaust-
ing themselves, though many of the nineteenth-century institutions of 
repression remain (131–132). 
Danto expanded on the concept in a reply to his critics. The end of art for 
him, did not mean that “there will be no more stories to tell after the end of 
art, only that there will not be a single metanarrative for the future history 
of art” (Danto 1998:140). By presenting Brillo boxes, Andy Warhol was 
not engaging in representing an image of a Brillo box. He was presenting 
a Brillo box. Danto claimed that he could not, philosophically, distinguish 
between Warhol’s boxes and Brillo boxes. That is, Warhol’s boxes embody 
their meaning, which is what C. S. Peirce said was iconic representation—
the image of the thing itself is the thing. Therefore, what Danto discovered 
was more than just the liberation of art, and thus its end, but a different 
way of seeing, a different way of communicating, and, ultimately, a differ-
ent consciousness. If Belting is right—that images were not conceived as 
art until the fifteenth century—then the different way of seeing ushered in 
by linear perspective served as a similar, albeit smaller, milestone. Danto’s 
end of art connects to the epochal change in human consciousness from 
logocentric to iconocentric. Images as art from the 1400s on became art 
for art in the mid-nineteenth century when, according to Baudelaire, 
artists had to abstract themselves and their work from social structures, 
which culminated in abstract expressionism. Pop art comes full circle 
when social life and art become indistinguishable. Anything can be art, 
and art can be anything. As revolutionary, pop art, while liberating, made 
art more  fragile. If anything could be art, then the lag between artistic 
innovations—the effect of shock value—and commodification disappears. 
As soon as avant-garde art appeared, it was always already a commodity.
Dance
Liberation from rigid boundaries between art and nonart was not limited 
to painting or even visual art broadly speaking. It emerged in all the arts 
and culture generally. Modern dance carried particularly revealing signifi-
cance. Modern dance emerged in the first part of the twentieth century 
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as a rebellion against classical ballet. Led by American women—notably 
Isadora Duncan, Ruth St. Denis, and Martha Graham—modern dance 
focused on expression rather than technical virtuosity. It uses freer move-
ments governed more by expression of mood as opposed ballet’s  codified 
movements. Graham in particular emphasized the meaningfulness of every 
gesture (Ross 2003:25). That concept resulted in highly stylized forms. 
In the 1960s a revolutionary choreographic mode appeared. Just as 
pop art treated the ordinary as art so did the new dance. “One of the most 
shocking aspects of avant-garde art in the 1960s was its conspicuous use of 
ordinary gestures, actions, rhythms, and objects” (Banes 2003:3). Building 
on Victor Shlovsky’s concept of defamiliarization (1929), Sally Banes 
argued that defamiliarization of the ordinary, incidentally a psychological 
effect of psychedelic drugs, can also refamiliarize—that is, demystify, mak-
ing poetry prosaic and art in general intelligible, accessible, and politically 
engaged (19 n4). Obviously artistic refamiliarization holds the potential of 
demystifying commodities. Consequently, even as avant-garde art of the 
1960s became already commodified, it could demystify itself. One of the 
ways dance achieved this end involved using ordinary movements. Instead 
of a dancer moving as a character in a drama, “[s]he walks as though she’s 
in the street” (3). The rebellious artists of the 1960s tried to transform 
art from the sacred into the profane, nullify the gulf between art and the 
quotidian, and subvert commodification. “‘Un-art’ liberates the artist from 
conventional modernism. . . . ‘As un-art takes a lifelike form and setting, 
as it begins to function in the world as if it were life, we can speculate 
that art and all its resonances may one day become unnecessary’” (Banes 
2003:17 quoting Krapow 1990:144). By the same token, Allan Krapow’s 
un-art strategy holds forth a promise of making the world artistic instead 
of a commodity.
According to Noël Carroll, when choreographers in the 1960s chal-
lenged the distinction between dance and ordinary gestures, they made 
the same commitment as pop art. He cited Judith Dunn’s Acapulco, Steve 
Paxton’s Satisfying Lover and Flat, and Simone Forti’s See-Saw (Carroll 
2003:93–94). He went on to note another effect of the new dance. It 
attacked the barrier between high and low art, as did Roy Lichtenstein and 
Andy Warhol in painting and Claes Oldenburg in sculpture. For example, 
“[i]n Elaine Summer’s Suite, the last section is organized around the then-
popular dance, the Twist. Not only did the dancers twist, but the audience 
was invited to join in” (94). Audience participation collectivizes the artistic 
subject, as the audience members become cocreators in the work, similar 
to what Bertolt Brecht hoped to achieve theatrically. This erasure of the 
subject, really a socialization of the subject, clearly belongs to high mod-
ernism rather than postmodernism as some critics and exponents claim.
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Another implication of capturing ordinary gestures for artistic creativ-
ity is potentially liberating a crucial part of the habitus of communication. 
George Herbert Mead (1934) argued that the self was a social artifact. 
Interaction among people created the self mainly through what he called 
significant symbols. Mead’s significant symbols closely resemble C. S. Peirce’s 
concept of symbolic sign relations in which a sign comes into relation to 
an object through an interpretant that is rule governed. Social norms con-
stitute the rules. The most palpable and arguably most frequent traffic in 
significant symbols takes verbal form—speaking, writing, singing, and so 
on. Nonetheless, face-to-face interaction contains many gestures, a part of 
what linguists categorize as pragmatics. When the new dance appropriated 
the everyday exchange of gestures, it aestheticized not only ordinary com-
munication but self-building. What Mead discursively explained for a rar-
efied academic audience, high modern dance realized for the masses. Selves 
became something we all have a say in creating. We do it every day when we 
interact with our fellows, just as the audience participated in the creation of 
Suite by dancing the Twist. This kind of high modernist liberation contains 
the germ of a solution to the essential alienation of capitalism. Work—human 
labor—remains definitive for the species. As a species, humans create their 
own primary ecological niche; they make culture. Capitalist social relations 
just as essentially force most people to alienate their creative capacity. Those 
who do not live by investment have to sell that which makes them human, 
their work. Recapturing creative productivity can rectify the alienation.
Feminism
Just as dance enjoined ordinary gesture, feminism, in its so-called second-
wave beginning in the late 1960s, challenged a fundamental category of 
alienation. It challenged gendered identity and the processes that construct 
it. Those processes flit between conscious and unconscious, between vol-
untary and coerced, a point made by Richard T. Ford by reference to learn-
ing the Tango. Relying on ideas from Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble, Ford 
described a female Tango student who finds “it easier to conform to the 
female role than to attack the Tango’s structure. . . . Over time conformity 
will become ‘second nature.’” Eventually, she forgets any urge to resist the 
relative passivity of the female’s Tango role; “[a]t that point the status will 
also have become her identity” (Ford 1999:857). The status, of course, is 
gender, in which the Tango is another building block in the apparent natu-
ral and biologically authorized category. Ford goes on to compare gender 
statuses to jurisdictional statuses, the legal statuses conferred by jurisdic-
tional boundaries, such as citizenship. There are degrees of citizenship, 
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as bearers of marginalized statuses continually rediscover. The feminist 
challenge reverberated through all sectors of mid-twentieth century society 
and culture. Nonetheless, its most terrifying threat to the elite pertained to 
gender’s role in the main social unit of reproduction, the family. Families 
have long been the site not only of procreation and primary socialization, 
but also as social institutions that allow capital formations to externalize 
costs. Employers do not employ those who toil to reproduce waged workers. 
“The modern feminist movement has challenged the arbitrary theoreti-
cal separation of production from reproduction in the process reducing 
how  material and social existence can be conceptualized” (Rowbotham 
1992:278). Moreover, families in their spatial manifestations—house-
holds—are key centers of consumerism, a critical part of the market in soci-
eties that are centers of world capitalism. As Sheila Rowbotham recounted,
We were prepared to challenge every sexual convention, yet woefully igno-
rant often of contraception, abortion, and our bodies. We faced contradic-
tory attitudes toward female sexuality and we were part of a ferment in 
which received theories and authority of every kind was contested. Every 
aspect of life was political. 
(Rowbotham 1992:261)
Second-wave feminism surfaced in the 1960s. Its formation came from 
the civil rights movement. After sexual discrimination appeared in the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, in an effort by opponents to stop its passage, Betty 
Friedan formed NOW, the National Organization of Women (258). One 
point of departure for the women’s movement began with “rap” groups 
devoted to consciousness raising. The advantage lay in exploring episte-
mological alternatives to patriarchy to assess social conditions and form 
preliminary strategies followed by emancipatory actions. This beginning 
also had two disadvantages. First, relying on small group discussions 
tended to overemphasize individualistic, personal relations. Second, self-
selected groups tended to be homogeneous with respect to other social 
divisions: race, class, sexual orientation, and so on. As discussed below, 
the elite reaction against feminism exploited both these disadvantages by 
using the first to blunt and divert its revolutionary potential and the sec-
ond to foment divisiveness. Nonetheless, second-wave feminism presented 
a major challenge to the hierarchical status quo.
In a 1998 reflective essay reviewing her earlier essay, Nancy Hartsock 
restated Camus’ “I rebel, therefore we are.” She wrote:
First, rather than getting rid of subjectivity, oppressed groups need to 
engage in the historical, political, and theoretical process of constituting 
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ourselves as subjects as well as objects of history. We need to sort out who we 
really are and in the process dissolve this false “we” into its real multiplicity 
and variety (240). 
In the essay, Hartsock also makes clear that liberated understandings and 
self-constitution come from material social and political struggle—that is, 
praxis. Success for the project of liberation does not rely on the particular 
understandings of individual rebels. The issue is not an opinion poll or 
social survey, but what Hartsock calls a “standpoint” drawing on Lukács’ 
History and Class Consciousness. “Rather a standpoint is a technical device 
that can allow for the creation of better (more objective, more liberatory) 
accounts of the world. Thus, I make no claim about the actual conscious-
ness of existing women” (Hartsock 1998:236). Feminism contained a 
severe challenge because it could realize subjective and universal liberation 
by conjoining the two goals. As a slogan of the times went, the personal 
is the political. As it turned out, this revolutionary potential of feminism 
did not succeed any more than the revolutionary potentials of any of the 
political, social, and cultural movements of the high modern period. The 
elite struck back against all of them, and in the process put an end to mod-
ernism, which presaged the end of modernity.
After Modernism
David Harvey began his 1989 study by observing that “[t]here has been 
a sea-change in cultural as well as in political-economic practices since 
around 1972. This sea-change is bound up with the emergence of new 
dominant ways in which we experience space and time” (vii).
The sea change did not occur from inexorable trends of social trans-
formation. On the contrary, the causes of the sea change reversed many 
of those trends. The elites, first in the United States and then followed by 
those in other countries central to the world system, carried out a deliber-
ate, concerted, and conscious campaign to reverse the trends of modernity. 
Although there are a variety of documents that reveal the campaign, none 
do it so concisely and clearly as a memorandum by the soon to be U.S. 
Supreme Court justice, Lewis Powell, in 1971. Powell, one of Virginia’s 
upper crust, was a partner in the law firm of Hunton, Williams, Gay, Powell 
and Gibson, now called Hunton and Williams LLP, which employs over a 
thousand lawyers. Powell specialized in mergers and acquisitions in corpo-
rate law. Nixon nominated him to the Supreme Court simultaneously with 
his nomination of William Rhenquist. Powell had a friend and neighbor, 
Eugene Sydnor, who was director of education for the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce. Conversations between them led to Powell’s memorandum, 
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intended to be secret, which outlined a counterattack by the ruling class 
against perceived threats to its power, wealth, and privilege. Tracing its 
direct impact would present an impossible task, but reading it after the 
reactionary onslaught of the late twentieth century, it offered what seems 
to be a blueprint for that counterattack. Calling on corporate leaders and 
the owning class of America, Powell (1971) proposed an eleven-point pro-
gram of where and how to carry out the counterattack.
 1. The campus, especially social science faculties; support right-thinking 
scholars and academics; suppress radical organizations.
 2. Influence and, where possible, control the news media, especially 
television.
 3. Influence the selection of government staffers, consultants, and 
experts.
 4. Support right-thinking politicians in elections.
 5. Support independent lecturers, writers, scholars, and others who 
shape culture.
 6. Push universities to include more right-thinking faculty.
 7. Evaluate textbooks and other publications; support those expressing 
right thinking.
 8. After universities, carry on the fight in high schools.
 9. Conduct a systematic public relations campaign in favor of elite 
capitalists’ interests. 
 10. Support publications of right-thinking scholars in publications.
 11. Get involved in adjudication; support right-thinking lawyers and 
judges.
It was not too long after his memorandum that the dawn of a new kind 
of postmodern analysis began to appear on the horizon for intellectual 
circles. France presents an interesting case, because the intellectuals who 
constituted what was originally called poststructuralism began having 
their works published and translated to English with remarkable rapidity. 
The French invasion of the 1970s was underway. Another aspect to this 
French wave lay in the backgrounds of many if not most of the scholars. 
They had been involved in The Events of May 1968, the Parisian rebellion 
that brought workers and students together. The strikes and other actions 
of those events and the worker-student coalition itself not only suffered 
intransigence from the French establishment, but the Communists, 
Socialists, and largest labor union confederation repudiated the rebel-
lion, thus thwarting its revolutionary potential. What followed resembled 
the effect of the collapse of the U.S. left in the face of the red scare 
after the Second World War, popularly known as McCarthyism. Then, 
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anti-Stalinists, so-called Trotskyites, and various other non-Communists 
social ists turned abruptly to the right, often in obscurantist ways. That 
turn spawned what became known as neoconservatism with such lights 
as Irving Krystal and Norman Podhoretz. Meeting in the United States in 
the 1970s, these two intellectual strains—the poststructuralists and neo-
conservatives—led to a dialectical dynamic that provided the discursive 
elements of  postmodernism. Gestating in intellectual circles and organiza-
tions, epigones of these superficially contradictory ideologies soon began 
to populate positions of policy making in government and business.
Michel Foucault’s theory of power exemplifies the French poststruc-
tural turn. It is a flawed version of some of the theories of social con-
trol articulated by early Chicago School sociologists. Foucault used the 
metaphor of capillary action to describe power dynamics—an upward 
flow from pervasive systems of roots. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattori 
(1972, 1980) used the term “rhizome” as a similar, though not identical, 
metaphor. This model takes power as an effect of modern societies with 
its complex imbrications of relationships and institutions as opposed 
to power emanating from the state or ruling class. That model opposes 
Louis Althusser’s (1965; Althusser and Balibar 1968) so-called structural 
Marxism, which posited a social structure in which the ruling class used its 
control of state apparatuses to order social relations. Two main state appa-
ratuses are those of force such as police or military and ideological such 
as schools. Foucault not only rejected the structural model but specifi-
cally excluded physical force saying that power and freedom are mutually 
necessary.
When one defines the exercise of power as a mode of action upon the 
actions of others, when one characterizes these actions as the government 
of men by other men—in the broadest sense of the term—one includes an 
important element: freedom. Power is exercised only over free subjects and 
only insofar as they are free. By this we mean individual or collective subjects 
who are faced with a field of possibilities. . . . Where the determining fac-
tors saturate the whole there is no relationship when a man is in chains. . . . 
The relationship between power and freedom’s refusal to submit cannot 
therefore be separated. 
(Foucault 1982:221)
Perhaps unaware of the connection, Foucault did not cite the concept of 
social control that stemmed from Edward Alsworth Ross, who introduced 
the idea (1901). In keeping with the liberal orientation of Progressivism 
of the early twentieth century in the United States, Ross took a social psy-
chological approach to human behavior similar to that of Charles Horton 
Cooley (1902). “Rather than a conception of ‘state’ or ‘civilization’ which 
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imposes its coercive, external ‘law’ on ‘human nature’, the new conceptual-
ization was that of an order which stems from social interaction” (Melossi 
1987:28). 
Foucault called “pastoral” the kind of power most prevalent in liberal, 
Western societies. Characteristics of pastoral power are (1) an ultimate 
aim to ensure individual salvation; (2) agents who are willing to sacrifice 
themselves for the good of the flock; (3) devotion to the care of individuals 
throughout their lives; and (4) knowledge of the inside of people’s minds. 
In its modern, secular form, pastoral power relies on an individualizing 
tactic associated with institutions such as the family, medicine, psychiatry, 
and employment (Foucault 1982). It might seem that the force of control, 
or power, in such institutions resides mainly in ideas—that is, power is 
ideological. Foucault explicitly abjured a connection with the Marxist 
concept of ideological domination. 
I think I would distinguish myself from both the Marxist and the para-
Marxist perspectives. As regards Marxism, I’m not one of those who try to 
elicit the effects of power at the level of ideology. . . . Because what troubles 
me with these analyses which prioritize ideology is that there is always pre-
supposed a human subject on the lines of the mode provided by classical 
philosophy endowed with a consciousness which power is then thought to 
seize on (1980:58). 
Foucault elaborated on his idea of a subjectless society by denying the effi-
cacy of communication. “What defines a relationship of power is that it is 
a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. 
Instead it acts on others’ actions” (1982:220). Foucault’s version of power 
seems more like a tennis match where one player acts on the actions of 
the other by hitting the ball. It does not comport with ideas of self, ego, or 
personhood emerging from social interactions and symbolic transaction 
as one finds in modernist thinkers such as Sigmund Freud (1923), George 
Herbert Mead (1934), or Georg Simmel (1900). It does not fit with the 
anthropological finding that persons, as opposed to biological individu-
als, emerge from social interaction and cultural systems—all of which are 
thoroughly compatible with Marx’s concept of persons emerging from 
productive relations. The problem Foucault thought he addressed is not 
so much within Marx’s writings, but those of some structuralist inter-
preters. That problem arises because Marxian structuralism has a ten-
dency to overlook human agency. The solution seems to require some 
kind of preexisting atoms—that is, subjects upon whom social forces act. 
Unfortunately, Foucault’s solution does not resolve the question of agency; 
it sinks the analysis in an even worse quagmire. Foucault’s notion of power 
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enunciates a postmodern individuality where there is no subject. There 
is nobody to blame. There is no slave and no master. Foucault’s power 
depends on accepting the spectacle of reified commodities, like tennis 
balls, where people do not interact with one another directly, but always 
and only through mediated things. Individual choice can reign supreme 
because its effects are only things, the fruits of others actions. 
The U.S. intelligentsia eagerly welcomed Foucault. At the same time, 
he and his compatriot poststructuralists gained currency, neoconservative 
American intellectuals plied their wares with the support and influence of 
the ruling class. In political economy, it was Neoliberalism, in other fields, 
neoconservatism. The two philosophies differ mainly by name, because 
in practice the liberality in neoliberalism applies only to the ruling class. 
A University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman recuperated Frederick 
Hayek’s theories, based on the economists of the monopoly capitalism and 
neocolonialism of Britain and France at the end of the nineteenth century: 
Alfred Marshall (1842–1924), William Stanley Jevons (1835–1882), and 
Marie-Esprit-Léon Walras (1834–1910). Their central thesis used marginal 
utility to displace the classical economics of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, 
and Karl Marx (Harvey 2005:20). It relied on a strategy of the capital 
centers—New York, London, and Tokyo most prominently—extracting 
wealth from the periphery of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The neo-
liberal political economics ostensibly advocated free enterprise and indi-
vidual responsibility while relying on state power, including military force, 
to ensure market dominance. At the domestic level, the ideas of James Q. 
Wilson supported a kind of social control through police power that aimed 
at dominating redundant populations who typically offered the greatest 
threat and rebellious potential. The success of such ideas depended on 
restructured class relations and control of outlets for cultural products. 
In apparent contrast to Foucault and other poststructuralists, the neocon-
servative philosophy did not deny preexisting subjects. It made them the 
end-all and be-all of analysis. It dismissed social formations such as class, 
race, and gender as methodologically unnecessary at best and imaginary at 
worst. Neoconservative approaches proceed as if there were no such things 
as social forces, only individual choice. 
The apparent contrast between neoconservatism and poststructuralism 
fueled a phony culture war. Neoconservatives attacked the poststructural 
trend as nihilist and amoral. Poststructuralists attacked the neoconserva-
tives as naïve and archaic. Occluded by the dispute carried on in rarefied 
academic venues were real political issues. While the political right shored 
up ruling-class economic interests, it simultaneously made value-laden 
appeals to such constituencies as fundamentalist Christians, libertarian-
minded new professionals, and older, blue-collar manual laborers. 
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Abortion, sexuality, and other moralistic matters became vanguard issues 
for the first target, fundamentalists. New professionals received enor-
mously expanded markets in heretofore-restricted commodities largely 
devoted to narcissistic appeals. New York City provided the test case. After 
the bankers’ takeover of the city following its debt default in 1975, the 
elite mobilized to sell its image as a culture center and tourist destination. 
They supported the opening of the cultural field to diverse cosmopolitan 
interests. “The narcissistic exploration of self, sexuality, and identity 
became the leitmotif of bourgeois urban culture” (Harvey 2005:47).
Blue-collar workers had their fears of shrinking opportunities diverted 
by racial scapegoating and encouragements to their self-image as middle 
class as opposed to working class. These so-called Reagan Democrats 
flocked to the image of a renewed American culture where they once again 
could assume a crucial position, as in the postwar slogan about them as 
the most productive workers in the world. By diverting and manipulating 
imagery and hot button issues through control of the culture industry, 
modernism gave way to postmodernism. It also disguised real political 
issues (Frank 2004; Gramsci 1971:149; Harvey 2005:39–60). Postmodern 
culture served to divert resistant energies to straw men and blunt the 
impact of liberatory art and literature. At the same time, marginalized 
peoples, both within the metropoles and the periphery, felt the effects of 
force. As of 2008, the United States had incarcerated 2.3 million people, 
about half of whom were African American. The United States and its 
allies carried war to Afghanistan, Iraq, and other less-noticed theaters 
such as Somalia and Colombia. 
Identity politics came to the aid of the revanchist political strategy of 
the ruling class. The high modern era helped spawn liberation movements 
of those subordinated by race, gender, class, and other  marginalizations. 
Those movements aimed at freedom, equality, and justice for all. Post-
modernism encouraged division by status identity. The political field 
began to resemble mass marketing, where market segmentation became 
a main strategy in advertising and public relations. Postmodern style pro -
gressively subsumed modernism throughout the last decades of the 
twentieth century. By the end of the century, art had reached exhausted 
dead ends in all major fields of endeavor. The visual arts merely rehashed 
former articulations (Hopkins 2000). Other artistic fields followed the 
same pattern. It was not that artists stopped painting, film makers stopped 
making movies, composers stopped writing music, but, while particular 
works could have a freshness, they presented no challenge to people’s lives 
and perceptions as had modernism. No postmodern painter challenged 
the way people see, as cubism had done. No composer challenged hear-
ing like Schönberg, no choreographer the way people move like Martha 
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Graham or Isadora Duncan, no writers like Kafka or Joyce to challenge 
understandings of daily life, and so on. 
Postmodern art offered no challenges, because postmodernity loomed 
on the horizon. The world political economy was moribund. Chaos would 
reign. In the last decades of the twentieth century, artists could only envi-
sion an inchoate future, one with as yet no templates for a new system. 
The situation resembled that of early fifteenth century Europe. By mid-
century, innovations and changes in society and culture began to shape 
the new system. But in the 1980s and 1990s, there was no equivalent to 
linear perspective to help form a new vision, a new way of seeing, and a 
new consciousness.
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Chapter 9
Resistance and the Fight 
against Repression
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the world system entered a state of chaos. The global elites resorted to authoritarianism to 
maintain their positions. Their principal method secured fear through 
order maintenance. That order, of course, meant the hierarchical social 
order. Two analysts of political economy, David Harvey and Immanuel 
Wallerstein, optimistically averred the possibility of alternatives to author-
itarian repression. Wallerstein (2004) wrote of the spirit of Porto Alegre, 
Brazil—the site of the first World Social Forum. Harvey referred to move-
ments against neoliberalism, mentioning worker movements begun in the 
1980s in South Korea and South Africa. He assigned particular significance 
to the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas, Mexico—the Ejército Zapatista 
de Liberación Nacional—which began January 1, 1994, when the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect. Harvey cited 
that one in particular because it “did not seek to take over state power 
or accomplish a political revolution; it sought instead a more inclusion-
ary politics” (2005:199). In the economic arena, Marx had defined the 
realm of freedom as beginning where labor determined by necessity and 
of mundane considerations ceases and turns toward labor for the sake of 
human realization (1894:820). Ultimate goals of liberation aim at human 
realization through freedom, equality, and justice. Reaching these goals, 
no matter how distant, requires lucid consciousness, which entails revolt 
against repression, both political and psychological.
Repression
In psychoanalysis, patients—technically called analysands—seek to undo 
repression to gain greater conscious control of their lives through liberation 
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from unconscious impulses. The analysands do the analyzing. The ana-
lysts assist by helping them overcome their own unconscious resistance 
against the analytic process. Those resistances come from fear, fear of 
what analysis might reveal about them. Fears embed themselves in human 
psyches largely because those fears take root in infantile experiences and 
understandings of the world. When mature adults in analysis unearth their 
infantile fears, they realize how unrealistic those fears are to their adult 
selves. The fears do not go away, they remain in the analysands’ minds, but 
the fears no longer rule their lives. Instead, they can live their lives accord-
ing to mature reflection. 
Just as a part of every analysand fears analysis and resists it, mature 
adults in contemporary societies fear losing the securities of hierarchical 
control. It is safer to keep things as they are. It is safer not to know how 
elites control people to extract wealth. It is safer not to take responsibility 
for their own lives but to hand it over to someone else whom they can 
blame if things go wrong. Wilhelm Reich (1946) and Erich Fromm (1941, 
1980) made parallel points in describing the populist acceptance and 
complicity in Nazism. Resistance in psychoanalysis remains mostly a 
personal, individual matter. Unconscious fears, memories, and fantasies 
at the individual level manifest as concerted and deliberate manipulation 
through hegemonic control at the societal level. Investigations about the 
belief that Saddam Hussein was involved in the 9/11 attacks revealed the 
social psychological mechanism of inferred justification. Inferred justifi-
cation is a form of motivated reasoning, a form of cognitive dissonance 
theory (Prasad et at. 2009 citing Festinger and Carlsmith 1959). At the 
societal level, forces arrayed against freedom and equality do not oper-
ate from infantile motives or ego defenses. Their motives are wealth and 
power. The analogy between psychoanalytically defined repression and 
societal level political repression is not just simile or metaphor. Despite 
psychoanalytic concentration on the personal and psychological, much, if 
not all, psychological repression finds reinforcement—and often even its 
origins—in massive, orchestrated social, cultural, and political repression.
Apparatuses of the state spearhead social repression. A case study of a 
drug abuse treatment center for criminalized adults revealed the process. 
The center dealt with impoverished and criminalized drug addicts in 
a long-term, residential setting. Coffee-drinking practices illustrate the 
mechanism of repression in that social microsystem. The administration 
of the facility repressed the drug-related aspects of coffee and the fact that 
the residents paid for the coffee through their food stamps. They repressed 
the economic and pharmacological facts by forbidding them from con-
versation. As Freud (1923) explained, consciousness relies on putting 
thoughts into words. Without verbalization, they remain unconscious. 
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When forces, psychological or political, forbid verbalization, the thoughts 
enter the dynamic unconscious—that is, they are repressed. 
Repression of the economic facts (food stamps) is effective because it 
is associated with repressing the drug-related attribute of coffee, and both 
of these aspects of coffee are associated with the overall economic, political, 
and legal oppression of the residents. Moreover, by breaking coffee-drinking 
rules, residents become subject to demotion in the status hierarchy, 
and thus affirm the imposed microsocial structure. The net effect of the 
repressions, displacements, and even oppositions is to support the pattern 
of power relations within this social establishment. Furthermore, the very 
existence of the institution supports the oppression of the residents, who 
are members of the underclass in the wider society (Skoll 1991:7).
A popular folksong exemplifies the same principle in a far wider 
setting. Woody Guthrie wrote This Land Is Your Land in 1940 as a rebel-
lious answer to Irving Berlin’s God Bless America. Although most people 
know, or at least have heard the first few verses, they remain ignorant of 
the song’s most pithy lyrics. Usually omitted from performances are the 
following verses:
There was a big high wall there that tried to stop me;
Sign was painted, it said—private property;
But on the back side it didn’t say nothing;
That side was made for you and me.
Nobody living can ever stop me,
As I go walking that freedom highway;
Nobody living can ever make me turn back
This land was made for you and me.
In the squares of the city, In the shadow of a steeple;
By the relief office, I’d seen my people.
As they stood there hungry, I stood there asking,
Is this land made for you and me? 
(Partridge 2002:85)
Bruce Springsteen and Pete Seeger performed the more complete ver-
sion at Barack Obama’s inauguration. Subsequent events have shown this 
return of the repressed as nothing more than co-optative showmanship by 
Barack Obama, a master manipulator, a “star of decision” in Guy Debord’s 
terms (1967:39). In the end, most people still do not know, much less care 
about the significance of the most poignant lyrics.
In keeping with a fractal view of social structure, patterns of repres-
sion, oppression, and hegemonic ideological control in social micro-
systems, such as the drug treatment center, replicate patterns within 
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U.S. society, and ultimately at a global level. The observations of the drug 
center took place in the mid-1980s at the height of the war on drugs under 
the Reagan regime. The practices of the drug center carry out hegemonic 
patterns on individuals, mainly the residents, but also the staff. Microsocial 
control through repression replicates and effectuates control exerted 
through courts, penal systems, and welfare agencies. The center helps ensure 
conformity with the pharmaceutical industry that relies on such facilities 
and attendant legal and welfare policies to regulate the drug market. At the 
highest level, facilities such as this one are part of U.S. policies that use the 
international drug trade to facilitate foreign policy. In the end, social control 
has to employ means to control individuals, but that control always follows 
systemic patterns, and always serves interests of the ruling class.
In psychoanalysis, people become familiar with the cleverness of 
psychic defenses. Even when repression lifts, consciousness can remain 
obscured until the analysand works through conscious and unconscious 
resistances. Only then can the analysand overcome the compulsion to repeat 
infantile experiences (Freud 1914, 1926). Societal level resistance against 
liberation operates similarly. Performances at a presidential inauguration 
are mere spectacles, a commodification of rebellion turned to politi-
cal advantage by representatives of ruling-class power. Thus, repression, 
a crucial tool for social control, operates on individuals through systemic 
patterns. Repression is both psychological and political, and the two can-
not be separated.
The Problem with Empire
Albert Camus repudiated the Catch-22 choice (Heller 1961) between vic-
timhood and executioner (1946:255–277). To stand with Camus means 
rebellion. It means rejecting the role of either master or slave, Hegel’s 
conundrum. It means dismantling the system—that is, revolution. 
Currently, and over the past several decades, certain purportedly revolu-
tionary perspectives have circulated. These perspectives—represented by 
analyses, discourses, and movements—often claim themselves as post-
modern, or at least innovative. That claim hinges on  understanding con-
temporary times as different from some recent past, modernity. Capillary 
(Foucault 1977), rhizomatic, and schizoanalytic (Deleuze and Guattori 
1972, 1980), and other terms implying transgressive properties reflect 
the spectacle of revolutionary change. They share a common theme: 
today’s dispersed power relations require similarly dispersed challenges 
to power. In fact, many such analyses, discourses, and movements subvert 
 revolution, and some are counterrevolutionary. In the Empire of Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000, 2004), postcolonialism,  postfeminism, 
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and  postracial claims distract attention and smother effective rebellion. 
Frequently, exponents combine them, but their effect remains the same: 
diversion, distraction, and ineffectiveness. Nonetheless, today’s rebels 
do not lack models. Some models come from years past; others are 
contemporary. Each has revolutionary potential. Effective models for 
revolt and revolution obviate the choice between being victims or execu-
tioners, masters or slaves.
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri published Empire in 2000 followed 
by a sequel, Multitude, in 2004. Their work swiftly gained popularity 
among self-described progressives, formerly known as liberals in the 
United States, and among café crowd revolutionaries. Their thesis argu-
ment has two parts. First, Empire represents a new, postmodern form of 
sovereignty. Second, rebellion against the new sovereignty is and should be 
local and decentralized. The main difference between old-style imperial-
ism and postmodern empire resides in the elimination of nation states as 
the imperial agents. Instead of imperialism, the United States conducts 
postmodern empire. The difference, according to Hardt and Negri, is that 
“The United States does not, and indeed no nation-state can today form the 
center of an imperialist project” (2000:xiv). Doubtless this assertion might 
surprise the millions of colonized people throughout the world bearing 
the brunt of U.S. military enforcement of transnational capitalism. It also 
would surprise Elihu Root (Secretary of War 1899–1904, Secretary of State 
1905–1906) who designed the U.S. imperial project. 
In contrast to imperialism, Empire established no territorial center of power 
and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is decentered and deter-
ritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire 
global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. 
(Hardt and Negri 2000:xii)
The sovereignty of Empire is realized at the margins, where borders are 
flexible and identities are hybrid and fluid. It would be difficult to say 
which is more important to Empire, the centers or the margins. In fact, 
center and margins seem continually to be shifting positions, fleeing any 
determinate locations. We could even say that the process itself is virtual 
and that power resides in the power of the mind (39).
Given this amorphous, imaginary kind of empire where jouissance 
replaces domination and exploitation, rebellion against Empire must mir-
ror its structure: “rebellious groups develop more complex, distributed 
network structures” (Hardt and Negri 2004:58). Both Empire and rebel-
lion against it take the form of networks, although Hardt and Negri do not 
specify whether they are actual or virtual. 
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The postmodern Empire consorts with globalization, a world market. 
Unlike the global capital described by Marx and Engels in the mid-
nineteenth century, something Hardt and Negri along with many other 
so-called Marxists continually overlook is that postmodern world markets 
come from marketing. That is because “capitalist marketing strategies 
have long been post-modernist, avant la lettre” (2000:151). The key strat-
egy for Hardt and Negri is market segmentation—a strategy which arose 
in a Fordist economy to ensure disposal of surplus production through 
consumerization of a relatively affluent middle class. In effect, marketing 
means selling people what they do not need. To compete successfully in 
the world as created by marketing, capitalists have to develop jouissance. 
“People of all different races and sexes, and sexual orientations should 
potentially be included in the corporation; the daily routine of the work-
place should be rejuvenated with unexpected changes in an atmosphere of 
fun” (153). Clearly, the message has not reached the networks of capital-
running sweatshops in China, Indonesia, and Guatemala. For Hardt and 
Negri the best thing about this globally marketed capitalism coupled 
with Empire is that it creates conditions of rebellion, because Empire 
and counter-Empire spring from the same postmodern social order. Guido 
Giacomo Preparata questioned the revolutionary potential of the view-
point espoused by Hardt and Negri.
There is something unreal about this passage; it is hard to say whether it 
is its insincerity, its meretricious plaudit of “postmodern marketing” . . . 
its cloying conformism, its pandering to multiculturalist affectation, or all 
of these things together. We’re being sold a “postmodern theory of revolu-
tion” [Balakrishnan 2003:1]; but where is the “theory,” and where is the 
“revolution”? 
(Preparata 2007:129)
Much of Hardt and Negri’s failure to proffer either theory or revolu-
tion derives from their muddled history. In his reflections on Empire 
(2003), Negri stated its three theses: (1) globalization entails regulation; 
(2) sovereignty is shifting away from the nation-state and going some-
where else, a nonplace; and (3) Marxian class conflict has disappeared 
and become a conflict within the capital relation producing a conflic-
tual matrix alternating between resistance and Potenza (cf. the French 
puis sance or Latin virtù). To translate, Empire recognizes that there 
are no unregulated markets, but nation-states can no longer provide 
 regulation, so regulatory power has become lodged in a noplace, or to 
use a more familiar term, utopia. Empire is utopia, and within utopia 
class conflict, no longer a bloody fight over control and exploitation, has 
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become conflicting marketing strategies. Nonetheless, sovereignty’s ability 
to regulate depends on war. “We say that today it is war that constitutes 
sovereignty and sovereign politics, just as yesterday they were constituted 
by discipline and control, to adopt a Foucauldian typology of power” (Negri 
2003:2). Apparently according to Hardt and Negri, the British Empire and 
the lesser empires of France and other European countries did not rest 
on war. Moreover, the eighteenth and nineteenth century imperialism, 
especially the neocolonialism of the late nineteenth century, had nothing 
to do with class conflict, or the establishment of the monopoly form of 
capitalism. Finally, this muddled history supports a truly extraordinary 
logic: “our methodological variant is first and foremost conflictual. . . . I do 
not believe that a conflictual point of view implies a monocausal and/or 
dialectical schema.” The reason for this rejection of what seem to be all the 
possibilities for causes of conflict is that “the method (the methodologi-
cal variant) that we employ is based on the relationship between material 
labour and immaterial labour, or rather the process of transition from 
one to the other” (9). They do not describe what immaterial labor might 
be except to say that it has to do with thought and ideas. The counter-
revolutionary effect of the Hardt and Negri enterprise springs from their 
utopianism and idealism—hardly a new source of counterrevolution. With 
a ruling body located nowhere, and labor turning from the real, material 
world to some world of ideas, no wonder class conflict is different from 
Marx’s time, or any other time for that matter.
Postcolonialism and Identity Politics
While Hardt and Negri write in terms of class conflict, albeit one that 
appears unrecognizable to those actually involved in class struggles, 
postcolonial and racial-ethnic liberation too often make no accounting 
for class. Liberation and revolutionary movements founder on several 
problems associated with this exclusion of class. E. San Juan set forth the 
ideological problem.
Emerging from the theoretical debates on structuralism in the sixties, post-
colonial criticism arose originally as a critique of Eurocentric discourse and 
imperial disciplinary practice. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, it 
evolved as an apologia for neoconservative free marketers and other reac-
tionary social formations. Its method of deconstruction skepticism led to its 
subsumption in a neoliberal epistemology that displaced concepts of class 
and nation. By rhetorical and ideological ruses it replaced the conceptual 
schema of class conflict with questions of indeterminate identity and sub-
jectivity. . . . A metaphysics of relativism and nihilism supervened. . . . Instead 
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of revolution, postcolonialism opts for a niche within the global intellectual 
marketplace in which official multiculturalism, cultural diversity, or plural-
ism allow localized, circumscribed identities based on ethnic markers to 
flourish. All for the benefit of consumerist pleasures, solipsist jouissance, 
and other self-serving games that foster the status quo of domination and 
subordination. . . . It thus serves objectively a counterrevolutionary function 
in contemporary exchanges as the ideology and practice of global capitalism 
proceeds to resolve by apocalyptic wars—the holocausts in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Lebanon, Palestine, and so on—the crisis of overproduction, unemployment, 
social ostracism, widespread impoverishment and homelessness, in addition 
to the irrecoverable devastation of the planet’s ecosystem. 
(San Juan 2007:xxiii)
While bosses divert the attention of oppressed minorities to their status 
identities, they are devastated by vicious class warfare, in some cases purely 
economic, but in others accompanied by military assault. Members of 
the middling classes—various white-collar workers and some blue-collar 
workers in the metropole—get to celebrate themselves through Facebook® 
and MySpace®, both of which signify the latest in commodification of 
personal interaction. Diversity and multiculturalism turn real subaltern 
status into cultural difference. “Multiculturalism thus legitimates pluralist 
 stratification, exploitation, and oppression in the process of capital accumu-
lation here and worldwide” (San Juan 2007:16 citing Applebaum 1996).
Race and Racism
Ethnicity, race, gender, and religion denote status identities that serve 
global capital. Whereas the capitalist economy operates rationally, capital 
often uses and appeals to irrationalisms. The distinction clarifies analytic 
confusion, which has confounded even the best theorists. Michael Omi 
and Howard Winant fall into that category. Their theory of racial for-
mation illustrates the point. They made a valuable contribution in the 
concept of racial formation (1994). Nonetheless, they both confuse and 
conflate class and status so their analysis of race and racism in the United 
States fails to offer a comprehensive account. They “mis-identify bourgeois 
economics (market theory) with a Marxist analysis by their preoccupa-
tion with the labor market” (San Juan 2007:27). They identify class in 
market exchange, then equate it with life chances, where racial identify 
becomes conflated with relations of production. Omi and Winant use race 
as a principal explanation for social action. Racial politics displaces class 
antagonism. “Unanchored to the material process of wage-labor exploita-
tion, race becomes an enigmatic fetish . . . a floating signifier susceptible to 
all kinds of contingencies and varying interpretations” (28).
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To avoid what they see as the Scylla and Charybdis of treating race as 
either an essence or an illusion, Omi and Winant say “The effort must be 
made to understand race as an unstable and ‘decentered’ complex of social 
meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle. “race is a 
concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by refer-
ring to different types of human bodies” (Omi and Winant 1994:55). This 
definition may resolve the essence-illusion problem, but it raises more 
problems. Definitional problems lie at the root of Omi and Winant’s fail-
ure to explain the racial backlash of the later 1960s and beyond. 
Omi and Winant’s definition has the right idea, but it does not distin-
guish between race as a social practice from knowledge of that practice. 
Americans “do” race all the time in their relations and interactions. They 
do or make race according to the kind of knowledge that expresses power 
relations, savoir versus connaissance in French (Foucault 1971:184–185). 
Omi and Winant illustrate the distinction between the two kinds of 
knowledge at the beginning of Chapter 4. In 1970, Louisiana defined 
anyone with 1/32nd “Negro blood” to be black, whereas research showed 
most Louisiana Whites to have at least 1/20th Negro ancestry (Omi 
and Winant 1994:53). The law is an example of power-knowledge; the 
research illustrates a knowing-about that ignores power, or appears so to 
do. So, the social practice of race is hedged about by power-knowledge 
discourses, such as laws.
In addition to race as social practice, race also exists as representa-
tions—the signs and symbols of race, which as Omi and Winant say, have a 
double referent. They point on the one hand toward social conflicts, while 
at the same time, and with the other hand, they point to persons and their 
bodies. Omi and Winant fail to distinguish between race as practice and 
race as signifier.
There is a third failure in their definition. In addition to practices 
and signifiers, race is also representational in and of itself. To appropri-
ate Henri Lefebvre’s application to space, representational race embodies 
“complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes not, linked to the 
clandestine or underground side of social life, as also to art” (Lefebvre 
1974:33). Representational race refers to the cultural valences of Blackness, 
Whiteness, Negritude, and so on. The last, of course, makes explicit 
the artistic gesture to musicians, poets, writers, painters, and the like. 
Representational race is race in the mind and race depicted. The definition 
has to clarify distinctions among (1) social practices of race; (2) represen-
tations of race; and (3) representational race.
Omi and Winant define racial formations as “sociohistorical pro-
cesses by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and 
destroyed” (Omi and Winant 1994:55). They say that racial formations 
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are made up of particular racial projects “in which human bodies and 
social structures are represented and organized” (56). Racial projects 
link representations and social structures through ideology, which is the 
power-knowledge kind of knowledge. The projects interpret, represent, 
and explain racial dynamics—that is, racial conflict and change. They do 
it by ascribing ever changing meanings so as to “redistribute and reorganize 
resources along particular racial lines” (56). That is, racial projects supply an 
ideology for racial categories, for racializing people according to the ques-
tions of who gets what, how, when, where, and how much.
Since Omi and Winant went to great pains to argue against reducing 
race to class, they leave off the argument here. They fail to bring their 
concepts to eliminate the tautology they set up with their definition of 
race. Race, according to them, turns social conflicts into conflicts among 
people based on body categories. But what are the social conflicts? They 
cannot be racial conflicts; otherwise Omi and Winant have produced a 
vacuous tautology. They are conflicts about the distribution of resources, 
and the distribution of resources according to people’s economic relations 
and practices—in other words, class. The reason Omi and Winant did not 
recognize the implications of their definitions of race, racial formations, 
and racial projects is that they treated class and status as the same. They 
refer to the Marxist understanding of class as social practices determined 
by people’s respective relationships to the means of production and then 
say that it does not matter if they use Marx’s class or Weber’s “relationship 
to the mode of distribution giving rise to particular ‘life chances’” (24). 
They cited Weber, but Weber’s distinction addresses class as an abstrac-
tion or representation as opposed to class as practice and relationship. 
In the passage they cite, Weber defined class in terms of a coherent social 
group, race as an abstraction rather than relation or practice (Gerth and 
Mills 1958:181–183). They found class explanations wanting because 
they say “class theories principally explain race by reference to economic 
processes” (Omi and Winant 1994:24). They used a narrow understanding 
of “economic” to make this criticism.
Economics always pertains to the distribution of resources, therefore to 
control of the resources, and therefore to all power relations. The institu-
tionalization of those relations and practices gives rise to class structures, 
which is the Weberian abstract meaning of class, but it does not explain 
positions within those structures and positions within other structures in 
a society. Those positions are statuses. Gender is a status. Age is a status. 
Race is a status. It is true that race cannot be reduced to class, because race 
is a different kind of thing—a status, like gender or age, and so on. Class, 
on the other hand, is not positional but relational. Omi and Winant would 
have had no worry about reducing race to class if they had recognized 
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race for what it is: a position in the social structures of American society. 
Therefore, race and class will always interact, in remarkably complex ways. 
In the same way, gender and class interact in complex ways.
Gender, Sex, and Feminism
Modern racism, of the kind prevalent in the United States, emerged coin-
cident with European imperialism of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 
Societies have always had racial distinctions, but the European world 
imperialism, itself both a part of and precondition for the world capital-
ist system, made those distinctions to serve economic exploitation. Male 
dominance occurs in many different kinds of societies, and throughout 
human history (Etienne and Leacock 1980; Rosaldo and Lamphere 1974; 
Sanday 1981). Nevertheless, systematic and gender based political and eco-
nomic exploitation functions only in class-stratified societies. Moreover, 
class stratification, along with systems of law, intrinsically defines states as 
political institutions. With states and class comes patriarchy. Karen Sacks 
(1974:207) said that although Engels made ethnographic errors, his main 
ideas are correct and remain the best way of explaining patriarchy. The 
shift from societies organized primarily through kinship to those orga-
nized by social class and the state account for modern patriarchy. In her 
application of these insights to a particular society—the Tongan Islands in 
Polynesia—Christine Ward Gailey observed that: 
Women’s authority and status necessarily decline with class and state 
 formation. Class formation is a process in which groups that cut across 
age and gender distinctions come to have differential control over what is 
produced in a society and how it is distributed. . . . The conflict between pro-
ducing people, orienting their work toward subsistence, and civil authority, 
protecting classes that siphon off goods and labor, is a continual, ongoing 
process. . . . Conceptualizing state formation as a process rather than a type or 
category helps us analyze historical changes and transformations of political 
institutions. 
(Gailey 1987:ix)
In the process of state formation, authority and status, formerly linked 
to kin, become linked to the abstract category of gender. Class relations 
pertain to differential access to resources of production, but gender strati-
fication comes about through changing political processes and the insti-
tutional means for ensuring class relations (xi–xii). In Tonga, prior to the 
emergence of the state, “in each kindred or lineage, sisters and their children 
had claims to the products and labor of brothers and brothers’ children. 
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Today . . . rank considerations have been superseded by class prerogatives; 
and material and labor claims by sisters are illegal” (xv). A principal tool 
for state and class formation was the imposition of Christianity supported 
by military conquest. Missionaries enforced Western notions of appropri-
ate female behavior, which entailed their subordination (xvi). Religious 
functionaries working on behalf of an organized church enforced gender 
norms and female subordination. With a certain perhaps predictable 
irony, the Vatican objected to inclusion of the term “gender” in the pro-
gram of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, September 
4–15, 1995, because the term connoted homosexuality. Controlling female 
behavior, therefore, applies to reproduction along with production, at least 
as far as the Roman Catholic Church is concerned (Butler 2004).
Structuralist analyses have not helped to reveal the interplay of gender 
and class. Sex, sex roles, and sexuality get linked to gender through repro-
ductive activities. Various theorists have essayed ways of sorting out the 
four factors. At first blush, they seem different, but their definitions and 
ontologies remain entangled by necessity. Luce Irigaray (1977), follow-
ing Jacques Lacan (1953–1954), asserted that sex is neither a biological 
category nor a social one, but linguistic. Lacan himself asserted that the 
Law-of-the Father, the phallus, defines sex, and he said there is only one 
sex. The Law-of-the Father, in Lacan’s view, is symbolic and unchange-
able. It translates the Real, which remains forever beyond consciousness, 
into representation. Nonetheless, this symbolic order remains an implicit 
and unconscious structure of human relations. Lacan derived these for-
mulations from Claude Lévi-Strauss who claimed that the symbolic order 
structures all human reality (1949). Specifically, Lévi-Strauss maintained 
that kinship follows from an exchange of women according to a small 
number of patterns of exchange. The exchange of women articulates the 
incest taboo, and thereby establishes sex and gender. According to this 
speculative structural anthropology, exchange of women is the empiri-
cally discernible activity of the incest taboo. And the incest taboo creates 
the symbolic categories of sex. The empirically discernible social practice 
follows a social structure, which in itself is not subject to empirical obser-
vation. It is a structure, and ultimately all social structure, and therefore 
the symbolic order, flows from the physical structures of humanity (1958). 
Lévi-Strauss’ anthropology resembles Chomsky’s theory of language. 
Chomsky grounded his structural linguistics in the so-called hard-wired 
anatomy and physiology of the human brain (1972). Following this struc-
turalist train of thought, it turns out that Lacan’s Real is biological, and, at 
base, biology structures the psyche unconsciously, and therefore structures 
society (Lévi-Strauss 1949, 1958), hence persons’ sex comes from their 
biology. This is how Lacan can claim that the unconscious is structured 
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like a language, almost precisely the opposite of what Freud said. Freud 
maintained that consciousness is structured according to language. The 
linguistic aspect of all this derives from Ferdinand de Saussure’s semiology 
(1911). Saussure’s semiology posits a dyadic relation between a sign and 
a signified. The signified is an idea. Although Saussure himself remained 
ambiguous about the foundation of signifieds in biology, the structuralists 
after the Second World War, as more or less materialists, grounded them 
in biology. Semiology differs from Peirce’s semiotics first in that Peirce 
used a dynamic triad instead of a dyad, and second, Peirce saw semiotics 
as a pragmatic perspective. Peirce’s signs emerge from human conduct in 
social relations. Maurice Merleau-Ponty resides in the same camp as Freud 
and Peirce, at least in the respect of biology, consciousness, and the uncon-
scious. He wrote regarding sex and sexuality.
Thus sexuality is not an autonomous cycle. It has internal links with the 
whole active and cognitive being . . . standing in a relationship to each other 
of reciprocal expression. Here we concur with the most lasting discover-
ies of psychoanalysis . . . [that] psychoanalytic research is in fact led to an 
explanation of man, not in terms of sexual substructure, but to a discovery 
in sexuality of relations and attitudes which had previously been held to 
reside in consciousness. Thus the significance of psychoanalysis is less to 
make psychology biological than to discover a dialectical process in func-
tions of thought as “purely bodily”, and to reintegrate sexuality into the 
human being. 
(Merleau-Ponty 1945:157–158)
As usual, reification and undue imposition of conceptual boundaries not 
only confuses and works against lucid consciousness but also hinders lib-
eration, rebellion, and revolution. Postfeminism reacts against feminism 
similarly as the postracial reacts against racial equality and liberation, 
with both as part of postmodernism’s reaction against modernism. In 
the process of state and class formation, divisions of labor by gender, age, 
and skill become “abstracted from their particular kinship connections and 
meanings” (Gailey 1987:16). Coincidentally, imperialist projects incorpo-
rate “new groups into tribute production or labor service . . . [which] often 
becomes the occasion for an ideology of separate, ‘biologically distinctive,’ 
and purportedly inferior humanity—the ethnic group or race. Racism 
and sexism emerge concomitantly” (20). Racism, sexism, and an invidi-
ous split between mental and physical labor (Sohn-Rethel 1978) mark 
class-stratified societies with a state-level political organization. Abstract 
and invidious categorizations mark state polities. Commodity production 
enforces its own abstraction on all social relations. Feminism, especially 
that of the second-wave feminists of the 1960s and 1970s, worked to 
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reverse abstractions to concrete relations and replace invidious catego-
rization with mutual appreciation. Their efforts met with resistance, just 
as did the efforts of those who struggled against racial oppression. The 
resistance to these liberations resulted in the reactionary backlash of post-
modernity.
Postfeminism and the Postracial in Postmodernity
Postfeminism and the postracial are reactionary developments within 
postmodernity. While the “post” prefix has achieved a certain cachet, it 
dissembles. The proper prefix should be “anti” or “counter.” So, counter-
feminism works against feminism, and the antiracial works against racial 
equality. Both of these discourses and practices involve a retreat from the 
problems of domination within capitalism (Brown 1995:14). “There is a 
silent suspension of class analysis . . . [and an] ideological displacement: 
when class antagonism is disavowed, when its key structuring role is sus-
pended, other markers of social difference may come . . . [to] bear all the 
weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that attrib-
utable to the explicitly politicized marking” (60 quoted in Žižek 2000:97). 
The displacement does not revive fights against racism and sexism. 
On the contrary, it publicizes them while at the same time ensuring that 
they can offer no real route to rebellion, therefore no revolution, and hence 
no liberation.
In other words, this displacement accounts for the somewhat “exces-
sive” way the discourse of postmodern identity politics insists on the 
horrors of sexism, racism, and so on—this “excess” comes from the fact 
that these other “isms” have to bear the surplus-investment from the class 
struggle whose extent is not acknowledged (Žižek 2000:97).
Angela McRobbie “understands postfeminism to refer to an active 
process by which feminist gains of the 1970s and 1980s came to be under-
mined” (2004:255). McRobbie gave this development historical context. 
She noted a turning point around 1990 when feminism seemed to shift 
attention away from concentrations of power such as the state, patriar-
chy, and the law to dispersed sites. She cited Michel Foucault’s thought 
as influential for this direction. In addition, she remarked on 1990 as the 
beginning of an opposition between feminism and femininity and the 
point when the concept of popular feminism found expression (256). This 
development has two prongs: one is a reaction against women’s libera-
tion and the other a celebration of a bygone femininity and apotheosis of 
female individualism. McRobbie offered the example of an advertisement 
with the model Eva Herzigova “looking down admiringly at her substan-
tial cleavage enhanced by the lacy pyrotechnics of the Wonderbra. . . . 
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It was, in a sense, taking feminism into account by showing it to be a thing 
of the past, provocatively ‘enacting sexism’” (258). The subtext, and osten-
sibly the appeal to consumers—both men and women—has at least three 
features. First, the advertisement has the obvious appeal to consumerism, 
a self-construction through purchasing commodities. Second, it denies 
exploitation since the depicted personage has notoriety as a highly paid 
supermodel, which relies on a misapprehension and misrepresentation 
of class. Third, it preempts objection with irony: “a specter of feminism 
is invoked so it that it might be undone. . . . For male viewers, tradition is 
restored . . . while for girls what it proposed is a movement beyond femi-
nism to a more comfortable zone where women are now free to choose 
for themselves” (259 citing Beck 1986). McRobbie links the celebration of 
individualism to the writings of Ulrich Beck (1986) and Anthony Giddens 
(1999), and, to a lesser extent, Nikolas Rose (1999) and Zygmunt Bauman 
(2000). Beck and Giddens lent academic sustenance to the third-way 
politics of Tony Blair in Great Britain, Gerhard Schröder in Germany, and, 
indirectly its paramount chief, William Jefferson Clinton in the United 
States. This so-called third-way politics transformed social democracy 
(in Europe) and liberalism (in the United States) to a new individualism 
where exploitation using gender, race, or other status identities emerged 
from their chrysalises of domination to butterflies of consumer choice. 
The choice invoked is not free, in either the monetary or the liberated and 
enfranchised sense. Instead, “[i]ndividuals must [emphasis added] now 
choose the kind of life they want to live. Girls must have a life plan. . . . The 
individual is compelled to be the kind of subject who can make the right 
choices” (McRobbie 2004:261).
Examining the covers of the mass-circulation magazines Time and 
Newsweek, Sarah Pojansky offered a further analysis and another aspect of 
postfeminism, this one highlighting girls. “[S]ince the 1990s postfeminist 
discourse has produced the conditions for the emergence of girl discourse 
and girl discourse contributes to and sustains postfeminism” (Pojansky 
2007:44). Pojansky generalized her point to include a range of artifacts 
of popular culture: magazines, film, television, advertising, T-shirts, 
sports, popular psychology and education, and music. She argued that 
“girlness—particularly adolescent girlness—epitomizes postfeminism” 
(45). Remember that early moves of second-wave feminism attacked the 
sobriquet “girl” as demeaning in a way similar to the way the term “boy” 
demeaned Black men. Pojansky argued that “contemporary representations 
can be understood to cast girls as the daughters of postfeminism and post 
feminist women, produced by and raised in a postfeminist milieu” (45). 
In addition, Pojansky’s apt analysis relates to another aspect of not only 
postfeminism, but postmodernity more generally. Second-wave feminism 
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grew in an era when youth culture overlapped with rebellious culture. The 
youth of the feminist mothers of today’s “girl” daughters overlapped with 
a wide-ranging rebellious spirit that questioned and challenged hierarchies 
of all kinds. It tended to reject consumerism as evidenced by what mass 
media characterized as the hippie culture.
Moreover, this shift from rebellious youth to reactionary youth did 
not occur on its own. The vague ebb and flow of popular culture is not 
responsible for the shift. More so than at any other time, the late  twentieth 
century and early twenty-first century is a time of media monopolies 
and corporate engagement with and intervention in media products 
(McChesney 2007, 2008). Consequently, postmodern culture is managed 
culture. And while particular outcomes cannot be foreseen or determined, 
the general contours of cultural trajectories are more malleable now than 
in the past and work more conclusively in the interests of the owners of 
the culture industry and ultimately the ruling class.
The Postracial
The U.S. presidential contest of 2008 displayed the postfeminist and 
postracial as national, indeed global, spectacles. Hillary Clinton, for-
mer Goldwater Girl in 1964 (Middendorf 2006:266) who married into 
Democratic Party politics, ran against Barack Obama for the party’s nomi-
nation. Eventually winning the presidency, Obama then appointed her 
Secretary of State. Hillary Clinton’s career serves as exemplary for the new, 
postfeminist woman who does not challenge and disrupt the structures 
of patriarchy but changes the meaning of gender so women can partake 
of those structures. Barack Obama’s Blackness offers the same exemplary 
model of the postracial.
The construction of Obama as a Black man who fits into the White 
power structure owes much to Bill Cosby’s show. The Cosby Show ran for 
eight seasons on NBC from September 20, 1984, to April 30, 1992. The 
situation comedy became a leading hit throughout the 1980s (TV Guide 
2008). It centered on a household led by Bill Cosby who played Cliff 
Huxtable, a physician and his wife, Claire, played by Phyilicia Rashad, an 
attorney. This household of professionals, in popular parlance—upper-
middle class—was set in Brooklyn Heights, New York. It promoted Black 
stars through guest appearances, including Jacob Lawrence, Miles Davis, 
James Brown, Stevie Wonder, Lena Horne, Duke Ellington, Dizzy Gillespie, 
and Miriam Makeba but only as spectacular performers. Eliding issues of 
racial struggle and conflict, the weekly program represents a culminat-
ing example of the mass-market style of television when the three major 
networks ruled the airwaves. After the Second World War, television 
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gained paramount status in producing a new national identity through 
selective incorporation (Gray 2005:99). After the relative successes of the 
civil rights movement in the 1960s, “Blacks, Latinos, and Asians no longer 
remained the silent and servile other to the televisual image of a homo-
geneous America basking in the spoils of post-war suburban expansion” 
(101). Postwar television relied on an assimilationist ideology predicated 
on color blindness, and legal equal opportunity with a morality of indi-
vidualism. The civil rights movement, followed by the power movements 
of other racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities, demanded something more 
like Camus’ rebel: an overturning of the system. In the 1970s, and even 
more stridently in the 1980s, the backlash produced Willie Horton who 
was juxtaposed with Cliff and Clair Huxtable.
The Willie Horton show was a political television advertisement 
used by then Vice President George H. W. Bush against his Democratic 
opponent, Michael Dukakis, governor of Massachusetts. Horton was a 
convict temporarily released under a Massachusetts’ furlough program. 
While on furlough, he committed armed robbery and rape. The Bush 
advertisements linked Horton to Dukakis, implying that the governor had 
personally released him. Whereas The Cosby Show constructed a postracial 
professional, upper-middle class icon, the 1988 campaign commercial 
constructed the criminal Black man icon (Russell-Brown 2007). Of course, 
both icons have the character of simulacra—copies without an original 
(Baudrillard 1981). Whereas the Huxtables were deracialized, Willie 
Horton was nothing but race, and race playing the part of a dangerous 
enemy. The Huxtables built on postwar homogenizing television. By the 
1980s, the Reagan years brought masterful expertise to the construction of 
a political culture. “Race and television were the twin pillars that anchored 
Ronald Reagan’s decade of ‘feel-good politics’” (Gray 1995:14). Herman 
Gray connected the Reagan success to the larger project of what he calls 
the new right. The new right deliberately set out to shift discourse to the 
right in politics and culture. As part of the effort, they made race a political 
issue using signs of blackness in “an explosion of television images, photo 
opportunities, and campaign pledges” (Gray 1995:15). Much of Reagan’s 
success came from making his persona into a “key signifier of the ‘authen-
tic America’ and the glory days of ‘American national preeminence’” (Gray 
1995:16 citing Rogin 1987). The construction of an authentic America, 
that was remarkably white, built on recouped images of television pro-
grams such as The Adventures of Ozzie and Harriet (ABC 1952–1956) and 
Little House on the Prairie (NBC 1974–1983). That such programs made no 
claim to documentary accuracy made no difference, as their importance lay 
in the images they had deposited in American collective memory (Coontz 
1992). In contrast to the Reaganesque authentic America, “blackness 
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was constructed along a continuum ranging from menace on one end to 
immorality on the other with irresponsibility located somewhere in the 
middle” (Gray 1995:17). Such images of blackness appealed to the long-
established racism in Euro-American culture going back to the earliest 
colonization, which depicted the indigenous population as hostile savages 
and employed kidnapped and enslaved Africans to turn the invaded ter-
ritory into economically productive capital. The masterstroke engineered 
by new right Republicans appealed to White racism without appearing 
racist (Gray 1995:18–19). Part of the trick involved spotlighting right-wing 
African Americans such as Clarence Thomas, Colin Powell, and Condoleeza 
Rice. Barack Obama is the apotheosis of these postracial icons.
Relying on some technological innovations, the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 created a postmodern way to reconcile the racist and 
postracial. These developments globalized electronic media, and opened 
myriad avenues of niche marketing. No longer did television, or other 
communications, have to bow to the majority. They could sell their wares 
to market segments. Hence BET—the Black Entertainment Network—
along with similar marketing devices, appeals to separated audiences, 
now segregated not by laws or populist racist sentiment, but by air-wave 
frequencies.
Cultural politics mobilized through the sign of raced, gendered, sexed, and 
former colonial subjects continues to carry specific histories, traditions, and 
memories of social struggle. In contrast to the political investments in the 
cultural politics of difference (which critiques difference as the basis for 
inequality and nationalism), the discourse of new media technologies often 
works to depoliticize difference, making it in effect an inconsequential niche 
market of shared lifestyles and taste. 
(Gray 2005:144)
Twenty-first century descendents of lumpen proletariat Whites whom 
the bourbon hierarchs of the defeated Confederacy recruited to do the 
heavy lifting in the Ku Klux Klan and similar organizations in the post-
Reconstruction South can find reassurance on cable networks aimed at 
their sensibilities. Partly pandering to preconceived racism and partly 
engineering it, market niche telecommunications can afford to deploy spe-
cialized propaganda to an entire spectrum of social and cultural desires. 
At the same time, postracial cultural constructions converted race from a 
contested source of possibly violent social conflict into diversity, identity, 
and multiculturalism.
Indeed, a more overt connection of race with marketing dominated the 
1990s, especially marketing the “urban” to young, white middle-class 
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Americans. This was a different kind of urban image than the images of 
urban black underclass that constituted most representations of people of 
color on 1980s American television. 
 . . . 
[C] apitalism and brand name culture, through relentless narrowing of 
marketing niches by means of gender, sexual identity, and ethnic and racial 
identity, has provided for rather than prevented a kind of diversity.
 . . . 
Words such as identity and multiculturalism were, in the 1980s, code words 
for race; in the early twenty-first century, these same terms are code words 
(especially for the consumer market) for “hip,” “urban,” and “cool.” Race, 
like gender as a political identity has been appropriated (at least in part) in 
the dominant culture through brands the identity of the urban and post-
feminism. 
(Banet-Weiser 2007:213–215)
Implications and Consequences of the “Posts”
Postfeminism, the postracial, the postsexual, and all the other “posts” are a 
crucial part of ruling class attempts to preserve their privileges in a crum-
bling world system. Postmodern public consciousness offers a dual visage. 
One face turns to the marginalized populations offering scapegoats for their 
circumstances. They mobilize common working-class people to protest the 
health-care reform proposals of the Democratic leadership and President 
Obama, because it would take away their individual freedoms. These are the 
same populations that Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and other leaders of 
the political new right used for populist support. They are the equivalent 
populations who have always supported populist appeals, despite their vic-
timization by those very leaders and those whom the leaders really represent. 
These populist appeals regularly ignore class as an explanation for the plight 
of those whom they wish to mobilize. Instead, the leaders tell them it is 
feminists who want abortions; it is Blacks who want jobs through affirmative 
action; it is gays and lesbians who want to destroy families; it is the Jews who 
bilk people out of their livelihood; and so on through history. The material 
disadvantages to the masses who listen to such leaders are loaded onto status 
identities. Appeals to status identities evoke people’s ressentiment against 
injustices imposed, not by the proffered scapegoats, but by the backers of the 
demagogues making the appeals—those who materially benefit: the ruling 
class. Such appeals deliberately obscure the class origins of disadvantage.
The other side of the Janus face of the postmodern strategy offers 
deception to those people who pride themselves on fair mindedness and 
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liberality. Reactionary rhetoric takes on a tone of magnanimity and equity, 
which conceals its reactionary character, especially when clothed in the 
status identity marginalization. Two speeches by the postracial Barack 
Obama illustrate this point. His speech of September 8, 2009 (Obama 
2009a), ostensibly directed at school children and his speech on health care 
of September 10, 2009 (Obama 2009b). The health-care speech presented 
a plan to ensure income to insurance and managed health-care corpora-
tions by requiring everyone in the United States to buy health insurance, 
fining those who did not, and providing public monies to those who sim-
ply did not have enough income. His education speech revealed a “Cosby 
moment” (Gray 1995:79) when he called on children to take personal 
responsibility for their education. His own touting of school privatization 
through charter school schemes and similar devices ensures that public 
monies will enrich private interests, and the needs for a collectively edu-
cated public be damned. That people take such policies that are blatantly 
designed to enrich financial elites at the public expense as policies of lib-
erality and general welfare come from the success of the “posts” at hiding 
their true intent. Obama’s Blackness obscures his class interests, precisely 
because he is a quintessential postracial figure. Consequently, his rhetoric 
can seem “liberal,” in the peculiar sense of the term in American politics, 
because he is a Black man, but one whose Blackness does not determine his 
beliefs, thoughts, and prescriptions for action. Of course, there is a certain 
truth to it. His Blackness does not determine his support of finance capital; 
his class interests are the determining factor.
Another consequence of the “posts” blunts and diverts the revolution-
ary potential of struggles for gender, racial, sexual, and other equalities and 
equities. When feminists attacked patriarchy, their assault could not but 
question and undermine its material base—differences in wealth conse-
quent to class hierarchy. When those striving against racism attacked racial 
inequalities in the United States, they were also attacking the class structure 
of White supremacy—a fact that probably contributed at least indirectly to 
Martin Luther King’s assassination when his mission at the time was to sup-
port the strike of municipal sanitation workers in Memphis, Tennessee. At 
the time of the Christopher Street or Stonewall riots in Greenwich Village, 
New York, in 1969, gay men were not merely taking on sexual prejudice 
but their own commercial exploitation. The “posts” deny any connection 
between status identities and class structure. The “post” semiotics abstracts 
the identity from material reality. Instead of disadvantages in the relations 
of the political economy, race, gender, sexuality, and so on, become reified 
things-in-themselves. Blackness stands for an identity that may be “urban,” 
or threatening, or dangerous in and of itself, not because being Black in 
America might lead some people to rebel against the status quo. 
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The ultimate problem with the “posts” comes from their counter-
revolutionary effects. Nonetheless, the historical period of postmodernity 
offers at least a possibility of greater revolutionary success than at any time 
in the last half millennium. Those possibilities and models are the subject 
of the following and last chapter.
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Chapter 10
The Rebel
Rebels have many ways to revolt. Rulers have only two ways to resist them: terror and restraint. Rulers either control the masses through fear—
the way Machiavelli recommended in The Prince—or they use physical or 
symbolic restraints. Typically, rulers employ both kinds of restraints. Late 
modern strategies of restraints increasingly took an actuarial approach. 
Focusing on penology in the United States, Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan 
Simon (1992) identified a shift, beginning in the 1970s, away from what 
they called the old penology towards a new penology. The old penology 
concerned individual miscreants, measuring responsibility according to 
moral sensibilities: using diagnosis, intervention, and treatment of individ-
ual offenders. The new penology “is concerned with techniques to  identify, 
classify, and manage groupings sorted by dangerousness. The task is mana-
gerial, not transformative. . . . It seeks to regulate levels of deviance . . .” 
(452). The new penology tends more toward the impersonal and bureau-
cratic, a sort of free market conception of crime control where regulatory 
techniques control the market in crime much as monetary regulation 
controls financial markets in the neoliberal economy. State bureaucracies, 
including but by no means limited to those overseeing criminal justice, 
prioritize the risks of betrayal and disloyalty, foreign invasion, and civil 
war (Simon 2001:22); or most pertinently, revolt.
Despite the apparent ultrarationality of the actuarial strategy, postmod-
ern states continually turn to physical force and coercion. The penal system 
in the United States testifies to just such a reliance of physical restraint. The 
overt military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq show how much imperial 
ambitions continue to rely on the most extreme forms of violence. More 
covert, or at least deniable, applications of massive military might apply to 
Pakistan and the clandestine military operations in east Africa and Iran with 
proxy mercenary forces applied in Colombia and other areas of strategic 
and economic interest. A third form of physical force relies on technologies 
9780230103498_11_cha10.indd   175 3/31/2010   5:57:53 PM
176  SOCIAL THEORY OF FEAR
of crowd control. Years in research and development; some of these technol-
ogies have begun to appear on the streets only recently. In Pittsburgh at the 
G20 conference in the fall 2009, police used some of them against  protesters. 
Along with the now commonplace beanbags fired from  shotguns, rubber 
bullets, Tasers, and the like, police use the Long Range Acoustic Device 
mounted on an armored personnel carrier. It produces extremely shrill and 
piercing sound to clear streets (Ferner 2009). Among the other armamen-
taria available for police to control popular protests are devices that produce 
nausea and vomiting and Raytheon’s Active Denial System designed for 
crowd control in combat zones, which uses an energy beam to induce an 
intolerable heating sensation, like a hot iron placed on the skin. It is effective 
beyond the range of small arms, in excess of 400 meters.
The strategy of terror similarly ranges from methods employed by local 
police, the restricted but symbolically significant use of capital punishment 
by state penal systems, all the way up to the global and most terrifying tech-
nology of all, the American preponderance of nuclear weapons coupled 
with worldwide delivery capabilities. While the political leadership of the 
United States continues to call for nuclear disarmament, the Pentagon also 
continually pursues a new generation of nuclear weapons (Cardinale 2009). 
Nonetheless, and despite new technologies, the strategies of repression are 
not new. In a similar vein, neither are strategies of revolt.
Revolts and revolutions need theories and models to provide intel-
lectual grounding for their strategies and actions. This chapter examines 
and critically discusses some of the most promising recent theories and 
theorists along with models of organized rebellion, both historic and con-
temporary. They all share at least one common theme: they diminish fear 
and strive for lucid consciousness.
Models of Rebellion
Revolts against oppression and exploitation have to contend with recent 
and contemporary developments and technologies in the hands of the 
elite. Globalism refers to more than globalization, a neoliberal locution 
that is really an ideological canard. Whereas globalization refers to the 
effects of lifting national protections against the penetration of inter-
national capital, globalism encompasses the opportunities presented by 
the breakdown of cultural barriers and deployment of worldwide com-
munication technologies. In concrete terms, globalism brings worldwide 
proletarian revolt within the realm of possibility.
Although presenting opportunities, globalism also, and so far, has 
facilitated repression on a global scale as never before. The U.S. military uses 
advanced electronic surveillance, weapons control, and long-range,  airborne 
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weapons systems to destroy what it deems sources of opposition to its 
hegemony. It carries out such strikes virtually anywhere on the globe using 
drones, satellite surveillance, military assassination teams, or mercenaries 
(Ackerman 2009; Marzetti 2009; Marzetti and Shane 2009). The global 
reach of U.S. military and intelligence violence, subversion, and surveillance 
militates against highly structured organizations. Similarly, technologies of 
crowd control and domestic surveillance in the metropole limit organized 
mass movements. Given such limitations and opportunities, models for 
rebellion must tend toward fluid networks with a globalized reach.
The Industrial Workers of the World
One such model comes from the early twentieth century in the United 
States. That period of U.S. history offers an analogy to the entire world a 
century later. Massive immigration from varied countries of origin, indus-
trialization, expansion of transport and communication, and concentrated 
extraction of natural resources characterized the continental United States 
then just as they characterize the entire world in the twenty-first century. 
Under those conditions, a new, indigenous revolutionary movement arose.
The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW, or self proclaimed 
Wobblies) formed in June 1905 in a convention of anarchists, socialists, 
syndicalists, and labor organizers. It succumbed to the Red Scare at the end 
of the First World War, although membership peaked in the early 1920s. 
After that date, splits and factions allied themselves with other organiza-
tions, largely socialist and communist. Although still extant today, the 
contemporary organization has membership of a couple of thousands at 
most with no revolutionary pretension, let alone capabilities. The IWW 
before the First World War recommends itself as an effective model for 
postmodern rebellion.
The following discussion owes its greatest debt to Salavatore Salerno’s 
1989 history and analysis, Red November, Black November. A caveat: the 
exemplary nature of the IWW for rebellion does not rest on the accuracy 
of Salerno’s account over those of Paul Brissenden (1957), Joseph Conlin 
(1969), Melvin Dubovsky (1969), or Philip Foner (1965). It rests on the 
historical IWW as Salerno depicted it. Even without his important critical 
insights, the words of the IWW’s own preamble to their constitution carry 
an important sense of their significance:
The working class and the employing class have nothing in common. There 
can be no peace so long as hunger and want are found among millions of 
the working people and the few, who make up the employing class, have all 
the good things of life.
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Between these two classes a struggle must go on until the workers of the 
world organize as a class, take possession of the means of production, abol-
ish the wage system, and live in harmony with the Earth.
 . . . 
Instead of the conservative motto, “A fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work,” 
we must inscribe on our banner the revolutionary watchword, “Abolition of 
the wage system.” 
It is the historic mission of the working class to do away with capitalism. 
(Preamble 2005)
The IWW developed an ideology by amalgamating elements of anarchism, 
Marxism, socialism, and syndicalism into its own unique and indigenous 
North American version. Although it had an organizational structure, 
especially prior to the First World War, that structure resembled more a 
network of locals than a bureaucracy. While often regarded mainly as a 
labor organization, the organizational aspects of the movement remained 
secondary to its revolutionary movement character. As a movement, 
instead of merely a labor union, it relied on its members to take tactical 
actions toward those ends set forth in the preamble: taking possession of 
the means of production, abolition of the wage system, eliminating capi-
talism, and living in harmony with the earth. In contradistinction to every 
other labor organization contemporary with it, the IWW advocated for 
and, to a remarkable extent, practiced gender and racial equality. Part of 
their strategy aimed at unified action among the many recent immigrants 
to the United States who came during the last part of the nineteenth and 
first part of the twentieth century. Many of them did not speak English, 
and they had no common language. Wobbly newsletters and other writ-
ings routinely published in several different languages. Nonetheless, the 
IWW also relied heavily on nonverbal communications using images and 
music to convey its revolutionary agitation.
The founders of the IWW relied on and often included many anarchists 
of the 1880s from Chicago, who today gain their main notoriety from the 
Haymarket Affair of 1886 (Avrich 1984; Green 2006). Those roots lent a 
libertarian tone to the IWW. Another historical influence, mainly ideo-
logical, but also strategic; came from contemporary French syndicalism 
through the Confédération Générale du Travail, or CGT. “The I. W. W. 
considered French syndicalism a particular manifestation of industrial 
unionism. . . . The early Wobblies believed that they were in a position to 
learn from the experience of the French syndicalists and improve on the 
contributions made by French syndicalists to revolutionary  unionism” 
(Salerno 1989:95). The central motif of industrial unionism played a 
role in both ideology and strategy. Wobbly intellectuals recognized the 
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recent developments of capitalism as creating a new kind of  industrialism 
that relied on machines rather than personal skills. V. I. Lenin (1917) 
and Thorstein Veblen (1904, 1914, 1921, 1923) made parallel analyses, 
which Harry Braverman (1974) explicated more recently. Consequently, 
Wobblies viewed the already established craft unions as obsolete. Their 
analysis stressed not only the machine technology but also the social rela-
tions that went with those new forces of production.
Several strategies became part of the IWW panoply. Each went through 
development and modification within the pre–First World War thought. 
From the French, they adapted the general strike. The French conceived of 
the general strike as a peaceful refusal to work, in which workers in many 
industries simultaneously laid down their tools for several days with the 
objective of paralyzing the country (Salerno 1989:101–102). Wobblies 
criticized this approach, arguing that a strike that separates workers from 
their tools “is a strike that can be settled with machine guns” (104), an 
astute observation still relevant in the twenty-first century. To the general 
strike, the IWW added the general lockout, a lockout not of workers but 
of capitalists, in which workers would seize the means of production. 
Workers would occupy the factories instead of leaving them. In the centers 
of postmodern capitalism, with their dearth of factory production, the 
basic strategy would take a different form than that of say, the famous sit-
down strikes of the 1930s.
The IWW always maintained a kind of grassroots principle in which 
tactical success depended on the initiative, ingenuity, and intelligence of 
workers who adapted to fluid conditions and did not limit themselves to 
particular tactics. While recognizing the importance of local conditions for 
effective action, the IWW linked local struggles to workers throughout the 
world, demonstrating that their name was not mere rhetoric.
the capitalist class throughout the world, through their pliant tools, are 
watching every move of the proletarians, for fear that methods adopted 
successfully in the conflicts of one land may be copied in another. . . . But 
knowledge is power; and to know the fighting methods applied by Industrial 
Unionists in every land the globe over . . . is one of the essential requisites of 
those who struggle and strive. 
(Salerno 1989:108)
Another strategy the IWW employed and advocated was sabotage. 
What that meant depended heavily on individual interpretations and 
 activists. In the capitalist press, sabotage often came to mean terrorism 
and  wrecking. Those tactics rarely applied to what Wobblies actually did. 
Instead, sabotage involved a tactic of what many called passive resistance 
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or passive action. It usually meant producing poor products and  diverting 
 productive capacities away from capitalist gain—think of so-called time 
stealing in which today’s cubicle workers surf the Internet instead of 
attending to assigned tasks.
Wobblies used art as a sort of mix between ideology, strategy, and orga-
nizing methods. Art also adapted to the necessity of cultural pluralism 
inherent in the social conditions of early twentieth-century America.
The effort to link art to revolutionary struggle, as a means of both dis-
seminating political ideology and creating a worker’s culture that challenged 
the definition of American life imposed by government and business elites, 
defined the major motif which emerged from the practice of Wobbly artists.
This culture was built on the initiative of rank-and-file workers and 
reflected their struggles, hopes, and aspirations. The labor radicalism of the 
I.W.W. was not rigidly drawn from a single ideological source. . . . Informed 
by diverse, often contradictory, sources of influence, the I.W.W.’s labor 
radicalism formed a complex mixture of inherent and derived forms of 
knowledge and lived experience. 
(Salerno 1989:140)
Using art meant relying on iconic representation more heavily than most 
propaganda. Their art opposed elite and indeed all class culture that was 
not working class. Their art was political because of its essential oppo-
sitional nature, iconically representing rebellion. Their art was political 
because it was rebellious as was the entire Wobbly sensibility.
Wobblies replaced the institutional basis of unionism with a conception of 
culture and community that was primary and constitutive. They created and 
used cultural expressions as a means of unifying workers and as a basis to 
move against the repressive social conditions of industrial development that 
extended beyond the point of production. 
(Salerno 1989:149)
The Wobblies fought resistance, obfuscation, and repression with con-
certed direct action, not relying on representatives in the approved 
political sphere. They remained incorrigible because they revolted. The 
Wobblies embodied Camus’ injunction: “I revolt, therefore we are.”
The Bolivarian Revolution
The Bolivarian revolution refers to the revolution begun in Venezuela at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. In fact, the official name of Venezuela 
became the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Led by Hugo Chávez 
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Frias, elected president in 1998, the revolution started as a restoration 
of liberal democracy. Chávez declared its socialist character in January 
2005 (Wilpert 2007:3). Of course, as with similar policy pronouncements 
from many different political leaders, its socialism remains undefined 
and vague. Its Bolivarianism, however, consists of national sovereignty, 
social justice, an emphasis on education, Latin American integration, and 
 civilian-military unity (16).
The namesake for the revolution, Simon Bolivar (1783–1830), earned 
the honorific title “Liberator” because he orchestrated the liberation 
of what are now the northern countries of South America—Bolivia, 
Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela—from Spain. Bolivar’s own ideology fol-
lowed the Enlightenment liberal thought of Jean Jacques Rousseau and 
Adam Smith, most prominently.
Chávez leads a cabinet and cadre of leftists culled from an array of 
political parties and movements. First elected president mainly by the 
middle class, many turned against him when he removed the former 
governing elite from positions of power. They in turn mounted a politi-
cal, public relations, and eventually a violent campaign against him. The 
efforts of the Opposition, as they were called, culminated in a mildly 
violent coup in April 2002. They forcibly removed Chávez from office 
and held him prisoner. In the four years of his presidency, he had pro-
moted reforms favoring the poor using the burgeoning oil revenues of the 
period to finance social security and education. His base of support shifted 
from the middle classes to the impoverished, who gave him his reelection 
victory in 2004 with a sizeable majority. When Venezuela had suffered the 
Washington-led neoliberalism shared by many Latin American countries 
in the 1980s and 1990s, it boasted the largest increase in poverty of all, 
rising to a poverty rate of approximately 43 percent of the population at 
the end of the millennium (Weisbrot et al. 2009:9). It was largely they, 
the poor, who thwarted the coup by marching into Caracas from the sur-
rounding barrios by the hundreds of thousands demanding his return. The 
Revolution Will Not Be Televised (Bartley and Donnacha 2003) presents a 
video graphic record of these events. Since the 2002 coup and especially 
since the failure of the recall election against him in 2004, the Chávez 
government has engineered a reduction in poverty from its high mark of 
54 percent in early 2003 to 26 percent at the end of 2008, while extreme 
poverty declined from 16.6 percent to 7 percent (Weisbrot et al. 2009:9).
In addition to promoting a massive shift toward economic equality, mea-
sured by a seven-point drop in the Gini index (10), the Bolivarian Republic 
established political reforms mainly through the new constitution adopted 
in 1999. Political reform accompanied social reform. In Chávez’ terms, 
democracy should be both participatory and proactive to achieve the 
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“socialism of the political” (Wilpert 2007:239). The Bolivarian Republic 
set up so-called “missions,” which would probably be called  “programs” in 
the United States, such as the antipoverty programs of Lyndon Johnson’s 
Great Society of the 1960s. Each mission had a particular social reform 
agenda. They also had the advantage of bypassing the conservative and 
corrupt bureaucracy of the state, which was also beset by cronyism among 
the Opposition who controlled much of it (Gott 2005:256). 
The Mission Barrio Adentro provided community health care. By the 
end of 2004, more than 13,000 physicians from Cuba assisted by 5,000 
Venezuelan personnel in allied health professions spread throughout the 
country, concentrating in impoverished rural and urban areas. Provided 
with materials and expertise from Caracas, denizens of the locales built 
their own clinics to house the medical staff, equipment, and medicines. 
Mission Robinson, taken from Simon Bolivar’s mentor, Simon Rodriguez’ 
pen name, spurred literacy, increasing it to one of the highest rates in Latin 
America, mainly by using the new constitution as its basic instructional 
text. The Mission Ribas gave two years instruction and a small stipend 
to young adults who had dropped out of school. Named after José Felix 
Ribas—husband to Simon Bolivar’s aunt and participant in the wars of 
independence—it gave night-school instruction in grammar, mathematics, 
geography, and a second language. 600,000 students were enrolled in 2004. 
Mission Sucre gave 70,000 students with a high school diploma additional 
education so they could enter universities. Mission Vuelvan Caras helped 
the unemployed find work. Mission Identidad was a voter-registration drive. 
Three missions concentrated in rural areas: Mission Zamora instituted land 
reform and redistribution to poor peasants; Mission Guaicaipuro aimed 
at restoring tribal land and ensuring human rights to indigenous peoples 
of Venezuela; Mission Mercal operates supermarkets and distributes food 
to urban populations, and it supports food cooperatives selling generic 
products at a 50 percent discount. Mission Mercal aims to restore agricul-
tural self-sufficiency to Venezuela after neoliberalism destroyed domestic 
food production. It also promotes organic, cooperative gardening in urban 
areas (Gott 2005:257–259). In the governmental sphere, the Bolivarian 
Republic strengthened control over the state-owned oil industry, Petróleos 
de Venezuela. The National Assembly enlarged the Supreme Court by sev-
enteen new judges and increased the total from twenty to thirty two. Also, a 
new media law brought Venezuela in line with countries in Western Europe 
ensuring public control over the airways and made privately owned outlets 
legally liable for fomenting treason and spreading libel.
Generally, since 2002—especially after the failure of the oil industry 
lockout and shutdown begun in late 2003—and continuing into 2004, the 
Bolivarian Republic has used laws and programs to promote democracy, 
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reduce poverty, and encourage grass roots self-determination in all sectors 
of the population. Whether or not such initiatives are twenty-first century 
socialism remains debatable. Nonetheless, it does not resemble the statism 
of the former Soviet Union, or the milquetoast reformism of European 
social democracy. Chávez characterized it as reclaiming socialism as a 
thesis by putting humans ahead of machines and people ahead of the state 
(Wilpert 2007:238).
The Bolivarian revolution provides a model because of its ideals and 
stated goals and because it has been nonviolent. It is the first self-proclaimed 
socialist revolution that has not taken over the state through violent revo-
lution but by peaceful political struggle. Moreover, its leadership repeat-
edly acknowledges, indeed insists, that what they have achieved only sets 
the stage for the real revolution, which the people, not a vanguard, must 
prosecute.
Democracy
The Wobblies and the Bolivarian Revolution offer models for rebellion 
because both incline toward democracy. Cleisthenes (fl. c.515–495 BCE) 
created the eponym of democracy in his constitution of 508 BCE by wrest-
ing politics from clans and giving it to demes. The demes cut across kin-
ship hierarchy, which had been the ancient form of government of Athens. 
By dividing the population into demes for making collective decisions, 
traditional authority gave way to political authority. Nonetheless, the 
meaning of democracy has forever been in dispute, as historically and cur-
rently tyrants rule in its name. Solon (c. 638–558 BCE) had already intro-
duced government by lot whereby state officials gained office by chance. 
More a conceptual contribution to democracy than a democratic practice, 
Cleisthenes’ constitution explicitly gave power to the people through their 
courts. Successive reforms gradually eliminated seats of inherited, aristo-
cratic power in favor of popular participation. Democracy separates col-
lective decision making from other social powers arising from kinship and 
concentrations of wealth. Therefore, democracy does not just presume a 
fiction of equality, it requires real equality. Further, it enlarges the public 
sphere at the expense of the private sphere. These two fundamental themes 
give the lie to the democratic claims of all the so-called liberal democracies 
governing most of the world. Jacques Rancière (2008:73) called them state 
oligarchies in which the state modulates oligarchic rule while ensuring 
nonthreatening liberties to the masses. Finally, democracy institutionalizes 
rebellion in politics.
Understanding the relation between democracy and rebellion requires 
a review of what democracy is not. In recent times self-proclaimed  radical 
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democrats, many of whose ideas comport with popular power, often 
frame democracy in terms of forms of its function. A common device 
welds democracy to republican forms, that is, representative democracy. 
As Rancière pointed out, however, “Originally, representation was the 
exact contrary of democracy.” The founders of the United States, oligarchs 
almost to a man, constructed the republic so that the elite could exercise 
de facto power (53). “The idea of the republic is one of a system of institu-
tions, laws and moral values that eliminate democratic excess by making 
the state and society homogeneous” (68). So, for instance, the business of 
Congress is hedged in by owners’ boxes. Neither does democracy equate 
with meritocracy; the idea that the best should rule. This concept owes 
its gravitas if not its origin to Plato, a founding father of antidemocracy. 
Voting and elections, a common measure of democracy, have little claim 
to its essence. Mechanisms that rely on the Solonic institution of choos-
ing officials by lot have purer democratic credentials. Behind election by 
chance lies the presumption of popular rule. If the people really are to 
rule, then any one of them has the right, and perhaps even the duty, to 
rule. Besides, election by lot counteracts the tendency for those who desire 
power to receive it. Furthermore, election by popular vote, even assum-
ing an ideal electoral process and an ideal electorate, would yield at best a 
technocracy, which weds government by natural elites—the smartest, for 
example—combined with the social power of those with expert compe-
tencies with the power of wealth (69).
Instead of the formalizations of democracy advocated by such as Chantal 
Mouffe (1992) or Selya Benhabib (1996) for instance, democracy enacts the 
political. Its direct antagonist is institution: the propensity to establish routines 
and make permanent decisions. Democracy means perpetual contest, revers-
ible decisions, and the barring of oligarchic influence from wealth, expertise, 
or force. Sometimes the intellectual antonym of an idea serves to clarify. 
The thought of Carl Schmitt, the Nazi jurist, represents just such a clarifying 
opposite. Of course Schmitt was no friend of parliamentarism. He viewed it 
as dangerous, because it yielded to the influence of parties and factions. His 
solution was not, on the contrary, democratic participation by all the people. 
He advocated what has been summed up as decisionism. In decisionism, 
an executive sovereign takes the power of legislation along with absolute 
 executive power to resolve a state of emergency (Schmitt 1923, 1927). Events 
of the time in Weimar Germany realized Schmitt’s concept, which ended 
with the ultimate in decisionism: ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer. Setting aside 
extreme tyrannies, prior attempts to establish democracy through revolution 
have all ended in the reinforcement of the state. Revolution seems always 
to have subverted both rebellion and democracy by augmenting govern-
ment at the expense of the political. “[T]he strange and terrifying growth of 
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the  modern state can be considered as the logical conclusion of inordinate 
technical and philosophical ambitions, foreign to the true spirit of rebellion” 
(Camus 1956:177). The trick remains to achieve the political without an 
excess of government, without the state. The fascist revolutions achieved the 
opposite as they, especially the Nazis, realized twentieth century nihilism on a 
scale never before imagined. The Nazi nihilism substituted action for reason, 
deifying the irrational (177–178). Perpetual action without reflection, with-
out lucid consciousness, eventuates in a society based on the meaningless. 
When the metanarratives disappear, as Lyotard characterized postmodern-
ism, “history is only written in terms of the hazards of force. . . . the Hitlerian 
revolution represented unadulterated dynamism” (178).
The Nazi nihilism explains that while democracy is not a matter of 
republican forms, neither is it populism. Hitler was nothing if not popular. 
The German people adored him. Such is the danger of populism. Today’s 
populism tends toward the fascist; Jacques Rancière called it postpolitics 
(1995) parallel with postfeminism, the postracial and all the other “posts.” 
The populisms in the United States and Western Europe build on a heavy 
strain of racism, antiimmigrant sentiment, and antiintellectualism found in 
the election of George W. Bush by, among others, the prototypical NASCAR 
enthusiasts, the good old boys (and girls) of the South and West. 
There is always something of this trick in populism. So, not only is populism 
not the arena within which today’s emancipatory projects should inscribe 
themselves, but one should even go a step further and propose that the main 
task of emancipatory politics, its life-and-death problem, is to find a form of 
political mobilization that, while (like populism) is critical of institutional-
ized politics, will avoid the populist temptation. 
(Žižek 2008a:268–269)
Populism lacks two elements essential to democracy. First, in the words of 
Maximilien Robespierre, democracy needs “that deep horror of tyranny . . . 
and holy love for humanity, without which a great revolution is just a noisy 
crime that destroys another crime” (Robespierre 2007:129). The second 
lack of populism is class struggle. That is what distinguishes Robespierre 
from Danton. Conservative historians lay the blame of the Thermidor 
counterrevolution at the feet of Robespierre and Saint Just and the Terror; 
it more rightly belongs to Danton who did not see the Terror as an expres-
sion of the people’s virtue. Danton did not speak for the people, but as 
their representative, as an embodiment of what was to become bourgeois 
democracy. He said “Let us be terrible so that the people will not have to be” 
(Žižek 2008a:415). Thermidore was the statist  resolution of Danton’s, and 
others’, bourgeois revolution. The Thermidorean constitution of Year III 
9780230103498_11_cha10.indd   185 3/31/2010   5:57:54 PM
186  SOCIAL THEORY OF FEAR
established a property-qualified voting system for which only 30,000 citi-
zens qualified and a prohibition of popular assembly: Article 366 states, 
“Every unarmed gathering shall be dispersed,” and, “No association may 
present them collectively, except the constituted authorities, and the only 
for matters within their jurisdiction” (Badiou 1998:125–126). Citing 
Boissy d’Anglas as exemplary, Alain Badiou noted that the Thermidor 
regime established government by the past, by which they meant those 
owning substantial property, with that same government extended to the 
colonized. “[T]he colonies belong to France because we have property 
there; the law must ‘pacify’ the independence movement’s emancipatory 
fervour because it threatens this property; and finally direct administrative 
control of these colonies is desirable because our security is at stake” (131). 
The resonance with suppression of popular protests at the G20 summit of 
2009 in Pittsburgh along with the essentially imperialistic War on Terror 
and invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq should be obvious. With respect to 
the so-called wars for security, Badiou observed that “we have (and will 
have, too, if the USA continues in Somalia and in Iraq, etc.) war as an 
abstract form of theatrical capture of an adversary (‘terrorism’), which is 
in its essence vague and elusive. The war against nothing: itself subtracted 
from the very idea of war” (Badiou 2006:28–29). 
The virtue of the people expressed by Robespierre and Saint Just bore 
the mark of the times, preceding the flowering of industrial capitalism 
in the nineteenth century. Therefore, it spoke of virtue instead of class 
struggle. Nonetheless class struggle by the working class remains critical 
for democracy. The reason is that the working class struggles against all 
class relations, and therefore can act as the universal class, which in the end 
dissolves itself. The question for today’s rebel concerns the whereabouts of 
today’s proletariat. They are found in the inhabitants of slums in the new 
megalopolises composed of marginalized workers, sacked civil servants, 
and landless peasants. Created by the neoliberal global economy, they 
join their cousins in the banlieues, ghettos, and favelas of the metropoles. 
Today they remain unorganized as a class and therefore unconscious of 
themselves as constituting a class.
What one finds in the “really-existing slums” is, of course, a mixture of 
improvised modes of social life, from criminal gangs and religious “funda-
mentalist” groups held together by a charismatic leader up to and including 
seeds of new forms of “socialist” solidarity. 
(Žižek 2008a:425)
They are not too different from the Parisian sansculottes of the eighteenth 
century, the constituency of the Jacobins, of Robespierre, and of Saint 
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Just. They also resemble the workers at whom the Wobblies aimed their 
organizing efforts in the early twentieth century in the United States. In 
the twenty-first century, Hugo Chávez founded his Bolivarian Revolution 
on them. He mobilized the people of the barrios around Caracas and the 
other major urban centers in Venezuela. His radical democracy expressly 
embraces the horror of tyranny and love of humanity espoused by 
Robespierre. Anyone who watches Chávez on television when surrounded 
by Venezuelans can have no doubt about the latter. Moreover, he has been 
working to prepare them for class struggle.
The course on which Chavez embarked from 2006 is the exact opposite of 
the postmodern Left’s mantra regarding de-territorialization, rejection of 
statist politics, and so on: far from “resisting state power,” he grabbed power 
(first by an attempted coup, then democratically), ruthlessly using the state 
apparatuses and interventions to promote his goals; furthermore he is mili-
tarizing the favelas, organizing the training of armed units. 
(Žižek 2008a:427)
Militarizing the favelas does not mean putting armed functionaries of the 
state into them. Just the opposite, it means arming the denizens of them. 
As noted above, the Bolivarian Revolution does not just arm them; it edu-
cates them, encourages their industry, and promotes their inclusion and 
participation in the polity. If that does not support class struggle, nothing 
does. That is why the Bolivarian Revolution is the clearest example of radi-
cal democracy in the twenty-first century, the best example of emancipa-
tory politics, and the real material expression of rebellion.
Jihad and Dirty Hands
Jihad, originally a word derived from the Koran and other classic Islamic 
texts, has entered contemporary American English. The fourth edition of 
the American Heritage Dictionary (2007) has the following entry:
 1. Islam: An individual’s striving for spiritual self-perfection.
 2. Islam: A Muslim holy war or spiritual struggle against infidels.
 3. A crusade or struggle: “The war against smoking is turning into a 
jihad against people who smoke” (Fortune).
  [Arabic jih d, from jahada, to strive; see ghd in Semitic roots.]
Americanized, it occasionally comes into dispute between those who 
emphasize the first meaning, a spiritual struggle within individuals, versus 
the second meaning implying violence and theocratic chauvinism, largely 
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directed against the West and especially the world capitalist hegemon. U.S. 
soldiers and some others have taken to using a variation, “jihadis,” as a 
term for what more polite reportage calls “militants” or “insurgents.” Such 
terminology includes the category of terrorists, meaning those individuals 
and groups using violence against Western states with a strong connotation 
of Islamic terrorists. Jihadi has come to play a linguistic role similar to that 
of “gook” during the Vietnam War—that is, any enemy and more generally 
any non-American. Despite such heavy loading, jihad is a perfectly good 
word referring to struggle, whether violent or not. As such, it could easily 
serve to augment the term “class struggle” that long ago acquired a nega-
tive association among polite company—that is, among the bourgeoisie—
especially in the United States.
“Dirty hands” has an even more varied set of meanings. One of the more 
straightforward acts as the antonym to the clean hands doctrine in equity 
law. Under the clean hands doctrine the law denies equitable relief to anyone 
whose prior conduct has violated conscience, good faith, or any other equi-
table principle. In sum, “one seeking equitable relief cannot take advantage 
of one’s own wrong” (Black’s Law Dictionary 1983). This legal definition has 
relevance because the concept of equitable relief relies on established state 
power to judge and grant it, and assumes parties in equity have agreed to 
submit to its power and authority. Another usage comes from social science. 
Everett C. Hughes used the term “dirty hands” to adjure social researchers, 
arguing that to do enlightening and intelligent research one had to dirty one’s 
hands (1958). Implicit in Hughes’ methodology is the concept that social 
research had to engage with real people and real situations. Researchers ought 
not to hold themselves aloof if they hope to find the truth. Alain Badiou iden-
tified another source of dirty hands—dirty money. “It is entirely legitimate to 
stipulate axiomatically that, beyond a certain sum, when one starts calculat-
ing in the tens of millions, all capitalist money is bound to be dirty” (Badiou 
1998:132). Those who handle dirty money perforce have dirty hands. Finally, 
the fourth, and most relevant meaning for the present discussion, relates to 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s 1948 play by that title. 
The plot of Dirty Hands centers on a political assassination. It is set in 
a fictional eastern European country between 1943 and 1945. A young 
Communist, Hugo Barine, is told that Hoederer, a party leader, has proposed 
talks with the other non-Socialist groups, including the fascist government 
and the liberal and nationalist-led resistance. The idea is to set up a joint resis-
tance group opposing the Germans, and a postwar coalition government. 
Hugo feels that Hoederer’s policy smacks of treachery. Louis, another party 
leader, has decided that Hoederer must die. He grudgingly agrees to let Hugo, 
who has more commitment than experience, do the job. In the end, Hugo 
does assassinate Hoederer, but neither the character Hugo nor the audience 
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can be certain whether Hugo acted mainly from adherence to party discipline 
or jealousy over his wife, or possibly an inextricable mixture of motives. In 
any case, the play raises moral and political issues for rebellion.
First, rebels cannot, and many would say, should not, excise personal emo-
tions from their rebellion. After all, a central goal of rebellion is humanism. 
Second, there is the question of whether a rebel can afford personal moral 
purity when exigencies of political conflict require submersion of individual 
interests in favor of the common good. In such circumstances, innocence 
remains unattainable, despite protestations to the contrary. Pleading with 
Hugo not to go through with the assassination, Jessica his wife says
I don’t want to choose: I don’t want you to get yourself killed and I don’t 
want you to kill him. . . . I don’t understand this whole business and I wash 
my hands of it. I am neither an oppressor nor a class traitor nor a revolu-
tionary. I’ve done nothing. I am innocent of everything. 
(Sartre 1949:215)
Of course, Jessica’s innocence cannot be. There can be and in fact are no 
bystanders in the kind of fundamental struggle taking place in the setting 
of the play. Having discovered Hugo’s assignment to kill him, Hoederer 
says to him 
How you cling to your purity young man! How afraid you are to soil your 
hands! All right, stay pure! . . . Well, I have dirty hands. Right up to the 
elbows. I’ve plunged them in filth and blood. . . . If you don’t love men, you 
can’t fight for them (223–225). 
Robespierre and Saint Just faced the same dilemma. For the love of the 
people, they had to murder. Another twist to the dirty hands conundrum 
pervades Stalinism, particularly the Stalinist terror and purges, especially 
when it came to the purge of the party leaders. Stalin and his Central 
Committee supporters accused Bolshevik leaders like Nikolai Bukharin 
(1888–1938) of objective guilt. For Bukharin that meant that, as a major 
Marxist theoretician as well as a functionary in the Soviet government, he 
had to support the revolution, never deviating from the party line, and 
always adhering to Lenin’s doctrine of democratic centralism. The Lenin 
doctrine meant that party leaders could dispute and disagree within their 
own ranks, in effect, in closed meetings. To the people, however, they must 
present a united front. Stalin jettisoned the democratic part of Lenin’s 
doctrine so that by 1938, the year of Bukharin’s purge trial, the only line 
possible was Stalin’s, whether within the closed circles of party leader-
ship or outside it. Furthermore, deviation was not permitted. The rule 
applied to genuine disagreement, or even to positions taken which might 
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 miscalculate exactly what party line prevailed, or even more insidiously, 
would prevail. “[I]n the Stalinist universe there are ultimately no dupes, 
and everyone knows the ‘objective meaning’ of their acts, disagreement 
with the party line can only be the result of direct hypocrisy and deceit” 
(Žižek 2008a:235). This is consequentialism taken to its extreme. That 
is, people are always completely responsible for the consequences of 
their acts, even if they cannot foresee those consequences. Outside of the 
Stalinist Soviet Union of the 1930s, which Žižek aptly compares to Kafka’s 
The Trial (1914), the concepts of objective guilt and dirty hands bear on 
the role of rebels.
Failing to act—Jessica’s defense in Dirty Hands—does not absolve any-
one, because as Trotsky observed, those who stand apart from the revolu-
tion, act against it. “[I]n a time of revolution standing on the wall involves 
great danger. . . . The priests of ‘conciliatory justice’ are usually found sitting 
inside the four walls waiting to see which side will win” (Trotsky 1930:xiii). 
Karl Jaspers offered a broader, and perhaps more poignant, assessment of 
objective guilt in reviewing the burden all Germans bore for Nazism. In 
his series of lectures, published as The Question of German Guilt (1948). 
He listed four categories of guilt: criminal guilt (the commitment of overt 
acts), political guilt (the degree of political acquiescence in the Nazi regime), 
moral guilt (a matter of private judgment among ones friends), and meta-
physical guilt (a universally shared responsibility of those who chose to 
remain alive rather than die in protest against Nazi atrocities). Minus the 
adherence to a party line, Jaspers rendered a more stringent standard than 
that of Stalin. What alternatives do rebels have if they want to avoid objec-
tive guilt for the evils of the current system, but still minimize those acts, 
such as murder, that carry their own, intrinsic burden of guilt?
The answer lies in correct analysis, lucid consciousness, and measured 
strategy. Outside of those jihadis who must fight against U.S., British, 
and allied occupation of their countries, rebels in the metropole need 
not resort to armed struggle. In fact, armed struggle within the United 
States is merely suicidal, and more importantly, ineffective. It is with 
that recognition that the models of the IWW, Venezuela, and some other 
rebel attempts are most useful. The Wobbly strategy of general strike and 
sabotage was nonviolent. The Bolivarian Revolution remains largely non-
violent. Strategies that recommend themselves are those of the Yes Men, 
universities in exile, and others discussed below.
Rebel Movements: Class, Gender, and Race
The failed world revolution of 1968, as Wallerstein would have it, did not 
fail because of inherent defects in the rebellious movements, although 
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they had plenty of them. Primarily, the ruling world capitalist class used 
the apparatuses of their respective states to crush them by force. Of 
course, this included the rulers in the Soviet Union, the nomenklatura, 
who headed the bureaucratic state capitalism long disguised as socialisme 
real. Nonetheless, police and military force only blunted the immediate 
uprisings of that year. The police in Chicago at the Democratic National 
Convention, the Soviet tanks on the streets of Prague, the army in Mexico 
City, and the others acted as the shock troops to thwart the rebellions for a 
moment. Similarly, the elites used force to block the revolts following the 
end of the First World War. In Germany, what was to become the Weimar 
regime with its Social Democratic leadership turned to the army, impor-
tantly abetted by the veteran paramilitary organizations like the Stahlhelm. 
In the United States, the Palmer raids virtually stamped out the IWW and 
other potentially revolutionary socialist organizations.
Dousing the immediate conflagrations of revolt would not have suf-
ficed if not followed by more fundamental and far-reaching strategies of 
repression. The history of those strategies in Germany and the United 
States led to rather different outcomes, and so too the long-term strategies 
of the ruling class varied in their effects in different countries after the ini-
tial failure of world revolution of 1968. Especially in the United States and 
Britain, one of the more successful strategies created divisions among the 
rebellious movements. The strategy eventuated in what became known as 
identity politics that appeared in the aftermath of the rebellion. It became 
manifest in the mid-1970s. Movements for racial equality, feminism, gay 
rights, and so on had once acted largely cooperatively if not in unison. The 
ruling class used all its abilities to deconstruct the cooperation at every 
level of society and culture from the ivory towers of academe to the more 
mundane, meretricious tools of market hucksterism. Once divisiveness 
had been sown, the politics of fear replaced it. 
Today’s predominant mode of politics is post-political bio-politics—an 
awesome example of theoretical jargon which, however, can be easily 
unpacked: “post-political” is a politics which claims to leave behind old 
ideological struggles and instead focus on expert management and adminis-
tration, while “bio-politics” designates the regulation of security and welfare 
of human lives as its primary goal. . . . The only way to introduce passion 
into this field . . . is through fear, a basic constituent of today’s subjectivity. 
For this reason, bio-politics is ultimately a politics of fear. . . . This is what 
separates a radical emancipatory politics from our political status quo. 
(Žižek 2008b:40)
The ever-ready tools of divisiveness served the ruling class as racial poli-
tics competed with gender politics, which in turn competed with politics 
9780230103498_11_cha10.indd   191 3/31/2010   5:57:54 PM
192  SOCIAL THEORY OF FEAR
of sexuality, and so on. Class, always a hushed up subject in the United 
States, lurked beneath all of them, but the identity movements’ leader-
ships collaborated with the national and global elite to deny it. “Political 
correctness is the exemplary liberal form of the politics of fear [which] 
always relies on the manipulation of a paranoid ochlos or multitude: it 
is the frightening rally of frightened people” (41). One of the main tasks 
for today’s rebel, therefore, depends on dampening the fear by undoing 
divisiveness. Since principal fissures in U.S. society are and perennially 
have been class, gender, and race, rebellious movements focusing on each 
must see ways to kit them together so as to work toward emancipatory 
politics.
Racial Politics
Commenting on the riots of 2005 in the Paris banlieues, Slavoj Žižek 
called them a case of phatic communication. Finding parallels with 
1968, he said. “if May ‘68 was a revolt with a utopian vision, the 2005 
revolt was just an outburst with no pretence to vision. . . . There were no 
particular demands made by the protesters. . . . There was only an insis-
tence on recognition based on a vague, unarticulated ressentiment” (Žižek 
2008b:774–775). Perhaps they were not so parallel with 1968, but instead 
with the urban riots in many U.S. cities during the late 1960s. True, those 
“civil disturbances” as the Kerner Commission called them (National 
Advisory Commission 1968) also insisted on recognition and expressed 
ressentiment, but they had, just as for those of the banlieues, deep his-
torical roots coupled with contemporary injuries, and immediate sparks. 
Not insignificantly, the spark of the 2005 riots was the same as those that 
the Kerner Commission identified for riots of the 1960s: police brutality, 
abuse, and insensitivity to the people, coherent with a persistent racism. 
One of the most important parallels resides in an insight offered by Gerald 
Horne (1995) about the Watts uprising of 1965. He attributed much of 
the middle-range cause of the explosion to the fact that Black residents 
of Los Angeles had been systematically deprived of channels and levers 
of political redress for the preceding several decades. In the midst of such 
“outbursts without vision,” per Žižek, a movement and organization took 
shape that addressed both the triggering spark of the riots and its middle-
range causes—the Black Panther Party.
Originally the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense combined the poli-
tics of racial liberation and equality with an incisive political-economic 
ideology and class analysis. Bobby Seale and Huey P. Newton founded the 
organization in fall 1966 and set forth a doctrine calling for the  protection 
of Black neighborhoods from police brutality and injustice for Black 
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Americans. The Panthers also extended the call for racial justice to all the 
colonized peoples of the world. Seale said they self-consciously directed 
their organizing toward “lumpen proletarian Afro-Americans [in] put-
ting together the ideology of the Black Panther Party” (Seale 1970:ix). He 
went on to say that by doing so, they contradicted the Marxian dictum 
that the lumpen proletariat was not revolutionary and often served as the 
shock troops of reaction. Despite that contradiction, Panthers’ ideology 
and analyses were broadly Marxist to which they added the important 
influence of Frantz Fanon (1952, 1961). The police crushed the orga-
nization by force (Churchill and Vander Wall 1990 a, b), but while they 
persisted they succeeded in mobilizing Black people throughout the 
United States and built coalitions and connections with other rebellious 
organizations and movements such as the Weatherman faction and the 
Brown Berets, a Latino group. Moreover, within the organization and 
through their organizing and propaganda, they did not fail to recognize 
the importance of overcoming gender inequality and other injustices 
(Brown 1992; Hilliard and Cole 1993). Their Ten Point Program, a sort 
of party platform, remains enlightening and instructive. A synopsis 
follows. 
 1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our 
Black community.
 2. We want full employment for our people.
 3. We want an end to the robbery by the white man of our Black com-
munity.
 4. We want decent housing, fit shelter of human beings.
 5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of 
this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us 
our true history and our role in present-day society.
 6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.
 7. We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER 
of black people.
 8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county, and 
city jails.
 9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried by a jury 
of their peer group or people from their black communities, as 
defined by the Constitution of the United States.
 10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and 
peace. (Foner 1970:2–3). 
The Panthers Ten Point Program bears a striking resemblance to another 
program from 1944. 
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 1. The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops 
or farms or mines of the nation;
 2. The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and 
recreation;
 3. The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return 
which will give him and his family a decent living;
 4. The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an 
atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and domination 
by monopolies at home or abroad;
 5. The right of every family to a decent home;
 6. The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve 
and enjoy good health;
 7. The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, 
sickness, accident, and unemployment;
 8. The right to a good education. (Roosevelt 1944) 
The latter comes from Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s State of the Union 
address, January 11, 1944. The resemblance testifies to how regressive and 
reactionary American politics has become. The FBI placed the Panthers 
on the Ten Most Wanted List, and carried out their campaign of violent 
repression against them. Today, even when identified as coming from FDR, 
his “economic Bill of Rights,” as he called it, more often than not gets the 
sobriquet of dangerously socialist. Side-by-side, the Panthers’ program 
and the FDR Economic Bill of Rights spell out minimal conditions for 
security to work toward human happiness and well being, as Roosevelt 
put it. Also, they are minimum requirements for basic democracy and 
the beginning of real, emancipatory politics. Even so, history since 1944 
and especially since the failed world revolution of 1968 and the revanchist 
reaction that ensued makes clear that the only way to work toward those 
goals remain, as always, rebellion.
Feminism and Gender Politics
Feminism as a rebel movement held great promise as it emerged in the 
1970s. It threatened a patriarchy structurally imbricated with racial and 
class oppression. Different versions of feminism emphasized different 
approaches: the political, the economic, racism, heterosexism, and so 
on. The ruling class’ counterattack was especially effective against it. The 
problem centered on the movement’s leadership and their goals. The 
National Women’s Studies Association (NWSA) conference of 1990 in 
Akron, Ohio, shows these effects dramatically. The NWSA is, as the name 
implies, an outgrowth of the scholarly and academic community. The 
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leadership of the organization and conference fell to college and university 
faculty, mostly women, but not exclusively so. Faculty in women’s studies 
or most other disciplines are mostly White. They are middle class, not so 
much because of their backgrounds, but because of the position faculty 
hold in academia—they are professionals and middle management. They 
run the organization and they ran the show at the 1990 Akron annual 
conference. The conference split along lines of class, race, and sexuality. 
The Lesbian Caucus, the Poor and Working-Class Caucus, the Women of 
Color Caucus, and women’s studies staff split and withdrew. The confer-
ence ended prematurely, and no annual conference convened the following 
year. By the twenty-first century, those splits were not sutured (Helmbold 
2002; Koyama 2000; Van Dyke 2002). An anonymous memorandum 
from a group of students and staff to the women’s studies faculty at the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee pithily articulated the problem. Some 
of the eight points follow:
2. We see you as walking contradictions. You oppose the so-called “White-
Boys Network” on this campus, yet you engage in the same secrecy, back-
stabbing, coverup of information, and “protection of your own.” You in 
effect perpetuate the same administration and system of oppression that 
you supposedly try to eliminate.
3. We feel that as women, and as faculty, you have disengaged . . . your 
main concerns are those of salary, daycare, and “scholarship.” . . . We feel 
these may be important issues, but only to those in your class.
4. We want to know . . is it fear?
7. Have you forgotten already what it is like to be oppressed? Have you 
ever been oppressed by other feminists before? We’re finding we have. 
(Anonymous 1992)
bell hooks summarized the elite’s strategy. “Supporting what in effect 
became white power reformist feminism enabled the mainstream white 
male patriarchy to bolster its power while simultaneously undermin-
ing the radical politics of feminism” (hooks 2000:104). Class and race 
crosscut feminism, but so do gender and sexuality. Judith Butler inter-
rogated gender and identity in Gender Trouble (1990). She questioned 
whether rebellious politics requires unity and rejected it. “Certain forms of 
acknowledged fragmentation might facilitate coalitional action precisely 
because the ‘unity’ of the category of women is neither presupposed nor 
desired” (15). Political action from a feminist standpoint need not imply 
identity politics. “The deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruc-
tion of politics; rather, it establishes as political the very terms through 
which identity is articulated” (148). Feminism can contribute to rebellious 
politics, because its perspective particularly suits questioning prevailing 
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categories,  assumptions, and reifications. Not just an intellectual strategy, 
effective questioning always involves material action, refusals to go along 
with expectations, and rejection of status norms in everyday, ordinary 
life.
Promising Strategies for Rebellion
The Yes Men use imposture, satire, and parody to subvert elite structures, 
organizations, and interests. They rely heavily on iconic representation, 
electronic media, along with lawful and nonviolent confrontation. They 
deliberately confound identity, and identity politics. On the face of the web 
page at www.theyesmen.org, they describe themselves as “[i]mpersonating 
big-time criminals in order to publicly humiliate them. Targets are leaders 
and big corporations who put profits ahead of everything else.” 
October 20, 2009, the Yes Men staged an official appearing event at the 
National Press Club in Washington D.C.; one of the Yes Men announced 
that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce had reversed its stance and decided 
to support current climate change legislation before Congress. A genuine 
representative of the Chamber confronted the Yes Men representative, who 
in turn promptly accused him of being an imposter (Vallis 2009).
A month earlier, on September 21, 2009—one day before a UN summit 
lead-up to the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2009—over 
2000 volunteers distributed throughout New York City a 32-page “special 
edition” New York Post, with the cover story “We’re Screwed” saying that 
the city could face deadly heat waves, extreme flooding, and other lethal 
effects of global warming within the next few decades. Other articles 
describe the Pentagon’s alarmed response to global warming, the U.S. 
government’s minuscule response, China’s advanced alternative energy 
program, and how the Copenhagen climate talks could be a “Flopenhagen.” 
There is also a fake Web site, http://nypost-se.com. On September 22, 2009, 
the Yes Men demonstrated an inflatable, ball-shaped costume claiming it 
was a self-contained living system for surviving disasters caused by global 
warming. Over two-dozen people wore the SurvivaBall costumes as it was 
demonstrated in the East River. Police shut down the demonstration for 
lack of a permit. Cofounder of the Yes Men, Andy Bichlbaum, was arrested 
on an outstanding parking ticket charge and a handful of other Yes Men 
were served with summons and tickets for disorderly behavior and creat-
ing hazardous conditions. The Yes Men began their campaign in 1999 by 
hosting a Web page. The Yes Men’s first prank was the satirical Web site 
www.gwbush.com, established for the 2000 presidential election to draw 
attention to alleged hypocrisies on Bush’s actual Web site. For the 2004 
presidential campaign, they went on tour posing as the group “Yes, Bush 
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Can!” and encouraged supporters to sign a “Patriot Pledge” agreeing to 
keep nuclear waste in their backyard and send their children off to war.
Possibly their most effective direct action was on December 3, 2004, the 
twentieth anniversary of the Bhopal disaster, Andy Bichlbaum appeared 
on BBC World as “Jude Finisterra,” a Dow Chemical spokesman. Dow 
is the owner of Union Carbide, the company responsible for the chemi-
cal disaster that killed thousands and left over 120,000 requiring lifelong 
care. On their fake Dow Chemical Web site, the Yes Men said that Dow 
Chemical Company had no intention whatsoever of repairing the damage. 
The Yes Men decided to pressure Dow further, so as “Finisterra” went on 
the news to claim that Dow planned to liquidate Union Carbide and use the 
resulting twelve billion dollars to pay for medical care, clean up the site, 
and fund research into the hazards of other Dow products. After two hours 
of wide coverage, Dow issued a press release denying the statement, ensur-
ing even greater coverage of the phony news of a cleanup. By the time the 
original story was discredited, Dow’s stock had declined in value by two 
billion dollars.
Other rebellious strategies include the establishment of universities 
in exile where scholars from the centers of world capitalism can carry on 
their research, writing, and teaching without censorship, censure, or inter-
ference from elite interest and authorities. Loosely modeled on the haven 
provided to Frankfurt School scholars fleeing from the Nazi regime, even-
tually established at the New School in New York, such institutes could 
locate in welcoming countries to carry on centers of rebellion against 
hegemonic tyrannies. Jennifer Peshut (2008) who came up with the idea is 
trying to establish such an institution in Venezuela. From them, scholars 
like Ward Churchill and Norman Finkelstein, both of whom their uni-
versities ousted for their rebellious political views, could find a base and 
simultaneously augment the culture of their host country.
Finally, more a tactic than a strategy, could subvert the campaign by 
metropoles against immigrants from the periphery of world capitalism. 
Rebels could advertise that illegal immigrants are welcome in their homes 
and businesses.
Most important for rebels in the twenty-first strategy is not any par-
ticular strategy, movement or organization, but continual challenge. 
Imagination, skill, and effective efforts flow from lucid consciousness and 
correct analysis. Rebellion need not require life-and-death dedication, 
but it does require intelligent application. To rebel humanizes everyone. 
I rebel, therefore we are!
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